Tag Archives: quantum

Universitas Magistrorum et Scholarium

I have arrived back in Waterloo to start my new hybrid University/Perimeter Institute position.  It’s been quite a long break from posting, because – strangely enough – having two affiliations means I had to do twice the amount of paperwork to get myself set-up this time.  As much as I loved being at PI, it is nice to be back in a university and to have some small role in educating the next generation of quantum mechanics.

Over the break, Andrew Thomas has left a few comments about the role of decoherence in interpretations of quantum theory in my Professional Jealousy post.  There are some who think that understanding decoherence alone is enough to “solve” the conceptual difficulties with quantum theory.  This is quite a popular opinion in some quarters of the physics community, where one often finds people mumbling something about decoherence when asked about the measurement problem.  However, there are also many deep thinkers on foundations who have denied that decoherence completely solves the problems, and I tend to agree with them, so we’ll have a post on “What can decoherence do for us?” later on this week.

To clarify, I’m not going to argue that decoherence isn’t an important and real physical effect, nor am I going to say that it has no role at all in foundational studies, so please hold your fire until after the next post if you were thinking of commenting to that effect.

Happy Holidays!

As I don’t expect to be able to blog again before the Xmas break, I’d like to wish all readers of QQ a happy whateveryou’recelebrating.

The holidays are one of those times of year when relatives get the opportunity to ask you, “So, what exactly is it that you do research on?”. This dreaded question will come with certainty, regardless of how many times you have previously explained it to them. It’s not their fault because the average person does not have physics on their mind for any significant amount of time, so it’s easy to forget what it’s all about.

The question is especially bad if you spend any time thinking about the foundations of quantum theory, because it’s difficult to describe quantum theory accurately in a few words. Here’s my best shot at an answer at the moment.

Miscellaneous Relative: So, what is this quantum theory thing all about then?

Me: Well, it’s not exactly about the fact that particles sometimes behave like waves and waves like particles.

MR: Go on.

Me: There is this thing called the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, but strictly speaking it doesn’t say that a measurement of position necessarily disturbs the momentum and vice-versa.

MR: OK.

Me: And it’s definitely not that there are multiple universes.

MR: That’s a shame. I enjoy science fiction, so that was the bit I liked the most.

Me: There are these things called wavefunctions, which can be in superpositions, but it’s not entirely clear what the true significance of that is.

MR: I’m not getting much insight into what you actually do from this by the way.

Me: It seems that John Bell proved that locality and realism are incompatible, but people are still debating the significance of that, so it’s definitely not the whole story either.

MR: Now I really have no clue what you are talking about.

Me: It’s not just about “finding the right language” with which to talk about physics. In particular, I don’t think that revising logic is really the right thing to do.

MR: That sounds sensible enough.

Me: Some people think the whole thing is just about doing something called “solving the measurement problem”, but I don’t think that’s an entirely helpful way of looking at things.

MR: So just what IS the whole thing about then?

Me: That’s the whole question. Welcome to my research programme.

Steane Roller

Earlier, I promised some discussion of Andrew Steane‘s new paper: Context, spactime loops, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Whilst it is impossible to summarize everything in the paper, I can give a short description of what I think are the most important points.

  • Firstly, he does believe that the whole universe obeys the laws of quantum mechanics, which are not required to be generalized.
  • Secondly, he does not think that Everett/Many-Worlds is a good way to go because it doesn’t give a well-defined rule for when we see one particular outcome of a measurement in one particular basis.
  • He believes that collapse is a real phenomenon and so the problem is to come up with a rule for assigning a basis in which the wavefunction collapses, as well as, roughly speaking, a spacetime location at which it occurs.
  • For now, he describes collapse as an unanalysed fundamenally stochastic process that achieves this, but he recognizes that it might be useful to come up with a more detailed mechanism by which this occurs.

