Tag Archives: APS

Quantum Foundations at the APS March Meeting

The March Meeting of the American Physical Society is taking place March 5-9 2017 in Los Angeles. There will be sessions on Quantum Foundations, Quantum Resource Theories, and Quantum Thermodynamics. You can submit an abstract for a contributed talk at http://www.aps.org/meetings/march/. The deadline is November 3 at 11:59pm EST.

The APS March Meeting is a great opportunity to advertise recent work in quantum foundations to the wider physics community. I hope you will consider contributing a talk so that we can showcase our research in the strongest possible way.

Quantum Times Book Reviews

Following Tuesday’s post, here is the second piece I wrote for the latest issue of the Quantum Times. It is a review of two recent popular science books on quantum computing by John Gribbin and Jonathan Dowling. Jonathan Dowling has the now obligatory book author’s blog, which you should also check out.

Book Review

  • Title: Computing With Quantum Cats: From Colossus To Qubits
  • Author: John Gribbin
  • Publisher: Bantam, 2013
  • Title: Schrödinger’s Killer App: Race To Build The World’s First Quantum Computer
  • Author: Jonathan Dowling
  • Publisher: CRC Press, 2013

The task of writing a popular book on quantum computing is a daunting
one. In order to get it right, you need to explain the subtleties of
theoretical computer science, at least to the point of understanding
what makes some problems hard and some easy to tackle on a classical
computer. You then need to explain the subtle distinctions between
classical and quantum physics. Both of these topics could, and indeed
have, filled entire popular books on their own. Gribbin’s strategy is
to divide his book into three sections of roughly equal length, one on
the history of classical computing, one on quantum theory, and one on
quantum computing. The advantage of this is that it makes the book
well paced, as the reader is not introduced to too many new ideas at
the same time. The disadvantage is that there is relatively little
space dedicated to the main topic of the book.

In order to weave the book together into a narrative, Gribbin
dedicates each chapter except the last to an individual prominent
scientist, specifically: Turing, von Neumann, Feynman, Bell and
Deutsch. This works well as it allows him to interleave the science
with biography, making the book more accessible. The first two
sections on classical computing and quantum theory display Gribbin’s
usual adeptness at popular writing. In the quantum section, my usual
pet peeves about things being described as “in two states at the same
time” and undue prominence being given to the many-worlds
interpretation apply, but no more than to any other popular treatment
of quantum theory. The explanations are otherwise very good. I
would, however, quibble with some of the choice of material for the
classical computing section. It seems to me that the story of how we
got from abstract Turing machines to modern day classical computers,
which is the main topic of the von Neumann chapter, is tangential to
the main topic of the book, and Gribbin fails to discuss more relevant
topics such as the circuit model and computational complexity in this
section. Instead these topics are squeezed in very briefly into the
quantum computing section, and Gribbin flubs the description of
computational complexity. For example, see if you can spot the
problems with the following three quotes:

“…problems that can be solved by efficient algorithms belong to a
category that mathematicians call `complexity class P’…”

“Another class of problem, known as NP, are very difficult to
solve…”

“All problems in P are, of course, also in NP.”

The last chapter of Gribbin’s book is an tour of the proposed
experimental implementations of quantum computing and the success
achieved so far. This chapter tries to cover too much material too
quickly and is rather credulous about the prospects of each
technology. Gribbin also persists with the device of including potted
biographies of the main scientists involved. The total effect is like
running at high speed through an unfamiliar woods, while someone slaps
you in the face rapidly with CVs and scientific papers. I think the
inclusion of such a detailed chapter was a mistake, especially since
it will seem badly out of date in just a year or two. Finally,
Gribbin includes an epilogue about the controversial issue of discord
in non-universal models of quantum computing. This is a bold
inclusion, which will either seem prescient or silly after the debate
has died down. My own preference would have been to focus on
well-established theory.

In summary, Gribbin’s has written a good popular book on quantum
computing, perhaps the best so far, but it is not yet a great one. It
is not quite the book you should give to your grandmother to explain
what you do. I fear she will unjustly come out of it thinking she is
not smart enough to understand, whereas in fact the failure is one of
unclear explanation in a few areas on the author’s part.

