Tag Archives: foundations

Q+ Hangout: Nicholas Brunner

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date/time: Tue. 25th Feb. at 4pm GMT/UTC

Speaker: Nicholas Brunner (University of Geneva)

Title: Dimension of Physical Systems

Abstract: The dimension of a physical system refers loosely speaking to the number of degrees of freedom relevant to describe it. Here we ask how quantum theory compares to more general models (such as Generalized Probabilistic Theories) from the point of view of dimension. This gives insight to information processing and thermodynamics in GPTs.

To watch the talk live, visit the event page at the appointed hour.

To keep up to date on the latest news about Q+ hangouts you can follow us on:

or visit our website http://qplus.burgarth.de

Q+ Hangout: Renato Renner

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date/Time: 29th October 2013 2pm GMT

Speaker: Renato Renner (ETH Zurich)

Title: Does freedom of choice imply that the wave function is real?

Abstract:

The question whether the quantum-mechanical wave function is “real” has recently attracted considerable interest. More precisely, the question is whether the wave function of a system is uniquely determined by any complete description of its “physical state”. In this talk I will present a simple and self-contained proof that this is indeed the case, under an assumption that one may term “freedom of choice”. It demands that arbitrary measurements can be applied to the system, and that these can be chosen independently of all parameters available at the time of measurement (with respect to any relativistic frame). A possible interpretation of this result is that the wave function of a system is as “objective or “real as any other complete description of the system’s state.
(This is based on unpublished work in collaboration with Roger Colbeck.)

To watch the talk live go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

Note that the change from daylight savings time to standard time will have happened in the UK, but not some other countries like the US and Canada. Therefore, your usual timezone calculation may be out by an hour, e.g. the talk is at 10am in East Coast US and Canada. Please check the time conversion for your location.

To keep up to date with the latest news on Q+ hangouts, you can follow us on:

or visit our website http://qplus.burgarth.de

Quantum Times Article about Surveys on the Foundations of Quantum Theory

A new edition of The Quantum Times (newsletter of the APS topical group on Quantum Information) is out and I have two articles in it. I am posting the first one here today and the second, a book review of two recent books on quantum computing by John Gribbin and Jonathan Dowling, will be posted later in the week. As always, I encourage you to download the newsletter itself because it contains other interesting articles and announcements other than my own. In particlar, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Ian Durham, current editor of The Quantum Times, is stepping down as editor at some point before the March meeting. If you are interested in getting more involved in the topical group, I would encourage you to put yourself forward. Details can be found at the end of the newsletter.

Upon reformatting my articles for the blog, I realized that I have reached almost Miguel Navascues levels of crankiness. I guess this might be because I had a stomach bug when I was writing them. Today’s article is a criticism of the recent “Snapshots of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics” surveys that appeared on the arXiv and generated a lot of attention. The article is part of a point-counterpoint, with Nathan Harshman defending the surveys. Here, I am only posting my part in its original version. The newsletter version is slightly edited from this, most significantly in the removal of my carefully constructed title.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Snapshots of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics

Q1. Which of the following questions is best resolved by taking a straw
poll of physicists attending a conference?

A. How long ago did the big bang happen?

B. What is the correct approach to quantum gravity?

C. Is nature supersymmetric?

D. What is the correct way to understand quantum theory?

E. None of the above.

By definition, a scientific question is one that is best resolved by
rational argument and appeal to empirical evidence.  It does not
matter if definitive evidence is lacking, so long as it is conceivable
that evidence may become available in the future, possibly via
experiments that we have not conceived of yet.  A poll is not a valid
method of resolving a scientific question.  If you answered anything
other than E to the above question then you must think that at least
one of A-D is not a scientific question, and the most likely culprit
is D.  If so, I disagree with you.

It is possible to legitimately disagree on whether a question is
scientific.  Our imaginations cannot conceive of all possible ways,
however indirect, that a question might get resolved.  The lesson from
history is that we are often wrong in declaring questions beyond the
reach of science.  For example, when big bang cosmology was first
introduced, many viewed it as unscientific because it was difficult to
conceive of how its predictions might be verified from our lowly
position here on Earth.  We have since gone from a situation in which
many people thought that the steady state model could not be
definitively refuted, to a big bang consensus with wildly fluctuating
estimates of the age of the universe, and finally to a precision value
of 13.77 +/- 0.059 billion years from the WMAP data.