Steane’s problem therefore reduces to picking a basis and a spacetime location. For the former, he uses the standard ideas from decoherence theory, i.e. the basis in which collapse occurs is the basis in which the reduced state of the system is diagonal. However, the location of collapse is what is really interesting about the proposal, and makes it more interesting and more bizzare than most of the proposals I have seen so far.

Firstly, note that the process of collapse destroys the phase information between the system and the environment. Therefore, if the environmental degrees of freedom could ever be gathered together and re-interacted with the system, then QM would predict interference effects that would not be present if a genuine collapse had occurred. Since Steane believes in the universal validity of QM, he has to come up with a way of having a genuine collapse without getting into a contradiction with this possibility.

His first innovation is to assert that the collapse need not be associated to an exactly precise location in spacetime. Instead, it can be a function of what is going on in a larger region of spacetime. Presumably, for events that we would normally regard as “classical” this region is supposed to be rather small, but for coherent evolutions it could be quite large.

The rule is easiest to state for special cases, so for now we will assume that we are talking about particles with a discrete quantum degree of freedom, e.g. spin, but that the position and momentum can be treated classically. Now, suppose we have 3 qubits and that they are in the state |000> + e^i phi |111>. The state of the first two qubits is a density operator, diagonal in the basis {|00>, |11>}, with a probability 1/2 for each of the two states. The phase e^i phi will only ever be detectable if the third qubit re-interacts with the first two. Whether or not this can happen is determined by the relative locations of the qubits, since the interaction Hamiltonias in nature are local. Since we are treating position and momentum classically at the moment, there is a matter of fact about whether this will occur and Steane’s rule is simple: if the qubits re-interact in the future then there is no collapse, but if they don’t then the then the first two qubits have collapsed into the state |00> or the state |11> with probability 1/2 for each one.

Things are going to get more complicated if we quantize the position and momentum, or indeed if we move to quantum field theory, since then we don’t have definite particle trajectories to work with. It is not entirely clear to me whether Steane’s proposal can be made to work in the general case, and he does admit that further technical work is needed. However, he still asserts that whether or not a system has collapsed at a given point is spacetime is in principle a function of its entire future, i.e. whether or not it will eventually re-interact with the environment it has decohered with respect to.

At this point, I want to highlight a bizzare physical prediction that can be made if you believe Steane’s point of view. Really, it is metaphysics, since the experiment is not at all practical. For starters, the fact that I experience myself being in a definite state rather than a superposition means that there are environmental degrees of freedom that I have interacted with in the past that have decohered me into a particular basis. We can in principle imagine an omnipotent “Maxwell’s demon” type character, who can collect up every degree of freedom I have ever interacted with, bring it all together and reverse the evolution, eliminating me in the process. Whilst this is impractical, there is nothing in principle to stop it happening if we believe that QM applies to the entire universe. However, according to Steane, the very fact that I have a definite experience means that we can predict with certainty that no such interaction happens in the future. If it did, there would be no basis for my definite experience at the moment.

Contrast this with a many-worlds account a la David Wallace. There, the entire global wavefunction still exists, and the fact that I experience the world in a particular basis is due to the fact that only certain special bases, the ones in which decoherence occurs, are capable of supporting systems complex enough to achieve conciousness. There is nothing in this view to rule out the Maxwell’s demon conclusively, although we may note that he is very unlikely to be generated by a natural process due to the second law of thermodynamics.

Therefore, there is something comforting about Steane’s proposal. If true, my very existence can be used to infer that I will never be wiped out by a Maxwell’s demon. All we need to do to test the theory is to try and wipe out a conscious being by constructing such a demon, which is obviously impractical and also unethical. Needless to say, there is something troubling about drawing such a strong metaphysical conclusion from quantum theory, which is why I still prefer the many-worlds account over Steane’s proposal at the moment. (That’s not to say that I agree with the former either though.)

Against Interpretation

It appears that I haven’t had a good rant on this blog for some time, but I have been stimulated into doing so by some of the discussion following the Quantum Pontiff‘s recent post about Bohmian Mechanics. I don’t want to talk about Bohm theory in particular, but to answer the following general question:

  • Just what is the goal of studying the foundations of quantum mechanics?