Dowling’s book is a different kettle of fish from Gribbin’s. He
claims to be aiming for the same audience of scientifically curious
lay readers, but I am afraid they will struggle. Dowling covers more
or less everything he is interested in and I think the rapid fire
topic changes would leave the lay reader confused. However, we all
know that popular science books written by physicists are really meant
to be read by other physicists rather than by the lay reader. From
this perspective, there is much valuable material in Dowling’s book.

Dowling is really on form when he is discussing his personal
experience. This mainly occurs in chapters 4 and 5, which are about
the experimental implementation of quantum computing and other quantum
technologies. There is also a lot of material about the internal
machinations of military and intelligence funding agencies, which
Dowling has copious experience of on both sides of the fence. Much of
this material is amusing and will be of value to those interested in
applying for such funding. As you might expect, Dowling’s assessment
of the prospects of the various proposed technologies is much more
accurate and conservative than Gribbin’s. In particular his treatment
of the cautionary tale of NMR quantum computing is masterful and his
assessment of non fully universal quantum computers, such as the D-Wave
One, is insightful. Dowling also gives an excellent account of quantum
technologies beyond quantum computing and cryptography, such as
quantum metrology, which are often neglected in popular treatments.

Chapter 6 is also interesting, although it is a bit of a hodge-podge
of different topics. It starts with a debunking of David Kaiser’s
thesis that the “hippies” of the Fundamental Fysiks group in Berkeley
were instrumental in the development of quantum information via their
involvement in the no-cloning theorem. Dowling rightly points out
that the origins of quantum cryptography are independent of this,
going back to Wiesner in the 1970’s, and that the no-cloning theorem
would probably have been discovered as a result of this. This section
is only missing a discussion of the role of Wheeler, since he was
really the person who made it OK for mainstream physicists to think
about the foundations of quantum theory again, and who encouraged his
students and postdocs to do so in information theoretic terms. Later
in the chapter, Dowling moves into extremely speculative territory,
arguing for “the reality of Hilbert space” and discussing what quantum
artificial intelligence might be like. I disagree with about as much
as I agree with in this section, but it is stimulating and
entertaining nonetheless.

You may notice that I have avoided talking about the first few
chapters of the book so far. Unfortunately, I do not have many
positive things to say about them.

The first couple of chapters cover the EPR experiment, Bell’s theorem,
and entanglement. Here, Dowling employs the all too common device of
psychoanalysing Einstein. As usual in such treatments, there is a
thin caricature of Einstein’s actual views followed by a lot of
comments along the lines of “Einstein wouldn’t have liked this” and
“tough luck Einstein”. I personally hate this sort of narrative with
a passion, particularly since Einstein’s response to quantum theory
was perfectly rational at the time he made it and who knows what he
would have made of Bell’s theorem? Worse than this, Dowling’s
treatment perpetuates the common myth that determinism is one of the
assumptions of both the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem. Of course,
CHSH does not assume this, but even EPR and Bell’s original argument
only use it when it can be derived from the quantum predictions.
Thus, there is not the option of “uncertainty” for evading the
consequences of these theorems, as Dowling maintains throughout the
book.

However, the worst feature of these chapters is the poor choice of
analogy. Dowling insists on using a single analogy to cover
everything, that of an analog clock or wristwatch. This analogy is
quite good for explaining classical common cause correlations,
e.g. Alice and Bob’s watches will always be anti-correlated if they
are located in timezones with a six hour time difference, and for
explaining the use of modular arithmetic in Shor’s algorithm.
However, since Dowling has earlier placed such great emphasis on the
interpretation of the watch readings in terms of actual time, it falls
flat when describing entanglement in which we have to imagine that the
hour hand randomly points to an hour that has nothing to do with time.
I think this is confusing and that a more abstract analogy,
e.g. colored balls in boxes, would have been better.

There are also a few places where Dowling makes flatly incorrect
statements. For example, he says that the OR gate does mod 2 addition
and he says that the state |00> + |01> + |10> + |11> is entangled. I
also found Dowling’s criterion for when something should be called an
ENT gate (his terminology for the CNOT gate) confusing. He says that
something is not an ENT gate unless it outputs an entangled state, but
of course this depends on what the input state is. For example, he
says that NMR quantum computers have no ENT gates, whereas I think
they do have them, but they just cannot produce the pure input states
needed to generate entanglement from them.