Traditionally, many physicists separated quantum theory into its
“practical part” and its “interpretation”, with the latter viewed as
more a matter of philosophy than physics.  John Bell refuted this by
showing that conceptual issues have experimental consequences.  The
more recent development of quantum information and computation also
shows the practical value of foundational thinking.  Despite these
developments, the view that “interpretation” is a separate
unscientific subject persists.  Partly this is because we have a
tendency to redraw the boundaries.  “Interpretation” is then a
catch-all term for the issues we cannot resolve, such as whether
Copenhagen, Bohmian mechanics, many-worlds, or something else is the
best way of looking at quantum theory.  However, the lesson of big
bang cosmology cautions against labelling these issues unscientific.
Although interpretations of quantum theory are constructed to yield
the same or similar enough predictions to standard quantum theory,
this need not be the case when we move beyond the experimental regime
that is now accessible.  Each interpretation is based on a different
explanatory framework, and each suggests different ways of modifying
or generalizing the theory.  If we think that quantum theory is not
our final theory then interpretations are relevant in constructing its
successor.  This may happen in quantum gravity, but it may equally
happen at lower energies, since we do not yet have an experimentally
confirmed theory that unifies the other three forces.  The need to
change quantum theory may happen sooner than you expect, and whichever
explanatory framework yields the next theory will then be proven
correct.  It is for this reason that I think question D is scientific.

Regardless of the status of question D, straw polls, such as the three
that recently appeared on the arXiv [1-3], cannot help us to resolve
it, and I find it puzzling that we choose to conduct them for this
question, but not for other controversial issues in physics.  Even
during the decades in which the status of big bang cosmology was
controversial, I know of no attempts to poll cosmologists’ views on
it.  Such a poll would have been viewed as meaningless by those who
thought cosmology was unscientific, and as the wrong way to resolve
the question by those who did think it was scientific.  The same is
true of question D, and the fact that we do nevertheless conduct polls
suggests that the question is not being treated with the same respect
as the others on the list.

Admittedly, polls about controversial scientific questions are
relevant to the sociology of science, and they might be useful to the
beginning graduate student who is more concerned with their career
prospects than following their own rational instincts.  From this
perspective, it would be just as interesting to know what percentage
of physicists think that supersymmetry is on the right track as it is
to know about their views on quantum theory.  However, to answer such
questions, polls need careful design and statistical analysis.  None
of the three polls claims to be scientific and none of them contain
any error analysis.  What then is the point of them?

The three recent polls are based on a set of questions designed by
Schlosshauer, Kofler and Zeilinger, who conducted the first poll at a
conference organized by Zeilinger [1].  The questions go beyond just
asking for a preferred interpretation of quantum theory, but in the
interests of brevity I will focus on this aspect alone.  In the
Schlosshauer et al.  poll, Copenhagen comes out top, closely followed
by “information-based/information-theoretical” interpretations.  The
second comes from a conference called “The Philosophy of Quantum
Mechanics” [2].  There was a larger proportion of self-identified
philosophers amongst those surveyed and “I have no preferred
interpretation” came out as the clear winner, not so closely followed
by de Broglie-Bohm theory, which had obtained zero votes in the poll
of Schlosshauer et al.  Copenhagen is in joint third place along with
objective collapse theories.  The third poll comes from “Quantum
theory without observers III” [3], at which de Broglie-Bohm got a
whopping 63% of the votes, not so closely followed by objective
collapse.

What we can conclude from this is that people who went to a meeting
organized by Zeilinger are likely to have views similar to Zeilinger.
People who went to a philosophy conference are less likely to be
committed, but are much more likely to pick a realist interpretation
than those who hang out with Zeilinger.  Finally, people who went to a
meeting that is mainly about de Broglie-Bohm theory, organized by the
world’s most prominent Bohmians, are likely to be Bohmians.  What have
we learned from this that we did not know already?

One thing I find especially amusing about these polls is how easy it
would have been to obtain a more representative sample of physicists’
views.  It is straightforward to post a survey on the internet for
free.  Then all you have to do is write a letter to Physics Today
asking people to complete the survey and send the URL to a bunch of
mailing lists.  The sample so obtained would still be self-selecting
to some degree, but much less so than at a conference dedicated to
some particular approach to quantum theory.  The sample would also be
larger by at least an order of magnitude.  The ease with which this
could be done only illustrates the extent to which these surveys
should not even be taken semi-seriously.