Before answering this question, note that its answer depends on whether you are approaching it as a physicist, mathematician, philosopher, or religious crank trying to seek justification for your outlandish worldview. I’m approaching the question as a physicist and to a lesser extent as a mathematician, but philosophers may have legitimate alternative answers. Since the current increase of interest in foundations is primarily amongst physicists and mathematicians, this seems like a natural viewpoint to take.

Let me begin by stating some common answers to the question:

1. To provide an interpretation of quantum theory, consistent with all its possible predictions, but free of the conceptual problems associated with orthodox and Copenhagen interpretations.

2. To discover a successor to quantum theory, consistent with the empirical facts known to date, but making new predictions in untested regimes as well as resolving the conceptual difficulties.

Now, let me give my proposed answer:

  • To provide a clear path for the future development of physics, and possibly to take a few steps along that path.

To me, this statement applies to the study of the foundations of any physical theory, not just quantum mechanics, and the success of the strategy has been born out in practice. For example, consider thermodynamics. The earliest complete statements of the principles of thermodynamics were in terms of heat engines. If you wanted to apply the theory to some physical system, you first had to work out how to think of it as a kind of heat engine before you started. This was often possible, but a rather unnatural thing to do in many cases. The introduction of the concept of entropy eliminated the need to talk about heat engines and allowed the theory to be applied to virtually any macroscopic system. Further, it facilitated the discovery of statistical mechanics. The formulation in terms of entropy is formally mathematically equivalent to the earlier formulations, and thus it might be thought superfluous to requirements, but in hindsight it is abundantly clear that it was the best way of looking at things for the progress of physics.

Let’s accept my answer to the foundational question for now and examine what becomes of the earlier answers. I think it is clear that answer 2 is consistent with my proposal, and is a legitimate task for a physicist to undertake. For those who wish to take that road, I wish you the best of luck. On the other hand, answer 1 is problematic.

Earlier, I wrote a post about criteria that a good interpretation should satisfy. Now I would like to take a step back from that and urge the banishment of the word interpretation entirely. The problem with 1 is that it ring-fences the experimental predictions of quantum theory, so that the foundational debate has no impact on them at all. This is the antithesis of the approach I advocate, since on my view foundational studies are supposed to feed back into improved practice of the theory. I think that the separation of foundations and practice did serve a useful role in the historical development of quantum theory, since rapid progress required focussing attention on practical matters, and the time was not ripe for detailed foundational investigations. For one thing, experiments that probe the weirder aspects of quantum theory were not possible until the last couple of decades. It can also serve a useful role for a subsection of the philosophy community, who may wish to focus on interpretation without having to keep track of modern developments in the physics. However, the view is simply a hangover from an earlier age, and should be abandoned as quickly as possible. It is a debate that can never be resolved, since how can physicists be convinced to adopt one interpretation over another if it makes no difference at all to how they understand the phenomenology of the theory?

On the other hand, if one looks closely it is evident that many “interpretations” that are supposedly of this type are not mere interpretations at all. For example, although Bohmian Mechanics is equivalent to standard quantum theory in its predictions, it immediately suggests a generalization to a “nonequilibrium” hidden variable theory, which would make new predictions not possible within the standard theory. Similar remarks can be made about other interpretations. For example, many-worlds, despite not being a favorite of mine, does suggest that it is perfectly fine to apply standard quantum theory to the entire universe. In Copenhagen this is not possible in any straightforward way, since there is always supposed to be a “classical” world out there at some level, which the state of the quantum system is referred to. In short, the distinction between “the physics” and “the interpretation” often disappears on close inspection, so we are better off abandoning the word “interpretation” and instead viewing the project as providing alternatives frameworks for the future progress of physics.