The most annoying thing about this book is that it is in dire need of
a good editor. There are many typos and basic fact-checking errors.
For example, John Bell is apparently Scottish and at one point a D-Wave
computer costs a mere $10,000. There is also far too much repetition.
For example, the tale of how funding for classical optical computing
dried up after Conway and Mead instigated VLSI design for silicon
chips, but then the optical technology was reused used to build the
internet, is told in reasonable detail at least three different times.
The first time it is an insightful comment, but by the third it is
like listening to an older relative with a limited stock of stories.
There are also whole sections that are so tangentially related to the
main topic that they should have been omitted, such as the long anti
string-theory rant in chapter six.

Dowling has a cute and geeky sense of humor, which comes through well
most of the time, but on occasion the humor gets in the way of clear
exposition. For example, in a rather silly analogy between Shor’s
algorithm and a fruitcake, the following occurs:

“We dive into the molassified rum extract of the classical core of the
Shor algorithm fruitcake and emerge (all sticky) with a theorem proved
in the 1760s…”

If he were a writing student, Dowling would surely get kicked out of
class for that. Finally, unless your name is David Foster Wallace, it
is not a good idea to put things that are essential to following the
plot in the footnotes. If you are not a quantum scientist then it is
unlikely that you know who Charlie Bennett and Dave Wineland are or
what NIST is, but then the quirky names chosen in the first few
chapters will be utterly confusing. They are explained in the main
text, but only much later. Otherwise, you have to hope that the
reader is not the sort of person who ignores footnotes. Overall,
having a sense of humor is a good thing, but there is such a thing as
being too cute.

Despite these criticisms, I would still recommend Dowling’s book to
physicists and other academics with a professional interest in quantum
technology. I think it is a valuable resource on the history of the
subject. I would steer the genuine lay reader more in the direction
of Gribbin’s book, at least until a better option becomes available.

Quantum Times Article about Surveys on the Foundations of Quantum Theory

A new edition of The Quantum Times (newsletter of the APS topical group on Quantum Information) is out and I have two articles in it. I am posting the first one here today and the second, a book review of two recent books on quantum computing by John Gribbin and Jonathan Dowling, will be posted later in the week. As always, I encourage you to download the newsletter itself because it contains other interesting articles and announcements other than my own. In particlar, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Ian Durham, current editor of The Quantum Times, is stepping down as editor at some point before the March meeting. If you are interested in getting more involved in the topical group, I would encourage you to put yourself forward. Details can be found at the end of the newsletter.

Upon reformatting my articles for the blog, I realized that I have reached almost Miguel Navascues levels of crankiness. I guess this might be because I had a stomach bug when I was writing them. Today’s article is a criticism of the recent “Snapshots of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics” surveys that appeared on the arXiv and generated a lot of attention. The article is part of a point-counterpoint, with Nathan Harshman defending the surveys. Here, I am only posting my part in its original version. The newsletter version is slightly edited from this, most significantly in the removal of my carefully constructed title.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Snapshots of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics

Q1. Which of the following questions is best resolved by taking a straw
poll of physicists attending a conference?

A. How long ago did the big bang happen?

B. What is the correct approach to quantum gravity?

C. Is nature supersymmetric?

D. What is the correct way to understand quantum theory?

E. None of the above.

By definition, a scientific question is one that is best resolved by
rational argument and appeal to empirical evidence.  It does not
matter if definitive evidence is lacking, so long as it is conceivable
that evidence may become available in the future, possibly via
experiments that we have not conceived of yet.  A poll is not a valid
method of resolving a scientific question.  If you answered anything
other than E to the above question then you must think that at least
one of A-D is not a scientific question, and the most likely culprit
is D.  If so, I disagree with you.

It is possible to legitimately disagree on whether a question is
scientific.  Our imaginations cannot conceive of all possible ways,
however indirect, that a question might get resolved.  The lesson from
history is that we are often wrong in declaring questions beyond the
reach of science.  For example, when big bang cosmology was first
introduced, many viewed it as unscientific because it was difficult to
conceive of how its predictions might be verified from our lowly
position here on Earth.  We have since gone from a situation in which
many people thought that the steady state model could not be
definitively refuted, to a big bang consensus with wildly fluctuating
estimates of the age of the universe, and finally to a precision value
of 13.77 +/- 0.059 billion years from the WMAP data.