I could go on about the bad design of the survey questions and about
how the error bars would be huge if you actually bothered to calculate
them.  It is amusing how willing scientists are to abandon the
scientific method when they address questions outside their own field.
However, I think I have taken up enough of your time already.  It is
time we recognized these surveys for the nonsense that they are.

References

[1] M. Schlosshauer, J. Kofler and A. Zeilinger, A Snapshot of
Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1301.1069
(2013).

[2] C. Sommer, Another Survey of Foundational Attitudes Towards
Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1303.2719 (2013).

[3] T. Norsen and S. Nelson, Yet Another Snapshot of Foundational
Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1306.4646 (2013).

Q+ Hangout: Bill Wootters

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date/time: Tuesday 18th June 2013 2pm BST/UTC+1

Speaker: Bill Wootters (Williams College)

Title: What is the origin of complex probability amplitudes?

Abstract: I begin this presentation with an attempt to explain the origin of probability amplitudes in quantum theory, but the explanation makes sense only if those amplitudes are real. This result provides motivation for studying the real-vector-space variant of quantum theory. I show how a particular model within real-vector-space quantum theory can produce the appearance of complex probability amplitudes. In this model, a special binary subsystem of the universe, called the universal rebit or “ubit,” plays the role of the complex phase factor. In a certain limit the effective theory emerging from the model mimics standard quantum theory, but if we stop short of this limit the model predicts the spontaneous decoherence of isolated systems.

To watch the talk live go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

To keep up to date on the latest news about Q+ hangouts you can follow us on:

or visit our website at http://qplus.burgarth.de

Q+ Hangout: Roger Colbeck

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date: Tuesday 29th January 2013

Time: 2pm GMT/UTC

Speaker: Roger Colbeck (ETH Zurich)

Title: No extension of quantum theory can have improved predictive power

Abstract:

According to quantum theory, measurements generate random outcomes, in stark contrast with classical mechanics. This raises the important question of whether there could exist an extension of the theory which removes this indeterminism, as famously suspected by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. Under the assumption of free choice within a particular causal structure, Bell’s work showed this to be impossible. However, existing results do not imply that the current theory is maximally informative. Could it be that certain hidden variable theories (for example) allow us to make more accurate predictions about the outcomes?

In this talk, I will discuss this question and show that, under the same free choice assumption, the answer is negative: no extension of quantum theory can give more information about the outcomes of future measurements than quantum theory itself.

I will then show that as a corollary of this result, we can reach the same conclusion as Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph that the wavefunction cannot be thought of as subjective.

(This is based on arXiv:1005.5173, arXiv:1111.6597 and arXiv:1208.4123)

To watch the talk live go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

To keep up to date with the latest news on Q+ hangouts you can follow us on:

Q+ Hangout: Rob Spekkens

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date/time: Tuesday 20th November 2pm GMT/UTC

Speaker: Rob Spekkens (Perimeter Institute)

Title: Quantum correlations from the perspective of causal discovery algorithms

Abstract: If correlation does not imply causation, then what does? The beginning of a rigorous answer to this question has been provided by researchers in machine learning, who have developed causal discovery algorithms. These take as their input facts about correlations among a set of observed variables and return as their output a causal structure relating these variables. We show that any attempt to provide a causal explanation of Bell-inequality-violating correlations must contradict a core principle of these algorithms, namely, that an observed statistical independence between variables should not be explained by fine-tuning of the causal parameters. In particular, we demonstrate the need for such fine-tuning for most of the causal mechanisms that have been proposed to underlie Bell correlations, including superluminal causal influences, superdeterminism (that is, a denial of freedom of choice of settings), and retrocausal influences which do not introduce causal cycles. This work suggests a novel perspective on the assumptions underlying Bell’s theorem: the nebulous assumption of “realism” is replaced with the principle that all correlations ought to be explained causally, and Bell’s notion of local causality is replaced with the assumption of no fine-tuning. Finally, we discuss the possibility of avoiding the fine-tuning by replacing conditional probabilities with a noncommutative generalization thereof.

Based on arXiv:1208.4119.

Joint work with Chris Wood.

To watch the talk live, go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

Don’t forget to fill out to have your say on who we should invite for future talks.

Q+ Hangout: Markus Mueller

Here are the details of the next Q+ hangout.