Finally, the more observant amongst you will have noticed that I did not include “solving the measurement problem” as a possible major goal of quantum foundations, despite its frequent appearance in this context. Deconstructing the measurement problem requires it’s own special rant, so I’m saving it for a future occasion.

New Papers

I don’t normally like to just list new papers without commenting on them, but I don’t have much reading time at the moment so here are two that look interesting.

Firstly, Andrew Steane has a new paper entitled “Context, spacetime loops, and the interpretation of quantum mechanics”, which was written for the Ghirardi festschrift. Steane is best known for his work on quantum error correction, fault tolerance and ion trap quantum computing, which may not engender a lot of confidence in his foundational speculations. However, the abstract looks interesting and the final sentence: “A single universe undergoing non-unitary evolution is a viable interpretation.” would seem to fit with my “Church of the smaller Hilbert space” point of view. Steane has also addressed foundational issues before in his paper “A quantum computer only needs one universe”, and I like the title even if I am not familiar with the contents. Both of these are on my reading list, so expect further comments in the coming weeks.

The second paper is a survey entitled “Philosophical Aspects of Quantum Information Theory” by Chris Timpson. The abstract makes it seem like it would be a good starting point for philosophers interested in the subject. Timpson is one of the most careful analysers of quantum information on the philosophy side of things, so it should be an interesting read.

Quantum Physics at the Crossroads

FOLKLORE:

When I was but a young undergrad student, I read some interesting books about the history and foundations of quantum theory. In those books the Solvay conferences played a major role, particularly the 5th conference in 1927. I was informed that the official part of the proceedings was largely insignificant, and that all the action centred around the debates that took place between Bohr and Einstein, in which Einstein repeatedly tried to undermine the uncertainty principle via a series of thought experiments, but Bohr was always quick to respond with a correct analysis of the experiment that showed uncertainty to be triumphant. This always put in my mind a picture similar to da Vinci’s “Last Supper”, with Bohr playing the role of Jesus, regailaing his many disciples with the moral parable of the day over dinner.

Another piece of folklore concerns the Ph.D. thesis of one Prince Louis de Broglie. This contained the famous de Broglie relation that gives the wavelength of the waves to be associated with matter particles. The story goes that the thesis was on the verge of being rejected, but was saved by Einstein’s recommendation, who was the only person to recognize the deep significance of the relation. As the story is told, it is hardly surprising, because the contents of the rest of the thesis is never explained. One is left to imagine a document that could only have been about 10 pages long, which intrroduces the relation and then explains some of its consequences. That may seem stong enough for a very good Phys. Rev. article, but is hardly enough to warrant a Ph.D.

LIFE:

Since those distant days of my youth, I have attended many a physics conference myself. I now recognise that it is the general rule, almost without exception, that the participants regard the discussions they have outside the talks as being much more important and interesting than anything that was said in the talks themselves. This rule holds regardless of the actual inherent interest of the topics under discussion. In fact, it is quite common to find some of the older participants banging on about some Hamiltonian they wrote down in the 1970s, whereas the young guns are talking about something genuinely new and interesting, the significance of which is not understood by the older guys yet. It is also extremely unlikely to find the entire group of conference participants, however small that group may be, listening in rapt attention to the discussion of just two people over dinner (if only because there are simply some groups of people who don’t get on with each other, and others who are more interested in going to the pub), and it is equally unlikely that that conversation represents the only interesting thing going on at the conference.

Also, it goes without saying really that I don’t know of anyone who got their Ph.D. for a 10 page paper, however great the idea contained therein happens to be.
REALITY:

Currently, I am about half way through reading “Quantum Theory at the Crossroads”, the new book by Bacciagaluppi and Valentini about the 1927 Solvay conference. The second half of the book is an English translation of the proceedings, but equally interesting is the new analysis of the conference discussions from a modern point of view, contained in the first half. Here are some things I found particularly interesting.