Traditionally, many physicists separated quantum theory into its
“practical part” and its “interpretation”, with the latter viewed as
more a matter of philosophy than physics.  John Bell refuted this by
showing that conceptual issues have experimental consequences.  The
more recent development of quantum information and computation also
shows the practical value of foundational thinking.  Despite these
developments, the view that “interpretation” is a separate
unscientific subject persists.  Partly this is because we have a
tendency to redraw the boundaries.  “Interpretation” is then a
catch-all term for the issues we cannot resolve, such as whether
Copenhagen, Bohmian mechanics, many-worlds, or something else is the
best way of looking at quantum theory.  However, the lesson of big
bang cosmology cautions against labelling these issues unscientific.
Although interpretations of quantum theory are constructed to yield
the same or similar enough predictions to standard quantum theory,
this need not be the case when we move beyond the experimental regime
that is now accessible.  Each interpretation is based on a different
explanatory framework, and each suggests different ways of modifying
or generalizing the theory.  If we think that quantum theory is not
our final theory then interpretations are relevant in constructing its
successor.  This may happen in quantum gravity, but it may equally
happen at lower energies, since we do not yet have an experimentally
confirmed theory that unifies the other three forces.  The need to
change quantum theory may happen sooner than you expect, and whichever
explanatory framework yields the next theory will then be proven
correct.  It is for this reason that I think question D is scientific.

Regardless of the status of question D, straw polls, such as the three
that recently appeared on the arXiv [1-3], cannot help us to resolve
it, and I find it puzzling that we choose to conduct them for this
question, but not for other controversial issues in physics.  Even
during the decades in which the status of big bang cosmology was
controversial, I know of no attempts to poll cosmologists’ views on
it.  Such a poll would have been viewed as meaningless by those who
thought cosmology was unscientific, and as the wrong way to resolve
the question by those who did think it was scientific.  The same is
true of question D, and the fact that we do nevertheless conduct polls
suggests that the question is not being treated with the same respect
as the others on the list.

Admittedly, polls about controversial scientific questions are
relevant to the sociology of science, and they might be useful to the
beginning graduate student who is more concerned with their career
prospects than following their own rational instincts.  From this
perspective, it would be just as interesting to know what percentage
of physicists think that supersymmetry is on the right track as it is
to know about their views on quantum theory.  However, to answer such
questions, polls need careful design and statistical analysis.  None
of the three polls claims to be scientific and none of them contain
any error analysis.  What then is the point of them?

The three recent polls are based on a set of questions designed by
Schlosshauer, Kofler and Zeilinger, who conducted the first poll at a
conference organized by Zeilinger [1].  The questions go beyond just
asking for a preferred interpretation of quantum theory, but in the
interests of brevity I will focus on this aspect alone.  In the
Schlosshauer et al.  poll, Copenhagen comes out top, closely followed
by “information-based/information-theoretical” interpretations.  The
second comes from a conference called “The Philosophy of Quantum
Mechanics” [2].  There was a larger proportion of self-identified
philosophers amongst those surveyed and “I have no preferred
interpretation” came out as the clear winner, not so closely followed
by de Broglie-Bohm theory, which had obtained zero votes in the poll
of Schlosshauer et al.  Copenhagen is in joint third place along with
objective collapse theories.  The third poll comes from “Quantum
theory without observers III” [3], at which de Broglie-Bohm got a
whopping 63% of the votes, not so closely followed by objective
collapse.

What we can conclude from this is that people who went to a meeting
organized by Zeilinger are likely to have views similar to Zeilinger.
People who went to a philosophy conference are less likely to be
committed, but are much more likely to pick a realist interpretation
than those who hang out with Zeilinger.  Finally, people who went to a
meeting that is mainly about de Broglie-Bohm theory, organized by the
world’s most prominent Bohmians, are likely to be Bohmians.  What have
we learned from this that we did not know already?

One thing I find especially amusing about these polls is how easy it
would have been to obtain a more representative sample of physicists’
views.  It is straightforward to post a survey on the internet for
free.  Then all you have to do is write a letter to Physics Today
asking people to complete the survey and send the URL to a bunch of
mailing lists.  The sample so obtained would still be self-selecting
to some degree, but much less so than at a conference dedicated to
some particular approach to quantum theory.  The sample would also be
larger by at least an order of magnitude.  The ease with which this
could be done only illustrates the extent to which these surveys
should not even be taken semi-seriously.