Date/time: Tuesday 23rd October 2pm BST

Speaker: Markus Mueller (Perimeter Institute)

Title: Three-dimensionality of space and the quantum bit: an information-theoretic approach

Absract: It is sometimes pointed out as a curiosity that the state space of quantum two-level systems, i.e. the qubit, and actual physical space are both three-dimensional and Euclidean. In this talk, I report on joint work with Lluis Masanes, where we attempt an information-theoretic analysis of this relationship, by proving a particular mathematical result: suppose that physics takes place in d spatial dimensions, and that some events happen probabilistically (not assuming quantum theory in any way). Furthermore, suppose there are systems that behave in some sense as “units of direction information”, interacting via some continuous reversible time evolution. We prove that this uniquely determines spatial dimension d=3 and quantum theory on two qubits. Hence, abstractly postulating the “nice” behavior of a Stern-Gerlach device in information-theoretic terms determines already some important aspects of physics as we know it.

This talk is based on http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0630

To watch the talk live go to http://qplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

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Rerun: Caslav Brukner’s Q+ hangout

We are rerunning Caslav Brukner’s Q+ hangout due to problems with the livestream and video recording in July. Note the earlier than usual starting time.

Date: 18th September 2012

Time: 12noon British Summer Time

Speaker: Caslav Brukner (University of Vienna)

Title: Quantum correlations with indefinite causal order

Abstract:

In quantum physics it is standardly assumed that the background time or definite causal structure exists such that every operation is either in the future, in the past or space-like separated from any other operation. Consequently, the correlations between operations respect definite causal order: they are either signalling correlations for the time-like or no-signalling correlations for the space-like separated operations. We develop a framework that assumes only that operations in local laboratories are described by quantum mechanics (i.e. are completely-positive maps), but relax the assumption that they are causally connected. Remarkably, we find situations where two operations are neither causally ordered nor in a probabilistic mixture of definite causal orders, i.e. one cannot say that one operations is before or after the other. The correlations between the operations are shown to enable performing a communication task (“causal game”) that is impossible if the operations are ordered according to a fixed background time.

To view the seminar live, go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

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Q+ Hangout: Caslav Brukner

Here are the details for the next Q+ hangout.

Date: 24th July 2012

Time: 2pm British Summer Time

Speaker: Caslav Brukner (University of Vienna)

Title: Quantum correlations with indefinite causal order

Abstract:

In quantum physics it is standardly assumed that the background time or definite causal structure exists such that every operation is either in the future, in the past or space-like separated from any other operation. Consequently, the correlations between operations respect definite causal order: they are either signalling correlations for the time-like or no-signalling correlations for the space-like separated operations. We develop a framework that assumes only that operations in local laboratories are described by quantum mechanics (i.e. are completely-positive maps), but relax the assumption that they are causally connected. Remarkably, we find situations where two operations are neither causally ordered nor in a probabilistic mixture of definite causal orders, i.e. one cannot say that one operations is before or after the other. The correlations between the operations are shown to enable performing a communication task (“causal game”) that is impossible if the operations are ordered according to a fixed background time.

To view the seminar live, go to http://gplus.to/qplus at the appointed hour.

To stay up to date on future Q+ hangouts, follow us on:

Google+: http://gplus.to/qplus

Twitter: @qplushangouts

Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/qplushangouts

or visit our website http://qplus.burgarth.de

Quantum Times Article on the PBR Theorem

I recently wrote an article (pdf) for The Quantum Times (Newsletter of the APS Topical Group on Quantum Information) about the PBR theorem. There is some overlap with my previous blog post, but the newsletter article focuses more on the implications of the PBR result, rather than the result itself. Therefore, I thought it would be worth reproducing it here. Quantum types should still download the original newsletter, as it contains many other interesting things, including an article by Charlie Bennett on logical depth (which he has also reproduced over at The Quantum Pontiff). APS members should also join the TGQI, and if you are at the March meeting this week, you should check out some of the interesting sessions they have organized.

Note: Due to the appearance of this paper, I would weaken some of the statements in this article if I were writing it again. The results of the paper imply that the factorization assumption is essential to obtain the PBR result, so this is an additional assumption that needs to be made if you want to prove things like Bell’s theorem directly from psi-ontology rather than using the traditional approach. When I wrote the article, I was optimistic that a proof of the PBR theorem that does not require factorization could be found, in which case teaching PBR first and then deriving other results like Bell as a consequence would have been an attractive pedagogical option. However, due to the necessity for stronger assumptions, I no longer think this.