– The only witnesses to the famous Bohr-Einstein debates were Heisenberg and Ehrenfest. The usuall account of these debates comes directly from an article written by Bohr many years after the conference took place. Heisenberg roughly confirms the account, also in recollections written many years later. The only account written shortly after the conference is a letter written by Ehrenfest, which seems to confirm that Bohr was triumphant in the debates, but gives no details.

– Bacciagaluppi and Valentini argue that it is highly unlikely that Einstein’s main target was the uncertainty relations. This is because, outside of Bohr’s account of the conference discussions, Einstein hardly mentions the uncertainty relations as a point of concern in any of his correspondence or published works. Instead, they argue, it is likely that he was trying to get at the point that the concept of separability was incompatible with quantum theory, which was later crystallized in the EPR argument. In fact, Einstein gives an argument in this direction also in the published general discsussion at the conference. It seems likely that Bohr missed this point, just as he seemed to miss the point years later in his published response to the EPR argument.

– At the time of the conference, the consolidation of quantum theory was far from complete. Three approaches were discussed in the talks: de Broglie’s pilot wave theory, Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics (with additions by Born). Despite the fact that “equivalence proofs” between wave and matrix mechanics had been published at the time of the conference, they were treated as distinct theories, which could potentially make different predictions. This is because, at the time, Schrödinger did not accept Born’s statistical hypothesis for wave mechanics, which was not yet formulated for arbitrary observables in any case. Also, Heisenberg and Born did not accept the fundamental significance of the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, and still clung to a view of matrix meachanics as describing the transition probabilities for systems always to be thought of as being in definite stationary states. In fact, it seems that the only person at the conference who presented something that we would now regard as being empirically equivalent to modern quantum theory was de Broglie.
– This was not recognized at the conference, partly because de Broglie did not realize that one sometimes has to treat the apparatus as a quantum system in pilot wave theory in order to get equivalence with standard quantum theory. Also, there was as yet desciption of spin within de Broglie’s theory, but on the other hand this same objection could be levelled at wave mechanics. Finally, de Broglie himself regarded the theory as provisional, since it was not relativistic and involved waves in configuration space rather than ordinary 3d space. He placed great significance on ideas for a better theory, which were far from complete at the time of the presentation.

– Schrödinger emphasizes that de Broglie’s work was a major inspiration for his wave equation. In particular, de Broglie’s idea of unifying the variational principles of Newtonian mechanics with those of geometrical optics, was used in the derivation of the equation.

– de Broglie presented his pilot-wave theory for multiparticle systems, not just for single particles as is commonly thought.

In light of this and other arguments, Bacciagaluppi and Valentini argue that the time is ripe for a revision of the usual textbook history of quantum mechanics, and in particular of de Broglie’s contribution . Those who believe that the history of science should be written with the same objective standards that we hope to uphold for science itself, rather than simply being written by the victors, are well-advised to read this book.

The Cambridgeshire Cat

I have left the sunny climbs of Canada for a few months, in favor of the eternally sweltering UK.

In fact, I am visiting the University of Cambridge, which reminds me of the following quote from Stephen Hawking:

“When I hear of Schrödinger’s cat, I reach for my gun.”

Although attributed to him, I wasn’t able to find the source, so if anyone knows it then please let me know.

The quote has 3 possible interpretations (at least that’s less than quantum theory):

  • Prof. Hawking intends to shoot the cat, thus demonstrating that it is dead without a doubt and not in any kind of quantum superposition.
  • Prof. Hawking intends to shoot the bore who is bringing up this hoary old issue once again.
  • Prof. Hawking intends to shoot himself because he is so fed up of hearing about the apocryphal cat.

Whichever meaning is intended, I think I ought to be careful what I talk about in public around here.

Why not von Neumann?

Anyone who read the comments on my last post will know that von Neumann is something of a hero of mine. Here’s a question that sometimes bothers me – why didn’t von Neumann think of quantum computing? Compare his profile with that of Feynman, who did think up quantum computing, and then ask yourself which one of them you would have bet on to come up with the idea.

  • von Neumann: Worked on a variety of different subjects thoughout his career, including interdisciplinary ones. Was well aware of the work by Turing, Church, Post and others that later became the foundation for computer science and of the role of logic in this work. Is credited with the design of the basic architechture of modern computers. Worked on the mathematical and conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and is responsible for the separable Hilbert space formulation of quantum theory that we still use today. Finally, at some point he was convinced that the best way to understand quantum theory was as a probability theory over logical structures (lattices) that generalize some of those from classical logic.
  • Feynmann: Spent most of his career working on mainstream topics in quantum field theory and high energy physics. Only towards the end of his career did his interests significantly diversify to include the theories of computation, quantum gravity and the foundations of quantum theory. Conceived of quantum theory mainly in the “sum over paths” formalism, where one looks at quantum theory as a rule for attaching amplitudes to possible histories as opposed to the probabilities used in classical theories.

None of this is meant as a slight against Feynman – he was certainly brilliant at everything he did scientifically – but it is clear that von Neumann was better positioned to come up with the idea much earlier on. Here are some possible explanations that I can think of:

  • The idea of connecting quantum mechanics to computing just never occurred to von Neumann. They occupied disjoint portions of his brain. Ideas that seem simple in hindsight are really not so obvious, and even the greatest minds miss them all the time.
  • von Neumann did think of something like quantum computing, but it was not obvious that it was interesting, since the science of computational complexity had not been developed yet. Without the distinction between exponential and polynomial time, there is no way to identify the potential advantage that quantum computers might offer over their classical counterparts.
  • The idea of some sort of difference in computing when quantum mechanics is thrown into the mix did occur to von Neumann, but he was unable to come up with a relevant model of computing because he was working with the wrong concepts. As alluded to in a paper of mine, Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic is definitely the wrong logic for thinking about quantum computing because the truth of quantum logic propositions on finite Hilbert spaces may be verified on a classical computer in polynomial time. The basic observation was pointed out to me by Scott Aaronson, but one needs to set up the model quite carefully to make it rigorous. I might write this up at some point, especially if people continue to produce papers that use quantum computing as a motivation for studying concrete BvN quantum logic on Hilbert spaces. Anyway, the point is that if von Neumann thought that replacing classical logic with his notion quantum logic was the way to come up with a model of quantum computing, then he would not have arrived at anything useful.
  • As a mathematician, von Neumann was not able to think of any practical problem to do with quantum mechanics that looks hard to do on a classical computer, but could be done efficiently in the quantum world. As a physicist, Feynman was much better placed to realize that simulating quantum dynamics was a useful thing to do, and that it might require exponential resources on a classical computer.

As a von Neumann fan, I’d like to think that something other than the first explanation is true, but I am prepared to admit that he might have missed something that ought to have been obvious to him. Hopefully, someday a historian of science will take it upon themselves to trawl the von Neumann archives looking for the answer.

Conferences

Here’s what this year’s foundational conference calendar looks like at the moment:

  • November 2-5: PSA 2006, Vancouver, Canada. This is the Biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association and there are a few sessions on quantum theory.
  • November 28 – December 3: QCMC 2006, Tsukuba, Japan.  This is really a quantum information, computation and optics meeting, but there are often a few talks relevant to foundations.
  • March 5-9: APS March Meeting 2007, Denver, Colorado.  The Topical Group in Quantum Information organized special sessions on the foundations of quantum theory last year, so I imagine it won’t be a major focus this time round.  However, I haven’t seen the list of sessions for this year yet, it’s a good opportunity to find out what’s going on in the rest of physics, and at least there will be some quantum information.
  • March 26-28: Quantum Interaction, Stanford, USA.  This is a bit of an oddball meeting aimed at applying ideas from QM to Artificial Intelligence.
  • March 29-31: 15th UK and European Meeting on the Foundations of Physics, Leeds, UK.  With a special session on quantum information.
  • April: Operational Probabilistic Theories as Foils to Quantum Theory, Cambridge, UK.  This one is an invitation only 2-week event, so please don’t write to the organizers asking to come or they will get very annoyed with me.
  • June 11-16: Quantum Theory: reconsideration of foundations-4: The 80 years of the Copenhagen Interpretation, Vaxjo, Sweden.  This will be the last in this conference series.  Apparently, you can only reconsider the foundations so many times.  No info on the website yet, but it will probably appear soon.
  • I haven’t seen any official announcements yet, but apparently there will be TWO meetings in celebration of 50 years since the publication of Everett’s paper on the relative state interpretation of QM, better known as many-worlds, one at Perimeter Institute and one at Oxford University.

If anyone knows of any other relevant meetings then please let me know and I’ll post an update.

Quantum foundations before WWII

The Shtetl Optimizer informs me that there has not been enough contemplation of Quantum Quandaries for his taste recently. Since there has not been a lot of interesting foundational news, the only sensible thing to do is to employ the usual blogger’s trick of cut, paste, link and plagiarize other blogs for ideas.

Scott recently posted a list of papers on quantum computation that a computer science student should read in order to prepare themselves for research in quantum complexity. Now, so far, nobody has asked me for a list of essential readings in the Foundations of Quantum Theory, which is incredibly surprising given the vast numbers of eager grad students who are entering the subject these days. In a way, I am quite glad about this, since there is no equivalent of “Mike and Ike” to point them towards. We are still waiting for a balanced textbook that gives each interpretation a fair hearing to appear. For now, we are stuck trawling the voluminous literature that has appeared on the subject since QM cohered into its present form in the 1920’s. Still, it might be useful to compile a list of essential readings that any foundational researcher worth their salt should have read.

Since this list is bound to be several pages long, today we will stick to those papers written before the outbreak of WWII, when physicists switched from debating foundational questions to the more nefarious applications of their subject. This is not enough to get you up to the cutting edge of modern research, so more specialized lists on particular topics will be compiled when I get around to it. I have tried to focus on texts that are still relevant to the debates going on today, so many papers that were important in their time but fairly uncontroversial today, such as Born’s introduction of the probability rule, have been omitted. Still, it is likely that I have missed something important, so feel free to add your favourites in the comments with the proviso that it must have been published before WWII.

  • P.A.M. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford University Press (1930).
  • J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press (1955). This is the first English translation, but I believe the original German version was published prior to WWII.
  • W. Heisenberg, Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik, Zeitschrift für Physik, 43, 172-198 (1927). The original uncertainty principle paper.
  • A. Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? Phys. Rev. 47, 777 (1935).
  • N. Bohr, Can quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?, Phys. Rev. 48, 696 (1935).
  • N. Bohr, The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr (vols. I and II), Oxbow Press (1987). It is a brave soul who can take this much Bohrdom in one sitting. All papers in vol. I and about half of vol. II were written prior to WWII. There is also a vol. III, but that contains post 1958 papers.
  • E. Schrödinger, Discussion of probability relations between separated systems, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. 31, 555-562 (1935).
  • E. Schrödinger, Die Gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik, Die Naturwissenschaften. 23, 807-812; 824-828; 844-849 (1935). Translated here.
  • Birkhoff, G., and von Neumann, J., The Logic of Quantum Mechanics, Annals of Mathematics 37, 823-843 (1936).

Many of the important papers are translated and reproduced in:

  • J. A. Wheeler and W.H. Zurek (eds.), Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton University Press (1983).

Somewhat bizzarely it is out of print, but you should find a copy in your local university library.

I am also informed that Anthony Valentini and Guido Bacciagaluppi have recently finished translating the proceedings of the 5th Solvay conference (1927), which is famous for the Bohr-Einstein debates, and produced one of the most well-known photos in physics. It should be worth a read when it comes out. A short video showing many of the major players at the 1927 Solvay conference is available here.

Update: A draft of the Valentini & Bacciagaluppi book has just appeared here.