I could go on about the bad design of the survey questions and about
how the error bars would be huge if you actually bothered to calculate
them.  It is amusing how willing scientists are to abandon the
scientific method when they address questions outside their own field.
However, I think I have taken up enough of your time already.  It is
time we recognized these surveys for the nonsense that they are.

References

[1] M. Schlosshauer, J. Kofler and A. Zeilinger, A Snapshot of
Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1301.1069
(2013).

[2] C. Sommer, Another Survey of Foundational Attitudes Towards
Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1303.2719 (2013).

[3] T. Norsen and S. Nelson, Yet Another Snapshot of Foundational
Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1306.4646 (2013).

Quantum Times Article on the PBR Theorem

I recently wrote an article (pdf) for The Quantum Times (Newsletter of the APS Topical Group on Quantum Information) about the PBR theorem. There is some overlap with my previous blog post, but the newsletter article focuses more on the implications of the PBR result, rather than the result itself. Therefore, I thought it would be worth reproducing it here. Quantum types should still download the original newsletter, as it contains many other interesting things, including an article by Charlie Bennett on logical depth (which he has also reproduced over at The Quantum Pontiff). APS members should also join the TGQI, and if you are at the March meeting this week, you should check out some of the interesting sessions they have organized.

Note: Due to the appearance of this paper, I would weaken some of the statements in this article if I were writing it again. The results of the paper imply that the factorization assumption is essential to obtain the PBR result, so this is an additional assumption that needs to be made if you want to prove things like Bell’s theorem directly from psi-ontology rather than using the traditional approach. When I wrote the article, I was optimistic that a proof of the PBR theorem that does not require factorization could be found, in which case teaching PBR first and then deriving other results like Bell as a consequence would have been an attractive pedagogical option. However, due to the necessity for stronger assumptions, I no longer think this.

OK, without further ado, here is the article.

PBR, EPR, and all that jazz

In the past couple of months, the quantum foundations world has been abuzz about a new preprint entitled “The Quantum State Cannot be Interpreted Statistically” by Matt Pusey, Jon Barrett and Terry Rudolph (henceforth known as PBR). Since I wrote a blog post explaining the result, I have been inundated with more correspondence from scientists and more requests for comment from science journalists than at any other point in my career. Reaction to the result amongst quantum researchers has been mixed, with many people reacting negatively to the title, which can be misinterpreted as an attack on the Born rule. Others have managed to read past the title, but are still unsure whether to credit the result with any fundamental significance. In this article, I would like to explain why I think that the PBR result is the most significant constraint on hidden variable theories that has been proved to date. It provides a simple proof of many other known theorems, and it supercharges the EPR argument, converting it into a rigorous proof of nonlocality that has the same status as Bell’s theorem. Before getting to this though, we need to understand the PBR result itself.

What are Quantum States?

One of the most debated issues in the foundations of quantum theory is the status of the quantum state. On the ontic view, quantum states represent a real property of quantum systems, somewhat akin to a physical field, albeit one with extremely bizarre properties like entanglement. The alternative to this is the epistemic view, which sees quantum states as states of knowledge, more akin to the probability distributions of statistical mechanics. A psi-ontologist
(as supporters of the ontic view have been dubbed by Chris Granade) might point to the phenomenon of interference in support of their view, and also to the fact that pretty much all viable realist interpretations of quantum theory, such as many-worlds or Bohmian mechanics, include an ontic state. The key argument in favor of the epistemic view is that it dissolves the measurement problem, since the fact that states undergo a discontinuous change in the light of measurement results does not then imply the existence of any real physical process. Instead, the collapse of the wavefunction is more akin to the way that classical probability distributions get updated by Bayesian conditioning in the light of new data.

Many people who advocate a psi-epistemic view also adopt an anti-realist or neo-Copenhagen point of view on quantum theory in which the quantum state does not represent knowledge about some underlying reality, but rather it only represents knowledge about the consequences of measurements that we might make on the system. However, there remained the nagging question of whether it is possible in principle to construct a realist interpretation of quantum theory that is also psi-epistemic, or whether the realist is compelled to think that quantum states are real. PBR have answered this question in the negative, at least within the standard framework for hidden variable theories that we use for other no go results such as Bell’s theorem. As with Bell’s theorem, there are loopholes, so it is better to say that PBR have placed a strong constraint on realist psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than ruling them out entirely.

The PBR Result

To properly formulate the result, we need to know a bit about how quantum states are represented in a hidden variable theory. In such a theory, quantum systems are assumed to have real pre-existing properties that are responsible for determining what happens when we make a measurement. A full specification of these properties is what we mean by an ontic state of the system. In general, we don’t have precise control over the ontic state so a quantum state corresponds to a probability distribution over the ontic states. This framework is illustrated below.

Representation of a quantum state in an ontic model

In an ontic model, a quantum state (indicated heuristically on the left as a vector in the Bloch sphere) is represented by a probability distribution over ontic states, as indicated on the right.

A hidden variable theory is psi-ontic if knowing the ontic state of the system allows you to determine the (pure) quantum state that was prepared uniquely. Equivalently, the probability distributions corresponding to two distinct pure states do not overlap. This is illustrated below.

Psi-ontic model

Representation of a pair of quantum states in a psi-ontic model

A hidden variable theory is psi-epistemic if it is not psi-ontic, i.e. there must exist an ontic state that is possible for more than one pure state, or, in other words, there must exist two nonorthogonal pure states with corresponding distributions that overlap. This is illustrated below.

Psi-epistemic model

Representation of nonorthogonal states in a psi-epistemic model

These definitions of psi-ontology and psi-epistemicism may seem a little abstract, so a classical analogy may be helpful. In Newtonian mechanics the ontic state of a particle is a point in phase space, i.e. a specification of its position and momentum. Other ontic properties of the particle, such as its energy, are given by functions of the phase space point, i.e. they are uniquely determined by the ontic state. Likewise, in a hidden variable theory, anything that is a unique function of the ontic state should be regarded as an ontic property of the system, and this applies to the quantum state in a psi-ontic model. The definition of a psi-epistemic model as the negation of this is very weak, e.g. it could still be the case that most ontic states are only possible in one quantum state and just a few are compatible with more than one. Nonetheless, even this very weak notion is ruled out by PBR.

The proof of the PBR result is quite simple, but I will not review it here because it is summarized in my blog post and the original paper is also very readable. Instead, I want to focus on its implications.

Size of the Ontic State Space

A trivial consequence of the PBR result is that the cardinality of the ontic state space of any hidden variable theory, even for just a qubit, must be infinite, in fact continuously so. This is because there must be at least one ontic state for each quantum state, and there are a continuous infinity of the latter. The fact that there must be infinite ontic states was previously proved by Lucien Hardy under the name “Ontological Excess Baggage theorem”, but we can now
view it as a corollary of PBR. If you think about it, this property is quite surprising because we can only extract one or two bits from a qubit (depending on whether we count superdense coding) so it would be natural to assume that a hidden variable state could be specified by a finite amount of information.

Hidden variable theories provide one possible method of simulating a quantum computer on a classical computer by simply tracking the value of the ontic state at each stage in the computation. This enables us to sample from the probability distribution of any quantum measurement at any point during the computation. Another method is to simply store a representation of the quantum state at each point in time. This second method is clearly inefficient, as the number of parameters required to specify a quantum state grows exponentially with the number of qubits. The PBR theorem tells us that the hidden variable method cannot be any better, as it requires an ontic state space that is at least as big as the set of quantum states. This conclusion was previously drawn by Alberto Montina using different methods, but again it now becomes a corollary of PBR. This result falls short of saying that any classical simulation of a quantum computer must have exponential space complexity, since we usually only have to simulate the outcome of one fixed measurement at the end of the computation and our simulation does not have to track the slice-by-slice causal evolution of the quantum circuit. Indeed, pretty much the first nontrivial result in quantum computational complexity theory, proved by Bernstein and Vazirani, showed that quantum circuits can be simulated with polynomial memory resources. Nevertheless, this result does reaffirm that we need to go beyond slice-by-slice simulations of quantum circuits in looking for efficient classical algorithms.

Supercharged EPR Argument

As emphasized by Harrigan and Spekkens, a variant of the EPR argument favoured by Einstein shows that any psi-ontic hidden variable theory must be nonlocal. Thus, prior to Bell’s theorem, the only open possibility for a local hidden variable theory was a psi-epistemic theory. Of course, Bell’s theorem rules out all local hidden variable theories, regardless of the status of the quantum state within them. Nevertheless, the PBR result now gives an arguably simpler route to the same conclusion by ruling out psi-epistemic theories, allowing us to infer nonlocality directly from EPR.

A sketch of the argument runs as follows. Consider a pair of qubits in the singlet state. When one of the qubits is measured in an orthonormal basis, the other qubit collapses to one of two orthogonal pure states. By varying the basis that the first qubit is measured in, the second qubit can be made to collapse in any basis we like (a phenomenon that Schroedinger called “steering”). If we restrict attention to two possible choices of measurement basis, then there are
four possible pure states that the second qubit might end up in. The PBR result implies that the sets of possible ontic states for the second system for each of these pure states must be disjoint. Consequently, the sets of possible ontic states corresponding to the two distinct choices of basis are also disjoint. Thus, the ontic state of the second system must depend on the choice of measurement made on the first system and this implies nonlocality because I can decide which measurement to perform on the first system at spacelike separation from the second.

PBR as a proto-theorem

We have seen that the PBR result can be used to establish some known constraints on hidden variable theories in a very straightforward way. There is more to this story that I can possibly fit into this article, and I suspect that every major no-go result for hidden variable theories may fall under the rubric of PBR. Thus, even if you don’t care a fig about fancy distinctions between ontic and epistemic states, it is still worth devoting a few braincells to the PBR result. I predict that it will become viewed as the basic result about hidden variable theories, and that we will end up teaching it to our students even before such stalwarts as Bell’s theorem and Kochen-Specker.

Further Reading

For further details of the PBR theorem see:

For constraints on the size of the ontic state space see:

For the early quantum computational complexity results see:

For a fully rigorous version of the PBR+EPR nonlocality argument see:

Foundations at APS, take 2

It doesn’t seem that a year has gone by since I wrote about the first sessions on quantum foundations organized by the topical group on quantum information, concepts and computation at the APS March meeting. Nevertheless it has, and I am here in Denver after possibly the longest day of continuous sitting through talks in my life. I arrived at 8am to chair the session on Quantum Limited Measurements, which was interesting, but readers of this blog won’t want to hear about such practical matters, so instead I’ll spill the beans on the two foundations sessions that followed.

In the first foundations session, things got off to a good start with Rob Spekkens as the invited speaker explaining to us once again why quantum states are states of knowledge. OK, I’m biased because he’s a collaborator, but he did throw us a new tidbit on how to make an analog of the Elitzur Vaidman bomb experiment in his toy theory by constructing a version for field theory.

Next, there was a talk by some complete crackpot called Matt Leifer. He talked about this.

Frank Schroeck gave an overview of his formulation of quantum mechanics on phase space, which did pique my interest, but 10 minutes was really too short to do it justice. Someday I’ll read his book.

Chris Fuchs gave a talk which was surprisingly not the same as his usual quantum Bayesian propaganda speech. It contained some new results about Symmetric Informationally Complete POVMs, including the fact that the states the POVM elements are proportional to are minimum uncertainty states with respect to mutually unbiased bases. This should be hitting an arXiv near you very soon.

Caslav Brukner talked about his recent work on the emergence of classicality via coarse graining. I’ve mentioned it before on this blog, and it’s definitely a topic I’m becoming much more interested in.

Later on, Jeff Tollaksen talked about generalizing a theorem proved by Rob Spekkens and myself about pre- and post-selected quantum systems to the case of weak measurements. I’m not sure I agree with the particular spin he gives on it, especially his idea of “quantum contextuality”, but you can decide for yourself by reading this.

Jan-Ake Larrson gave a very comprehensible talk about a “loophole” (he prefers the term “experimental problem”) in Bell inequality tests to do with coincidence times of photon detection. You can deal with it by having a detection efficiency just a few percent higher than that needed to overcome the detection loophole. Read all about it here.

Most of the rest of the talks in this session were more quantum information oriented, but I suppose you can argue they were at the foundational end of quantum information. Animesh Datta talked about the role of entanglement in the Knill-Laflamme model of quantum computation with one pure qubit, Anil Shaji talked about using easily computable entanglement measures to put bounds on those that aren’t so easy to compute and finally Ian Durham made some interesting observations about the connections between entropy, information and Bell inequalities.

The second foundations session was more of a mixed bag, but let me just mention a couple of the talks that appealed to me. Marcello Sarandy Alioscia Hamma talked about generalizing the quantum adiabatic theorem to open systems, where you don’t necessarily have a Hamiltonian with well-defined eigenstates to talk about and Kicheon Kang talked about a proposal for a quantum eraser experiment with electrons.

On Tuesday, Bill Wootters won a prize for best research at an undergraduate teaching college. He gave a great talk about his discrete Wigner functions, which included some new stuff about minumum uncertainty states and analogs of coherent states.

That’s pretty much it for the foundations talks at APS this year. It’s all quantum information from here on in. That is unless you count Zeilinger, who is talking on Thursday. He’s supposed to be talking about quantum cryptography, but perhaps he will say something about the more foundationy experiments going on in his lab as well.

Foundations at APS

I’m currently at the APS March Meeting, where there were two sessions on Quantum Foundations on Monday. I am pleased to report that they were well attended. Hopefully, this marks the start of an increased involvement of the APS in the field.

The second session was particularly interesting, so here’s a short summary of what we heard:

  • Invited speaker Lucien Hardy outlined his Causaloid framework for general probabilistic theories without a fixed background causal structure. It is hoped that this might lead to a new path for developing a theory of quantum gravity.
  • Chris Fuchs gave a shortened version of his usual talk, focussing on the role of symmetric informationally complete POVMs in his approach to quantum foundations.
  • Terry Rudolph presented an extension of Rob Spekkens’ toy theory for dealing with continuous variable theories. This has lots of features in common with QM, but has a natural hidden variable interpretation, being a resticted version of Liouville mechanics.
  • Rob Spekkens showed how two seemingly different notions of “nonclassicallity”, nalely negativity of peseudo-probability distributions and the impossibility of a noncontextual hidden variable theory, are actually the same within the new approach to contextuality that he has developed.
  • Nicholas Harrigan outlined an approach to quantifying contextuality that he has been developing with Terry Rudolph.
  • Joseph Altepeter, from Kwiat’s group, gave an interesting presentation on their current state of the art photonic Bell inequality experiments.
  • OK, I have to admit that I was getting tired at this point and skipped out for a talk, so I have no idea about the next talk. Apologies to Giuliano Scarcelli.
  • There then followed two talks about decoherence from Diego Dalvit and Fernando Cucchietti, collaborators of Zurek and Paz respectively. This is an important topic for many interpretations of QM and the results looked solid. However, I’m not an expert on this stuff.
  • Ruth Kastner, who was due to deconstruct the now famous Ashfar experiment, was unfortunately unable to attend due to illness, but Ashfar was here to give his side of the story instead. The experiment is interesting at least because it has made quite a few physicists think about complimentarity and foundations in general a bit more deeply. Personally, I agree with Kastner’s analysis, but Ashfar disputes it.
  • Jeff Tollaksen outlined a new way of measuring the “weak values” introduced by Aharonov and collaborators. I didn’t follow the details of the construction, but look forward to reading the paper.
  • Caslav Brukner outlined his work with Zeilinger on an “information based” approach to quantum foundations. It’s not my personal favourite amongst such approaches, but gave plenty of food for thought.

Well, foundations at this meeting are pretty much finished after that. There are still a few interesting quantum information sessions before the end of the week, but I can leave other bloggeurs to deal with that.

Support the APS topical group

As you may know, the American Physical Society has recently opened a topical group on Quantum Information, Concepts and Compuation, which covers the foundations of quantum mechanics within its remit (under the “concepts” heading I suppose).  There will be a special session on the Foundations of Quantum Theory at the APS March Meeting in Baltimore this year.

Although the abstract submission deadline has passed, I’d like to encourage everyone involved in quantum foundations to attend.  The APS has not always looked favourably on foundational studies and it has been difficult to get foundations papers published in their journals in the past.  The topical group could open the way for a new era of respectability for the subject within the APS, so making sure that the special session is well attended seems like a very good idea to me.  In any case, besides the political point, the talks are bound to be interesting.