OK, without further ado, here is the article.

PBR, EPR, and all that jazz

In the past couple of months, the quantum foundations world has been abuzz about a new preprint entitled “The Quantum State Cannot be Interpreted Statistically” by Matt Pusey, Jon Barrett and Terry Rudolph (henceforth known as PBR). Since I wrote a blog post explaining the result, I have been inundated with more correspondence from scientists and more requests for comment from science journalists than at any other point in my career. Reaction to the result amongst quantum researchers has been mixed, with many people reacting negatively to the title, which can be misinterpreted as an attack on the Born rule. Others have managed to read past the title, but are still unsure whether to credit the result with any fundamental significance. In this article, I would like to explain why I think that the PBR result is the most significant constraint on hidden variable theories that has been proved to date. It provides a simple proof of many other known theorems, and it supercharges the EPR argument, converting it into a rigorous proof of nonlocality that has the same status as Bell’s theorem. Before getting to this though, we need to understand the PBR result itself.

What are Quantum States?

One of the most debated issues in the foundations of quantum theory is the status of the quantum state. On the ontic view, quantum states represent a real property of quantum systems, somewhat akin to a physical field, albeit one with extremely bizarre properties like entanglement. The alternative to this is the epistemic view, which sees quantum states as states of knowledge, more akin to the probability distributions of statistical mechanics. A psi-ontologist
(as supporters of the ontic view have been dubbed by Chris Granade) might point to the phenomenon of interference in support of their view, and also to the fact that pretty much all viable realist interpretations of quantum theory, such as many-worlds or Bohmian mechanics, include an ontic state. The key argument in favor of the epistemic view is that it dissolves the measurement problem, since the fact that states undergo a discontinuous change in the light of measurement results does not then imply the existence of any real physical process. Instead, the collapse of the wavefunction is more akin to the way that classical probability distributions get updated by Bayesian conditioning in the light of new data.

Many people who advocate a psi-epistemic view also adopt an anti-realist or neo-Copenhagen point of view on quantum theory in which the quantum state does not represent knowledge about some underlying reality, but rather it only represents knowledge about the consequences of measurements that we might make on the system. However, there remained the nagging question of whether it is possible in principle to construct a realist interpretation of quantum theory that is also psi-epistemic, or whether the realist is compelled to think that quantum states are real. PBR have answered this question in the negative, at least within the standard framework for hidden variable theories that we use for other no go results such as Bell’s theorem. As with Bell’s theorem, there are loopholes, so it is better to say that PBR have placed a strong constraint on realist psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than ruling them out entirely.

The PBR Result

To properly formulate the result, we need to know a bit about how quantum states are represented in a hidden variable theory. In such a theory, quantum systems are assumed to have real pre-existing properties that are responsible for determining what happens when we make a measurement. A full specification of these properties is what we mean by an ontic state of the system. In general, we don’t have precise control over the ontic state so a quantum state corresponds to a probability distribution over the ontic states. This framework is illustrated below.

Representation of a quantum state in an ontic model

In an ontic model, a quantum state (indicated heuristically on the left as a vector in the Bloch sphere) is represented by a probability distribution over ontic states, as indicated on the right.

A hidden variable theory is psi-ontic if knowing the ontic state of the system allows you to determine the (pure) quantum state that was prepared uniquely. Equivalently, the probability distributions corresponding to two distinct pure states do not overlap. This is illustrated below.

Psi-ontic model

Representation of a pair of quantum states in a psi-ontic model

A hidden variable theory is psi-epistemic if it is not psi-ontic, i.e. there must exist an ontic state that is possible for more than one pure state, or, in other words, there must exist two nonorthogonal pure states with corresponding distributions that overlap. This is illustrated below.

Psi-epistemic model

Representation of nonorthogonal states in a psi-epistemic model

These definitions of psi-ontology and psi-epistemicism may seem a little abstract, so a classical analogy may be helpful. In Newtonian mechanics the ontic state of a particle is a point in phase space, i.e. a specification of its position and momentum. Other ontic properties of the particle, such as its energy, are given by functions of the phase space point, i.e. they are uniquely determined by the ontic state. Likewise, in a hidden variable theory, anything that is a unique function of the ontic state should be regarded as an ontic property of the system, and this applies to the quantum state in a psi-ontic model. The definition of a psi-epistemic model as the negation of this is very weak, e.g. it could still be the case that most ontic states are only possible in one quantum state and just a few are compatible with more than one. Nonetheless, even this very weak notion is ruled out by PBR.

The proof of the PBR result is quite simple, but I will not review it here because it is summarized in my blog post and the original paper is also very readable. Instead, I want to focus on its implications.

Size of the Ontic State Space

A trivial consequence of the PBR result is that the cardinality of the ontic state space of any hidden variable theory, even for just a qubit, must be infinite, in fact continuously so. This is because there must be at least one ontic state for each quantum state, and there are a continuous infinity of the latter. The fact that there must be infinite ontic states was previously proved by Lucien Hardy under the name “Ontological Excess Baggage theorem”, but we can now
view it as a corollary of PBR. If you think about it, this property is quite surprising because we can only extract one or two bits from a qubit (depending on whether we count superdense coding) so it would be natural to assume that a hidden variable state could be specified by a finite amount of information.

Hidden variable theories provide one possible method of simulating a quantum computer on a classical computer by simply tracking the value of the ontic state at each stage in the computation. This enables us to sample from the probability distribution of any quantum measurement at any point during the computation. Another method is to simply store a representation of the quantum state at each point in time. This second method is clearly inefficient, as the number of parameters required to specify a quantum state grows exponentially with the number of qubits. The PBR theorem tells us that the hidden variable method cannot be any better, as it requires an ontic state space that is at least as big as the set of quantum states. This conclusion was previously drawn by Alberto Montina using different methods, but again it now becomes a corollary of PBR. This result falls short of saying that any classical simulation of a quantum computer must have exponential space complexity, since we usually only have to simulate the outcome of one fixed measurement at the end of the computation and our simulation does not have to track the slice-by-slice causal evolution of the quantum circuit. Indeed, pretty much the first nontrivial result in quantum computational complexity theory, proved by Bernstein and Vazirani, showed that quantum circuits can be simulated with polynomial memory resources. Nevertheless, this result does reaffirm that we need to go beyond slice-by-slice simulations of quantum circuits in looking for efficient classical algorithms.

Supercharged EPR Argument

As emphasized by Harrigan and Spekkens, a variant of the EPR argument favoured by Einstein shows that any psi-ontic hidden variable theory must be nonlocal. Thus, prior to Bell’s theorem, the only open possibility for a local hidden variable theory was a psi-epistemic theory. Of course, Bell’s theorem rules out all local hidden variable theories, regardless of the status of the quantum state within them. Nevertheless, the PBR result now gives an arguably simpler route to the same conclusion by ruling out psi-epistemic theories, allowing us to infer nonlocality directly from EPR.

A sketch of the argument runs as follows. Consider a pair of qubits in the singlet state. When one of the qubits is measured in an orthonormal basis, the other qubit collapses to one of two orthogonal pure states. By varying the basis that the first qubit is measured in, the second qubit can be made to collapse in any basis we like (a phenomenon that Schroedinger called “steering”). If we restrict attention to two possible choices of measurement basis, then there are
four possible pure states that the second qubit might end up in. The PBR result implies that the sets of possible ontic states for the second system for each of these pure states must be disjoint. Consequently, the sets of possible ontic states corresponding to the two distinct choices of basis are also disjoint. Thus, the ontic state of the second system must depend on the choice of measurement made on the first system and this implies nonlocality because I can decide which measurement to perform on the first system at spacelike separation from the second.

PBR as a proto-theorem

We have seen that the PBR result can be used to establish some known constraints on hidden variable theories in a very straightforward way. There is more to this story that I can possibly fit into this article, and I suspect that every major no-go result for hidden variable theories may fall under the rubric of PBR. Thus, even if you don’t care a fig about fancy distinctions between ontic and epistemic states, it is still worth devoting a few braincells to the PBR result. I predict that it will become viewed as the basic result about hidden variable theories, and that we will end up teaching it to our students even before such stalwarts as Bell’s theorem and Kochen-Specker.

Further Reading

For further details of the PBR theorem see:

For constraints on the size of the ontic state space see:

For the early quantum computational complexity results see:

For a fully rigorous version of the PBR+EPR nonlocality argument see: