

A Bayesian approach to compatibility, improvement, and pooling of quantum states

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In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? and how should the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory [1]. Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion, based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state when you learn someone else's state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this context.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In Bayesian probability theory, probabilities represent an agent’s information, knowledge or beliefs; and hence it is possible for two agents to assign different probability distributions to one and the same quantity. Recently, due in part to the emergence of quantum information theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in approaches to quantum theory that view the quantum state in a similar way [2–13], and in such approaches it is possible for two agents¹ to assign different quantum states to one and the same quantum system (henceforth, to avoid repetition, the term “state” will be used to refer to either a classical probability distribution or a quantum state). One way this can arise is when the agents have access to differing data about the system. For example, in the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [14], Alice, having prepared the system herself, would assign one of four pure states to the system, whereas the best that Bob can do before making his measurement is to assign a maximally mixed state to the system. This naturally leads to the question of when two state assignments are *compatible* with one another, i.e. when can they represent validly differing views on one and the same system?

The meaning of “validly differing view” depends on the interpretation of quantum theory and, in particular, on the status of the quantum state within it. If the quantum state is thought of as being analogous to a Bayesian probability distribution, then the meaning of “validly differing view” also depends on precisely which approach to Bayesian probability one is trying to apply to the quantum case. In the Jaynes-Cox approach [15, 16], sometimes called objective Bayesianism, states are taken to represent objective information or knowledge and, given a particular collection of known data, there is assumed to be a unique state that a rational agent ought to assign, often derived from a rule such as the Jaynes maximum entropy principle. In contrast, in the de Finetti-Ramsey-Savage approach [17–21], often called subjective Bayesianism, states are taken to represent an agent’s subjective degrees of belief and agents may validly assign different states to the same system even if they have access to identical data about the system. This is due to differing prior state assignments, the roots of which are taken to be unanalyzable by the subjective Bayesian.

In its modern form, the problem of quantum state compatibility was first tackled by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin (BFM) [22–25], although this work was motivated by earlier concerns of Peierls [26, 27]. BFM provide a compatibility criterion for quantum states on finite dimensional Hilbert spaces. Mathematically, the criterion is that two density operators are compatible if the intersection of their supports is nontrivial. In particular, the BFM criterion implies that two distinct pure states are never compatible, so that if any agent assigns a pure state to the system then any other agent who wishes to assign a compatible pure state must assign the same one. In the special case of commuting state assignments, it also implies the classical criterion for compatibility of probability distributions on finite sample spaces, which is that there must be at least one element of the sample space that is in the support of both distributions.

To date there have been two types of argument given for requiring the BFM compatibility criterion: one due to BFM themselves [24] (an argument that takes a similar point of view was later developed by Jacobs [28]) and one due to Caves, Fuchs and Schack (CFS) [29]. Although not explicitly given in Bayesian terms, the BFM argument has an objective Bayesian flavor in that it assumes that there is a unique quantum state that all agents would assign to the system if they had access to all the available data. On the other hand, the CFS argument is an attempt to give an explicitly subjective Bayesian argument for the BFM compatibility criterion. Both arguments start from lists of intuitively plausible criteria that state assignments should obey, but, in our view, a more rigorous approach is needed in order to correctly generalize the meaning that compatibility has in the classical case.

Classically, there are two arguments for compatibility depending on whether one adopts the objective or the subjective approach. In both cases, compatibility is defined in terms of the rules that Bayesian probability theory lays down for making probabilistic inferences, and, in particular the requirement that, upon learning new data, states should be updated by Bayesian conditioning. The reason for demanding an argument based on a well-defined methodology for inference is that there are situations in which even a Bayesian would want to update their state assignment by means other than Bayesian conditioning. For example, if you discover some information that is better represented as a constraint than as the acquisition of new data, such as finding out the mean energy of the molecules in a gas, then minimization of relative entropy, rather than Bayesian conditioning, would commonly be used to update probabilities [30, 31]. Arguments have also been made for applying generalizations of Bayesian conditioning, e.g. Jeffrey conditioning [32, 33], on the acquisition of new data in certain circumstances. It is not clear whether the intuitions used by BFM and CFS are applicable to all such circumstances and indeed our intuitions about probabilities and quantum states are not all that reliable in general. It is therefore important

¹ Traditionalist quantum physicists may prefer “observers” to “agents”. In our view, the term “agent” is preferable because, whatever happens when one measures a quantum system, it cannot be regarded as a mere passive “observation”. The term “agent” also emphasizes the close connection to the decision theoretic roots of classical Bayesian probability theory.

to be clear about the type of inference procedures that are being allowed for in any argument for a compatibility condition.

What is missing from the existing arguments for BFM compatibility is a specification of precisely what sorts of probabilistic inferences are valid — in short, a precise quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning. We have recently proposed such an analog within the formalism of conditional quantum states [1]. This formalism has the advantage of being more causally neutral than the standard quantum formalism, by which we mean that Bayesian conditioning is applied in the same way regardless of how the data is causally related to the system of interest, e.g. the data could be the outcome of a direct measurement of the system, a variable involved in the preparation of the system, the outcome of a measurement of a remote system that is correlated with the system of interest, etc. This causal neutrality allows us to develop arguments that are applicable in a broader range of experimental scenarios — or more accurately, *causal* scenarios — than those obtained within the conventional formalism.

In this article, we derive BFM compatibility from the principled application of the idea that, upon learning new data, agents should update their states according to our quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. This leaves no room for other principles of a more ad hoc nature. Both objective and subjective Bayesian arguments are given by first reviewing the corresponding classical compatibility arguments and then drawing out the parallels to the quantum case using conditional states. The BFM-Jacobs and CFS arguments are then criticized in the light of our results.

Having dealt with the question of how state assignments can differ, we then turn to the question of how to combine the state assignments of different agents. In Bayesian theory, the purpose of states is to provide a guide to rational decision making via the principle of maximizing expected utility. In its usual interpretation, this is a rule for *individual* decision making that does not take into account the views of other agents. This raises two conceptually distinct problems.

Firstly, decision making should be performed on the basis of all available relevant evidence. The fact that another agent assigns a particular state could be relevant evidence, and may cause you to change your state assignment, even in the case where both state assignments are the same. For example, if both you and I assign the same high probability to some event, then telling you my state assignment may cause you to assign an even higher probability if you believe that my reasons for assigning a high probability are valid and that they are independent of yours. Following Herbut [34], we call updating your state assignment in light of another agent’s state assignment *state improvement*.

Secondly, if two agents do have different state assignments, then they may have different preferences over the available choices in decision making scenarios. In prac-

tice, decisions often have to be made as a group, in which case a preference conflict prevents all the agents in the group from maximizing their individual expected utilities simultaneously. This motivates the need for methods of combining state assignments into a single assignment that accurately represents the beliefs, information, or knowledge of the group as a whole. This problem is called *state pooling*.

In the classical case, both improvement and pooling have been studied extensively (see [35] and [36] for reviews). From this it is clear that there is no hope of coming up with a universal rule, applicable to all cases, that is just a simple functional of the different state assignments. Instead, we offer a general methodology for combining states, in both the classical and quantum cases, again based on the application of Bayesian conditioning.

Learning another agent’s state assignment can be thought of as acquiring new data. Therefore, given our Bayesian methodology, the state improvement problem is solved by simply conditioning on this data. For state pooling, we adopt the *supra-Bayesian* approach [37], which requires the agents to put themselves in the shoes of a neutral decision maker. Although their ability to do this is not guaranteed, doing so reduces the pooling problem to an instance of state improvement, i.e. the neutral decision maker’s state is conditioned on all the other agents’ state assignments and the result is used as the pooled state. As with compatibility, our approach to these problems is to draw out the parallels to the classical case using conditional states and to derive our results by a principled application of Bayesian conditioning. This is an improvement over earlier approaches [10, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39], which use more ad hoc principles. However, some of the results of these earlier approaches are recovered within the present approach. In particular, a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman [10] can be derived from our method in the special case where the minimal sufficient statistics for the data collected by different agents satisfy a condition that is slightly weaker than conditional independence. This is an improvement on the original derivation, which only holds for a more restricted class of scenarios.

The results in this paper can be viewed as a demonstration of the conceptual power of the conditional states formalism developed in [1]. However, two concepts that were not discussed in [1] are required to develop our approach to the state improvement and pooling problems. These are quantum conditional independence and sufficient statistics. Conditional independence has previously been studied in [40], from which we borrow the required results. Several definitions of quantum sufficient statistics have been given in the literature [41–43], but they concern sufficient statistics for a quantum system with respect to a classical parameter, or sufficient statistics for measurement data with respect to a preparation variable. By contrast, here we need sufficient statistics for classical variables with respect to quantum systems. Our treatment of this is novel to the best of our knowledge.

II. REVIEW OF THE CONDITIONAL STATES FORMALISM

A. Basic concepts

The conditional states formalism, developed in [1], treats quantum theory as a generalization of the classical theory of Bayesian inference. In the quantum generalization, classical variables become quantum systems, and normalized probability distributions over those variables become operators on the Hilbert spaces of the systems that have unit trace but are not always positive. The generalization is summarized in table I, the elements of which we now review. The treatment here is necessarily brief. A more detailed development of the formalism and its relation to the conventional quantum formalism can be found in [1].

Note that we adopt the convention that classical variables are denoted by letters towards the end of the alphabet, such as R, S, T, X, Y and Z , while quantum systems are denoted by letters near the beginning of the alphabet, such as A, B and C .

In the classical theory of Bayesian inference, a joint probability distribution $P(R, S)$ describes an agent's knowledge, information or degrees of belief about a pair of random variables R and S . There is no constraint on the interpretation of what the two variables can represent. They may refer to the properties of two distinct physical systems at a single time, or to the properties of a single system at two distinct times, or indeed to any pair of physical degrees of freedom located anywhere in spacetime. They may even have a completely abstract interpretation that is independent of physics, e.g. R could represent acceptance or rejection of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and S could be the truth value of the Reimann hypothesis. However, given that we are interested in quantum theory, such abstract interpretations are of less interest to us than physical ones. The main point is that the same mathematical object, a joint probability distribution $P(R, S)$, is used regardless of the interpretation of the variables in terms of physical degrees of freedom.

The theory of quantum Bayesian inference aims to achieve a similar level of independence from physical interpretation. In particular, we want to describe inferences about two systems at a fixed time via the same rules that are used to describe a single system at two times. As such, the usual talk of “systems” in quantum theory is inappropriate, as a system is usually thought of as something that persists in time. Instead, the basic element of the conditional states formalism is a *region*. An *elementary region* describes what would normally be called a system at a fixed point in time and a *region* is a collection of elementary regions. For example, whilst the input and output of a quantum channel are usually thought of as the same system in the conventional formalism, they correspond to two disjoint regions in our terminology. This gives a greater symmetry to the case

of two systems at a single time, which also correspond to two disjoint regions.

A region A is assigned a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_A and a composite region AB consisting of two disjoint regions, A and B , is assigned the Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_{AB} = \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$. The knowledge, information, or beliefs of an agent about AB are described by a linear operator on \mathcal{H}_{AB} (this operator has other mathematical properties which will be discussed further on). This operator is called the *joint state* and, for the moment, we denote it by τ_{AB} . Ideally, one would like this framework to handle any set of regions, regardless of where they are situated in spacetime, but unfortunately the formalism developed in [1] is not quite up to the task. For instance, it is currently unclear how to represent degrees of belief about three regions that describe a system at three distinct times.

In a classical theory of Bayesian inference, one also has the freedom to conditionalize upon any set of variables, regardless of the spatio-temporal relations that hold among them, or indeed of the spatio-temporal relations between the conditioning variables and the conditioned variables. Therefore, this is an ideal to which a quantum theory of Bayesian inference should also strive. Again, the formalism of [1] does not quite achieve this ideal. For instance, this framework cannot currently deal with pre- and post-selection, for which the conditioning regions straddle the conditioned system in time.

Whilst these sorts of consideration limit the scope of our results, we are still able to treat a wide variety of causal scenarios including all those that have been previously discussed in the literature on compatibility, improvement, and pooling. We begin by providing a synopsis of the formalism as it has been developed thus far².

Table I summarizes the basic concepts and formulas of this framework and defines the terminology that we use for them.

For an elementary region A , the quantum analogue of a normalized probability distribution is a trace-one operator τ_A on \mathcal{H}_A . For a region AB , composed of two disjoint elementary regions, the analogue of a joint distribution $P(R, S)$ is an operator τ_{AB} on \mathcal{H}_{AB} . The marginalization operation $P(S) = \sum_R P(R, S)$ which corresponds to ignoring R , is replaced by the partial trace operation, $\tau_B = \text{Tr}_A(\tau_{AB})$, which corresponds to ignoring A . The role of the marginal distribution $P(S)$ is played by the marginal state τ_B .

² In both Bayesian probability and quantum theory, all states depend on the background information available to the agent, so all states are really conditional states. When writing down an unconditional probability distribution, this background knowledge is assumed implicitly. However, in the quantum case, the properties of a quantum state might well depend on the spatio-temporal relation of these implicit conditioning regions to the region of interest. Here, we assume that these conditioning regions are related to the conditioned region in the standard sort of way. For instance, implicit pre- and post-selection are not permitted.

	Classical	Quantum
State	$P(R)$	τ_A
Joint state	$P(R, S)$	τ_{AB}
Marginalization	$P(S) = \sum_R P(R, S)$	$\tau_B = \text{Tr}_A (\tau_{AB})$
Conditional state	$P(S R)$ $\sum_S P(S R) = 1$	$\tau_{B A}$ $\text{Tr}_B (\tau_{B A}) = I_A$
Relation between joint and conditional states	$P(R, S) = P(S R)P(R)$ $P(S R) = P(R, S)/P(R)$	$\tau_{AB} = \tau_{B A} \star \tau_A$ $\tau_{B A} = \tau_{AB} \star \tau_A^{-1}$
Bayes' theorem	$P(R S) = P(S R)P(R)/P(S)$	$\tau_{A B} = \tau_{B A} \star (\tau_A \tau_B^{-1})$
Belief propagation	$P(S) = \sum_R P(S R)P(R)$	$\tau_B = \text{Tr}_A (\tau_{B A} \tau_A)$

TABLE I: Analogies between the classical theory of Bayesian inference and the conditional states formalism for quantum theory.

If A is an elementary region, then τ_A is also *positive*, and simply corresponds to a conventional density operator on A . To highlight this fact, we denote it by ρ_A in this case. The positivity of marginal states on elementary regions implies that the joint state τ_{AB} of a pair of elementary regions must have positive partial traces (but it need not itself be a positive operator).

Another key concept in classical probability is a conditional probability distribution $P(S|R)$. $P(S|R)$ represents an agent's degrees of belief about S for each possible value of R . It satisfies $\sum_s P(S = s|R = r) = 1$ for all r and is related to the joint probability by $P(S|R) = P(R, S)/P(R)$. This implies Bayes' theorem, $P(R|S) = P(S|R)P(R)/P(S)$, which allows conditionals to be inverted. Conditional probabilities are critical to probabilistic inference. In particular, if you assign the conditional distribution $P(S|R)$ and your state for R is $P(R)$, then your state for S can be computed from $P(S) = \sum_R P(S|R)P(R)$. This map from $P(R)$ to $P(S)$ is called *belief propagation*.

The quantum analogue of a conditional probability is a *conditional state* for region B given region A . This is a linear operator on \mathcal{H}_{AB} , denoted $\tau_{B|A}$, that satisfies $\text{Tr}_B (\tau_{B|A}) = I_A$. It is related to the joint state by $\tau_{B|A} = \tau_{AB} \star \tau_A^{-1}$, where the \star -product is defined by

$$M \star N \equiv N^{1/2} M N^{1/2}, \quad (1)$$

and we have adopted the convention of dropping identity operators and tensor products, so that $\tau_{AB} \star \tau_A^{-1}$ is shorthand for $\tau_{AB} \star (\tau_A^{-1} \otimes I_B) = (\tau_A^{-1/2} \otimes I_B) \tau_{AB} (\tau_A^{-1/2} \otimes I_B)$. The quantum analogue of Bayes' theorem, relating $\tau_{B|A}$ and $\tau_{A|B}$, is $\tau_{A|B} = \tau_{B|A} \star (\tau_A \tau_B^{-1})$. Conditional states are the key to inference in this framework. In particular, if you assign the conditional state $\tau_{B|A}$ and your state for A is τ_A , then your state for B can be computed from $\tau_B = \text{Tr}_A (\tau_{B|A} \tau_A)$, where we have used the cyclic

property of the trace. This map from τ_A to τ_B is called *quantum belief propagation*.

B. The relevance of causal relations

The rules of classical Bayesian inference are independent of the causal relationships between the variables under consideration. For instance, the formula for belief propagation from R to S does not depend on whether R and S represent properties of distinct systems or of the same system at two different times. Nonetheless, causal relations between variables can affect the set of probability distributions that are regarded as plausible models. For example, if T is a common cause of R and S , then R and S should be conditionally independent given T , i.e. any viable probability model should satisfy $P(R, S|T) = P(R|T)P(S|T)$.

In the quantum case, the situation is similar. The rules of inference, such as the formula for belief propagation, do not depend on the causal relations between the regions under consideration, but causal relations do affect the set of operators that can describe joint states. Indeed, the dependence is stronger in the quantum case because the kind of operator used depends on the causal relation even for a *pair* of regions.

Suppose that A and B represent elementary regions. A and B are *causally* related if there is a direct causal influence from A to B (for instance, if A and B are the input and the output of a quantum channel), or if there is an indirect causal influence through other regions (for instance, there is a sequence of channels with A as the input to the first and B as the output of the last). A and B are *acausally* related if there is no such direct or indirect causal connection between them, for instance, if they represent two distinct systems at a fixed time.

If A and B are *acausally* related, then their joint state

τ_{AB} is a positive operator. It simply corresponds to a standard density operator for independent systems. The conditionals $\tau_{A|B}$ and $\tau_{B|A}$ are then also positive operators. Given that ρ is the standard notation for density operators, a joint state of two acausally related regions is denoted ρ_{AB} . Similarly, the conditional states are denoted $\rho_{A|B}$ and $\rho_{B|A}$. This notation is meant to be a reminder of the mathematical properties of these operators. We refer to them as *acausal* (joint and conditional) states.

If A and B are *causally* related, then τ_{AB} does not have to be a positive operator, but $\tau_{AB}^{T_A}$ (or equivalently $\tau_{AB}^{T_B}$) is always positive, where T_A and T_B denote partial transpose operations on A and B ³. Similarly, $\tau_{A|B}$ and $\tau_{B|A}$ are not necessarily positive, but they must have positive partial transpose. In this case, the operators τ_{AB} , $\tau_{A|B}$ and $\tau_{B|A}$ are denoted ϱ_{AB} , $\varrho_{A|B}$ and $\varrho_{B|A}$ respectively and we refer to them as *causal* (joint and conditional) states. In particular, dynamical evolution taking ρ_A to ρ_B can be represented as quantum belief propagation using a causal conditional state $\varrho_{B|A}$, i.e. $\rho_B = \text{Tr}_A(\varrho_{B|A}\rho_A)$. If, in the conventional formalism, the dynamics would be described by a Completely Positive Trace-preserving (CPT) map $\mathcal{E}_{B|A} : \mathfrak{L}(\mathcal{H}_A) \rightarrow \mathfrak{L}(\mathcal{H}_B)$, then the corresponding conditional state $\varrho_{B|A}$ is the operator on $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$ that is Jamiolkowski-isomorphic [44] to $\mathcal{E}_{B|A}$, that is, $\varrho_{B|A} = \sum_{j,k} |j\rangle\langle k|_A \otimes \mathcal{E}_{B|A'}(|k\rangle\langle j|_{A'})$, where $\mathcal{H}_{A'}$ is isomorphic to \mathcal{H}_A and $\{|j\rangle\}$ is any orthonormal basis for \mathcal{H}_A .

C. Modeling classical variables

Joint, marginal and conditional classical probability distributions are special cases of joint, marginal and conditional quantum states. To see this, note that a random variable R , with d_R possible values, can be associated with a d_R dimensional Hilbert space with a preferred basis $\{|r_1\rangle_R, |r_2\rangle_R, \dots, |r_{d_R}\rangle_R\}$ labeled by the possible values of R . Then, a probability distribution $P(R)$ can be encoded in a density operator that is diagonal in this basis via $\tau_R = \sum_r P(R=r) |r\rangle\langle r|_R$. Similarly, for two random variables, R and S , we can construct Hilbert spaces and preferred bases for each and encode a joint distribution $P(R, S)$ in a joint state via $\tau_{RS} = \sum_{r,s} P(R=r, S=s) |r\rangle\langle r|_R \otimes |s\rangle\langle s|_S$, and a conditional distribution $P(S|R)$ in a conditional state via $\tau_{S|R} = \sum_{r,s} P(S=s|R=r) |r\rangle\langle r|_R \otimes |s\rangle\langle s|_S$.

Because all operators on a given classical region commute, the \star -product reduces to the regular operator product for classical states, so that the formulas for quantum Bayesian inference reduce to their classical

counterparts. For instance, the quantum Bayes' theorem becomes $\tau_{R|S} = \tau_{S|R}\tau_R\tau_S^{-1}$, which is equivalent to $P(R|S) = P(S|R)P(R)/P(S)$.

Note that if we adopt the convention that partial transposes on classical regions are always defined with respect to the preferred basis, then classical joint and conditional states are invariant under this operation. Therefore, classical *causal* states have the same mathematical properties as classical *acausal* states⁴. Since the notational distinction between ρ and ϱ is supposed to act as a reminder of the mathematical difference between causal and acausal states for pairs of quantum regions, there is no need to make the distinction for classical states. We therefore adopt the convention of denoting classical states over an arbitrary set of regions by ρ , regardless of how the regions are causally related.

To complete our discussion of the basic objects in the conditional states formalism, we need to describe how correlations between classical and quantum regions can be represented. The classical variable X is represented by a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_X with a preferred basis, as described above, and the quantum region A is associated with a Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_A with no preferred structure. The hybrid region XA is assigned the Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}_{XA} = \mathcal{H}_X \otimes \mathcal{H}_A$, but in representing correlated states on this space, we must ensure that the classical part remains classical. In particular, this means that there can be no entanglement between X and A , and that the reduced state on X must be diagonal in the preferred basis. This motivates defining a *hybrid quantum-classical* operator on \mathcal{H}_{XA} to be an operator of the form $M_{XA} = \sum_x |x\rangle\langle x|_X \otimes M_{X=x,A}$, where each $M_{X=x,A}$ is an operator on \mathcal{H}_A . The operators $M_{X=x,A}$ are called the *components* of M_{XA} .

It follows that a hybrid joint state has the form $\tau_{XA} = \sum_x |x\rangle\langle x|_X \otimes \tau_{X=x,A}$, where each component $\tau_{X=x,A}$ is an operator on \mathcal{H}_A . Recall that if X and A are acausally related, then τ_{XA} must be positive, while if X and A are causally related, then $\tau_{XA}^{T_A}$ must be positive. However, given the form of a hybrid state, τ_{XA} is positive if and only if $\tau_{XA}^{T_A}$ is positive, so the two conditions are equivalent. Consequently, causal and acausal states on hybrid regions correspond to the same set of operators. Therefore, as for classical states, ρ is used to denote all hybrid states, regardless of their causal interpretation.

By calculating the marginal state ρ_X and ρ_A from the hybrid state ρ_{AX} , we can define conditional states as $\rho_{X|A} = \rho_{AX} \star \rho_A^{-1}$ and $\rho_{A|X} = \rho_{AX} \star \rho_X^{-1} = \rho_{AX} \rho_X^{-1}$.

³ Whilst the partial transpose operation depends on a choice of basis, the *set* of operators that are positive under partial transposition is basis independent.

⁴ Even if we do not adopt the convention of evaluating partial transposes in the preferred basis, the sets of acausal and causal states are still isomorphic. If $\{|r\rangle_R\}$ is the preferred basis for acausal states then this amounts to choosing a preferred basis $\{|r^*\rangle_R\}$ for causal states, where $*$ is complex conjugation in the basis used to define the partial transpose. However, this is an unnecessary complication that is avoided by adopting the recommended convention.

In the latter case, the \star -product reduces to the regular operator product because X is classical. There are two sorts of conditional states for hybrid systems corresponding to whether the quantum or the classical region is on the right of the conditional. If the conditioning system is quantum, then the conditional state has the form $\rho_{X|A} = \sum_x |x\rangle \langle x|_X \otimes \rho_{X=x|A}$ where $\rho_{X=x|A}$ is positive and $\sum_x \rho_{X=x|A} = I_A$. It follows that the set of operators $\{\rho_{X=x|A}\}$ is a Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) and therefore such conditional states can be used to represent measurements, a fact that we shall make use of in §III A. If the conditioning system is classical, then the conditional state has the form $\rho_{A|X} = \sum_x \rho_{A|X=x} \otimes |x\rangle \langle x|_X$ where $\rho_{A|X=x}$ is positive and $\text{Tr}_A(\rho_{A|X=x}) = 1$ for all x . The operators $\{\rho_{A|X=x}\}$ therefore constitute a set of normalized states on A , and can therefore be used to represent state preparations, a fact that will also be used in §III A.

D. Bayesian conditioning

Classically, if you are interested in a random variable R , and you learn that a correlated variable X takes the value x , then you should update your probability distribution for R from the prior, $P(R)$, to the posterior, $P(R|X=x)$. This is known as *Bayesian Conditioning*.

In the conditional states formalism, whenever there is a hybrid region, regardless of the causal relationship between the classical variable X and the quantum region A , you can always assign a joint state ρ_{XA} . When you learn that X takes the value x , the state of the quantum region should be updated from ρ_A to $\rho_{A|X=x}$. This is *quantum Bayesian conditioning*.

E. How to read this paper

This article is mainly concerned with the consequences of conditioning a quantum region on classical data, so the main objects of interest are hybrid conditional states with classical conditioning regions. In this case the set of operators under consideration does not depend on the causal relation between the two regions. However, thus far we have only considered conditioning a quantum region on a *single* classical variable. Suppose instead that you learn the values of *two* classical variables, X_1 and X_2 , and you want to update your beliefs about a quantum region A . In this case, there are some causal scenarios where your beliefs cannot be correctly represented by a joint state $\rho_{AX_1X_2}$. In such scenarios, our results do not apply.

To properly explain the distinction between the types of causal scenario to which our results apply and those to which they do not requires delving into the conditional states formalism in more detail. However, this extra material is not necessary for understanding most of our results, so the reader who is eager to get to the discussion of

compatibility, improvement and pooling can skip ahead to §IV, referring back to §III as necessary.

The next section covers the required background for understanding the scope of our results and gives several examples of experimental scenarios to which our results apply. In particular, all of the causal scenarios that have been considered to date in the literature on compatibility, improvement, and pooling are within the scope of our results. Indeed, given that all previous results have been derived in the context of specific causal scenarios, our results represent a substantial increase in the breadth of applicability, even if they do not yet cover all conceivable cases.

III. MODELING EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS USING THE CONDITIONAL STATES FORMALISM

Table II translates various concepts and formulas from the conventional quantum formalism into the language of conditional states. These correspondences are described in more detail in [1]. The meaning of most of the rows should be evident from the discussion in the previous section, and the rest are explained in this section as needed.

We begin by showing how conditioning a quantum region on a single classical variable works in several different experimental scenarios. This is necessary background knowledge for considering the more relevant scenarios involving conditioning on a pair of variables. The different experiments correspond to different causal structures, which are illustrated by directed acyclic graphs.

A. Conditioning on a single classical variable

In this section, the quantum region we are interested in making inferences about is always denoted B and the classical variable on which the inference is based is denoted X .

Example III.1. Consider the following preparation procedure. A classical random variable X with probability distribution $P(X)$ is generated by flipping coins, rolling dice or any other suitable procedure, and then a quantum region is prepared in a state ρ_x^B depending on the value of X obtained. This scenario is depicted in fig. 1a. Suppose that, initially, you do not know the value of X that was obtained in this procedure. In the conditional states formalism, your beliefs about X are represented by a diagonal state ρ_X with components $\rho_{X=x} \equiv P(X=x)$. The set of states prepared is represented by a conditional state $\rho_{B|X}$ with components $\rho_{B|X=x} \equiv \rho_x^B$. Since the \star -product reduces to a regular product for classical states, the joint state of XB is $\rho_{XB} = \rho_{B|X}\rho_X$. In terms of components, this is $\rho_{XB} = \sum_x P(X=x) |x\rangle \langle x|_X \otimes \rho_x^B$. It follows that ρ_{XB} contains sufficient information to describe an *ensemble* of states, i.e. a set of states supplemented with a

	Conventional Notation	Conditional States Formalism
Probability distribution of X	$P(X)$	ρ_X
Probability that $X = x$	$P(X = x)$	$\rho_{X=x}$
Set of states on A	$\{\rho_x^A\}$	$\rho_{A X}$
Individual state on A	ρ_x^A	$\rho_{A X=x}$
POVM on A	$\{E_x^A\}$	$\rho_{X A}$
Individual effect on A	E_x^A	$\rho_{X=x A}$
Channel from A to B	$\mathcal{E}_{B A}$	$\varrho_{B A}$
Instrument	$\{\mathcal{E}_x^{B A}\}$	$\varrho_{XB A}$
Individual Operation	$\mathcal{E}_x^{B A}$	$\varrho_{X=x,B A}$
The Born rule	$\forall x : P(X = x) = \text{Tr}_A (E_x^A \rho_A)$	$\rho_X = \text{Tr}_A (\rho_{X A} \rho_A)$
Ensemble averaging	$\rho_A = \sum_x P(X = x) \rho_x^A$	$\rho_A = \text{Tr}_X (\rho_{A X} \rho_X)$
Action of a quantum channel	$\rho_B = \mathcal{E}_{B A} (\rho_A)$	$\rho_B = \text{Tr}_A (\varrho_{B A} \rho_A)$
Composition of channels	$\mathcal{E}_{C A} = \mathcal{E}_{C B} \circ \mathcal{E}_{B A}$	$\varrho_{C A} = \text{Tr}_B (\varrho_{C B} \varrho_{B A})$
State update rule	$\forall x : P(X = x) \rho_x^B = \mathcal{E}_x^{B A} (\rho_A)$	$\rho_{XB} = \text{Tr}_A (\varrho_{XB A} \rho_A)$

TABLE II: Translation of concepts and equations from conventional notation to the conditional states formalism.




FIG. 1: Quantum-classical hybrid regions with different causal relations. Triangles represent classical variables (as suggested by the shape of the probability simplex) and circles represent quantum regions (as suggested by the spherical state space of a qubit). (a) Preparation procedure: a quantum region B is prepared in one of a set of states depending on the value of a classical variable X (B is in the causal future of X). (b) Remote measurement: a measurement is made on A , which is acausally related to B . The classical outcome X is then acausally related to B . (c) Measurement: a measurement is made on a quantum region B and the classical variable X represents the outcome (X is in the causal future of B).

probability distribution over them. Tracing over X gives the marginal $\rho_B = \text{Tr}_X (\rho_{B|X} \rho_X) = \sum_x P(X = x) \rho_x^B$, which is easily recognized as the ensemble average state

on B .

According to the conventional formalism, upon learning that X takes the value x , you should assign the state that was prepared for that particular value of X to B , which is just ρ_x^B . However, since $\rho_{B|X=x} = \rho_x^B$ in the conditional states formalism, this update has the form $\rho_B \rightarrow \rho_{B|X=x}$, so it is an example of quantum Bayesian conditioning. The interpretation of conditioning in this scenario is as an update from the ensemble average state to a particular state in the ensemble.

Example III.2. Suppose that A and B are two acausally related quantum regions to which you assign the state ρ_{AB} . The (prior) reduced state on B is $\rho_B = \text{Tr}_A (\rho_{AB})$. Now suppose that you make a measurement on A with outcome described by the variable X and that the measurement is associated with a POVM $\{E_x^A\}$. In the conditional states formalism, the measurement is represented by a conditional state $\rho_{X|A}$, where $\rho_{X=x|A} \equiv E_x^A$. We are interested in how the state for B gets updated upon learning the outcome x of X . This causal scenario is depicted in fig. 1b. This is the scenario that occurs in the EPR experiment, or more generally in “quantum steering”. The update map in this case is sometimes called a “remote collapse rule”.

In the conditional states formalism, the joint state on XB can be determined by belief propagation from A to X , i.e. $\rho_{XB} = \text{Tr}_A (\rho_{X|A} \rho_{AB})$. The marginal on X




FIG. 2: Causal scenario for describing measurement update rules, or quantum instruments. A represents the system before the measurement, X is the measurement outcome and B is the system after the measurement has been completed.

gives the outcome probabilities for the measurement and is given by $\rho_X = \text{Tr}_B(\rho_{BX})$. From these, the conditional state $\rho_{B|X}$ is determined via $\rho_{B|X} = \rho_{BX}\rho_X^{-1}$. By substituting $X = x$ into the expression for $\rho_{B|X}$, we obtain $\rho_{B|X=x}$. This is the state that you should assign to B when you learn that $X = x$, i.e. the update rule for the remote region is just Bayesian conditioning $\rho_B \rightarrow \rho_{B|X=x}$. The updated state $\rho_{B|X=x}$ can be expressed in terms of the givens in the problem, i.e. the state ρ_{AB} and the POVM elements E_x^A , but this is not especially instructive for present purposes. Interested readers can consult [1], where it is shown that this form of Bayesian conditioning is precisely the same as the usual remote collapse rule in the conventional formalism.

Example III.3. Consider the case where X represents the outcome of a direct measurement made on B and you want to condition the state of B on the value of this outcome. This causal scenario is depicted in fig. 1c, and is described by an input state ρ_B and a conditional state $\rho_{X|B}$ with components given by the POVM that is being measured. The conditional $\rho_{B|X=x}$ is then the $X = x$ component of $\rho_{B|X}$, which can be computed from an application of Bayes' theorem $\rho_{B|X} = \rho_{X|B} \star (\rho_B \rho_X^{-1})$, where $\rho_X = \text{Tr}_B(\rho_{X|B}\rho_B)$. The operator $\rho_{B|X=x}$ is the state that should be assigned to region B upon learning that the outcome X takes the value x .

Note that Bayesian conditioning in this case is a kind of *retrodiction*: the region being conditioned upon, the outcome of the measurement, is to the future of the conditioned region, the quantum input to the measurement. This application of Bayesian conditioning to retrodiction is discussed in detail in [1] and is shown to generate precisely the same operational consequences as would be obtained in the conventional formalism for retrodiction.

Example III.4. Finally, consider a direct measurement again, but where the region of interest is the quantum output of the measurement rather than its input. Let A and B denote the input and output respectively. Since these are distinct regions, they must be given distinct labels in the conditional states formalism, whereas conventionally they would be given the same label as they represent the same system at two different times. The

classical variable representing the outcome is X . We are interested in how the state of B should be updated upon learning the value of X . The relevant causal structure is depicted in fig. 2. The causal arrow from X to B represents the fact that the post-measurement state can depend on the measurement outcome in addition to the pre-measurement state.

In general, the rule for determining the state of the region after the measurement, given the state of the region before the measurement and the outcome, is not uniquely determined by the POVM associated with the measurement. The most general possible rule is conventionally represented by a *quantum instrument*, which is a set of trace-nonincreasing completely positive maps, $\{\mathcal{E}_x^{B|A}\}$. The operation $\mathcal{E}_x^{B|A}$ maps a pre-measurement state ρ_A to the unnormalized post-measurement state that should be assigned when the outcome is x , i.e. $\mathcal{E}_x^{B|A}(\rho_A) = P(X = x)\rho_x^B$, where $P(X = x)$ is the probability of obtaining outcome x and ρ_x^B is the normalized post-measurement state. This implies that if a measurement is associated with a POVM $\{E_x^A\}$, then the quantum instrument must satisfy $\text{Tr}_B(\mathcal{E}_x^{B|A}(\rho_A)) = \text{Tr}_A(E_x^A\rho_A)$ for all input states ρ_A .

It is not too difficult to see how to represent a quantum instrument in the conditional states formalism. First, note that the measurement generates an ensemble of states for B , i.e. for each possible outcome $X = x$ there is a probability $P(X = x)$, given by the Born rule, and a corresponding state ρ_x^B for B , which is the state that should be assigned to B when the outcome $X = x$ occurs. We have already seen that an ensemble of states can be written as a joint state ρ_{XB} of the hybrid region XB via $\rho_{XB} = \sum_x P(X = x)|x\rangle\langle x|_X \otimes \rho_x^B$. What is needed then, is a way of determining a joint state ρ_{XB} of XB , given a state ρ_A of region A . Perhaps unsurprisingly, this can be done by specifying a causal conditional state $\varrho_{XB|A}$ and using belief propagation to obtain $\rho_{XB} = \text{Tr}_A(\varrho_{XB|A}\rho_A)$. The POVM that is measured by this procedure is given by the components of the conditional state $\varrho_{X|A} = \text{Tr}_B(\varrho_{XB|A})$. The precise relation between the instrument $\{\mathcal{E}_x^{B|A}\}$ and the causal conditional state $\varrho_{XB|A}$ is obtained through the Jamiolkowski isomorphism and is described in [1].

If you assign a prior state ρ_A to the region before the measurement, and describe the quantum instrument implementing the measurement by $\varrho_{XB|A}$, then the ensemble of output states is described by $\rho_{XB} = \text{Tr}_A(\varrho_{XB|A}\rho_A)$. The marginal state $\rho_B = \text{Tr}_X(\rho_{XB})$ is then your prior state for the output region and $\rho_X = \text{Tr}_B(\rho_{XB})$ gives the Born rule probabilities for the measurement outcomes. The states in the ensemble, $\rho_{B|X=x}$, can then be computed from the conditional $\rho_{B|X} = \rho_{XB}\rho_X^{-1}$. Upon learning that $X = x$, you should update your beliefs about B by Bayesian conditioning, i.e. by the rule $\rho_B \rightarrow \rho_{B|X=x}$.

Note that Bayesian conditioning is *not* a rule that

maps your prior state about the measurement's input to your posterior state about the measurement's output, which would be a map of the form $\rho_A \rightarrow \rho_{B|X=x}$. The projection postulate is an instance of this latter kind of update, but it is not an instance of Bayesian conditioning. Bayesian conditioning is a map from prior states to posterior states of *one and the same region*. The map $\rho_B \rightarrow \rho_{B|X=x}$, which takes the prior state of the measurement's output to the posterior state of the measurement's output *is* an instance of quantum Bayesian conditioning. In the conventional formalism it corresponds to a transition from the output of a non-selective state-update rule, which you would apply when you know that a measurement has occurred but not which outcome was obtained, to the output of the corresponding selective state-update rule, which applies when you do know the outcome.

B. Conditioning on two classical variables

The problems discussed in this paper concern inferences made by multiple (typically two) agents based on different data. Thus, we are interested in conditioning a quantum region on the values of more than one classical variable, which may or may not be known to all the agents.

It is convenient to introduce a few more notational conventions to handle such scenarios. Since we are using letters to denote regions, we use numbers to refer to agents. Given that regions A and B are prominent in our article, it is confusing to use the usual names Alice and Bob for our numbered agents, so we refer to agent 1 as Wanda and agent 2 as Theo. Occasionally, we will refer to a decision-maker, whom we call Debbie, and for which we use the number 0. A classical variable that agent j learns during the course of their inference procedure is denoted X_j . The quantum region about which the agents are making inferences is denoted B , and, when making analogies between quantum theory and classical probability theory, the classical variable analogous to B is denoted Y . Any other auxiliary quantum regions involved in setting up the causal scenario are denoted A (or A_1, A_2, \dots if there is more than one of them) and auxiliary classical variables are denoted Z (or Z_1, Z_2, \dots if there is more than one of them).

Depending on the causal relations between the classical variables X_j and an elementary quantum region B , it is possible to construct scenarios in which the available information about the quantum region cannot be summed up by the assignment of a single state (positive density operator) to the region. For example, this is familiar in the case of pre- and post-selected ensembles, which are described by a pair of states rather than a single state in the formalism of Aharonov et. al. [45]. Although our results apply to a much wider variety of causal scenarios than those typically discussed in the literature on compatibility, improvement, and pooling, we still do not consider situations in which the region of interest has to be




FIG. 3: Introducing an extra classical variable to the causal scenarios depicted in fig. 1 via post-processing.

described by a more exotic object than a single quantum state. Of course, a general quantum theory of Bayesian inference *should* be able to address such scenarios, but that is a topic for future work.

Mathematically speaking, our results apply whenever the following condition holds:

Condition III.5. The joint region consisting of the quantum region of interest, B , and all the classical variables involved in the inference procedure, X_1, X_2, \dots , can be assigned a joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2\dots}$ (which may be either an acausal or a causal state).

Consider the case of two classical variables, X_1 and X_2 , and suppose that a joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ exists. From this, one can compute the reduced states ρ_B, ρ_{X_1} and ρ_{X_2} , and the joint states ρ_{BX_1}, ρ_{BX_2} and $\rho_{X_1X_2}$. From these, one can easily compute the conditional states $\rho_{B|X_1}, \rho_{B|X_2}$ and $\rho_{B|X_1X_2}$. If Wanda learns that $X_1 = x_1$ then she updates ρ_B to her posterior state $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}$, and if Theo learns that $X_2 = x_2$ then he updates ρ_B to his posterior state $\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$. An agent who learns both outcomes would update to $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$. The existence of the joint state $\rho_{X_1X_2B}$ ensures that all the posterior states $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}, \rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$ and $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$ are well defined. Similar comments apply when there are more than two classical variables.

In the remainder of this section, we give several examples of causal scenarios in which this condition does apply, in order to emphasize the generality of our results, and we provide some examples where it does not, to clarify the limitations to their applicability. All the examples involve inferences about a quantum region B based on two classical variables X_1 and X_2 .

1. Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state can be assigned

Example III.6. Perhaps the simplest class of causal scenarios in which a joint state can be assigned are those in which the second variable X_2 is obtained via a post-processing of the variable X_1 , i.e. X_2 is obtained from X_1 via conditional probabilities $P(X_2|X_1)$, or equivalently a

classical conditional state $\rho_{X_2|X_1}$. Only X_1 is directly related to the quantum region B and any correlations between X_2 and B are mediated by X_1 . Examples of this sort of causal scenario are depicted in fig. 3.

In all these scenarios, we already know from §III A that BX_1 can be assigned a joint state ρ_{BX_1} and then the joint state of BX_1X_2 is just

$$\rho_{BX_1X_2} = \rho_{X_2|X_1}\rho_{BX_1}, \quad (2)$$

so condition III.5 is satisfied. These examples are important because they imply that arbitrary classical processing may be performed on a classical variable without changing our ability to assign a joint state. In particular, this is used in §V B where hybrid sufficient statistics are defined as a kind of processing of a classical data variable.




FIG. 4: Wanda and Theo learn variables that are correlated with a variable used to prepare region B .

Example III.7. Consider a generalization of the preparation scenario depicted in fig. 1a to the scenario depicted in fig. 4, which adds two further classical variables that depend on the preparation variable. In this scenario, a classical random variable Z is sampled from a probability distribution $P(Z)$ and, upon obtaining the outcome $Z = z$, a region B is prepared in the state $\rho_{B|Z=z}$. Some data about Z is revealed to the two agents: X_1 to Wanda, and X_2 to Theo. X_1 and X_2 may be coarse-grainings of Z , or they may even depend on Z stochastically. For example, if Z is the outcome of a dice roll, then X_1 and X_2 could both be binary variables, with X_1 indicating whether Z is odd or even and X_2 indicating whether it is ≤ 3 . Generally, the dependence of X_1 and X_2 on Z is given by classical conditional states $\rho_{X_1|Z}$ and $\rho_{X_2|Z}$. A joint state for X_1X_2B can be defined in this case via

$$\rho_{X_1X_2B} = \text{Tr}_Z (\rho_{X_1|Z}\rho_{X_2|Z}\rho_{B|Z}\rho_Z), \quad (3)$$

so, again, condition III.5 is satisfied.

Example III.8. Consider the generalization of the remote measurement scenario depicted in fig. 1b to a pair of remote measurements, as depicted in fig. 5. This scenario is in fact the one that is adopted in much of the literature on compatibility and pooling [10, 24, 25]. The region of interest, B , is acausally related to two other quantum regions, A_1 and A_2 , so we have a tripartite state $\rho_{A_1A_2B}$. Direct measurements are made on A_1 and A_2 , with outcomes X_1 and X_2 respectively, and which are described by the conditional states $\rho_{X_1|A_1}$ and $\rho_{X_2|A_2}$ respectively.




FIG. 5: Wanda and Theo learn about B by making measurements on two acausally related regions A_1 and A_2 .

It is assumed that Wanda learns only X_1 and Theo learns only X_2 . In this case, we can define a tripartite acausal state by

$$\rho_{X_1X_2B} = \text{Tr}_{A_1A_2} (\rho_{X_1|A_1}\rho_{X_2|A_2}\rho_{A_1A_2B}). \quad (4)$$




FIG. 6: Wanda and Theo learn variables derived from a direct measurement made on region B .

Example III.9. Consider a generalization of the direct measurement scenario depicted in fig. 1c to the scenario of fig. 6, which introduces two further classical variables that depend on the measurement result. This is similar to the second example considered in this section except that, rather than Z being used to prepare B , it is now obtained by making a direct measurement on B , described by the conditional state $\rho_{Z|B}$. As before, some information about Z is distributed to each agent, specifically, variables X_1 and X_2 to Wanda and Theo respectively. The dependence of X_1 and X_2 on Z is again described by conditional states $\rho_{X_1|Z}$ and $\rho_{X_2|Z}$. In this case, a joint state $\rho_{X_1X_2B}$ can be defined as

$$\rho_{X_1X_2B} = \text{Tr}_Z (\rho_{X_1|Z}\rho_{X_2|Z} [\rho_{Z|B} \star \rho_B]), \quad (5)$$

and conditioning on values of the classical variables yields states that are relevant for retrodiction.

Example III.10. Consider a generalization of the measurement scenario depicted in fig. 2 to a case where a pair of measurements are implemented in succession, as depicted in fig. 7. This scenario has been considered in the context of compatibility and pooling by Jacobs [28], as discussed in §IV C 2. The input region of the first measurement is denoted A_1 . The output of the first measurement, which is also the input of the second, is denoted A_2 ,




FIG. 7: Wanda and Theo learn the results of two measurements performed in sequence.

and the output of the second measurement, which is the region about which Wanda and Theo seek to make inferences, is denoted by B . The classical variables describing the outcomes of the two measurements are denoted X_1 and X_2 respectively, and it is assumed that Wanda learns X_1 while Theo learns X_2 .

Suppose that Wanda and Theo agree on the input state ρ_{A_1} and on the causal conditional states, $\varrho_{X_1 A_2 | A_1}$ and $\varrho_{X_2 B | A_2}$, that describe the measurements. A joint state can then be assigned to $X_1 X_2 B$ via

$$\rho_{X_1 X_2 B} = \text{Tr}_{A_1 A_2} (\varrho_{X_2 B | A_2} \varrho_{X_1 A_2 | A_1} \rho_{A_1}). \quad (6)$$

The interpretation of eq. (6) is that the two consecutive measurements can be thought of as a preparation procedure for B that prepares the states in the ensemble $\rho_{X_1 X_2 B}$ depending on the values of X_1 and X_2 .

These examples should serve to give an idea of the type of scenarios to which our results apply.

2. Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state cannot be assigned

Example III.11. Consider the prepare-and-measure scenario depicted in fig. 8. Here, B is prepared in a state depending on the preparation variable X_1 and then B is measured, resulting in the outcome X_2 . More concretely, consider the case where B is a qubit prepared in the $\{|0\rangle_B, |1\rangle_B\}$ basis and measured in the $\{|+\rangle_B, |-\rangle_B\}$ basis, where $|\pm\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle \pm |1\rangle)$. Suppose that X_2 takes the value $X_2 = 0$ for $|+\rangle_B$ and $X_2 = 1$ for $|-\rangle_B$. Although it is possible to assign joint states to $X_1 B$ and to $X_2 B$, the conditional states that these assignments imply are not compatible with any joint state for $X_1 X_2 B$.

To see this, note that the joint states for $X_1 B$ and $X_2 B$ have to be of the form

$$\rho_{X_1 B} = P(X_1 = 0) |0\rangle \langle 0|_{X_1} \otimes |0\rangle \langle 0|_B + P(X_1 = 1) |1\rangle \langle 1|_{X_1} \otimes |1\rangle \langle 1|_B \quad (7)$$




FIG. 8: Wanda learns a preparation variables and Theo learns a measurement variable. Learning both variables gives a pre- and post-selected ensemble.

$$\rho_{X_2 B} = P(X_2 = 0) |0\rangle \langle 0|_{X_2} \otimes |+\rangle \langle +|_B + P(X_2 = 1) |1\rangle \langle 1|_{X_2} \otimes |-\rangle \langle -|_B, \quad (8)$$

where $P(X_1)$ is the distribution of the preparation variable and $P(X_2)$ is the Born rule probability distribution for the outcomes of the measurement.

Then, $\rho_{B | X_1 = x_1}$ is a definite state in the $\{|0\rangle_B, |1\rangle_B\}$ basis and $\rho_{B | X_2 = x_2}$ is a definite state in the $\{|+\rangle_B, |-\rangle_B\}$ basis. Any putative $\rho_{B | X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2}$, derived from a joint state of all three regions, would then have to have definite values for measurements in both the $\{|0\rangle_B, |1\rangle_B\}$ basis and in the $\{|+\rangle_B, |-\rangle_B\}$ basis. There is no state with this property because these are complimentary observables.

Conditioning on both $X_1 = x_1$ and $X_2 = x_2$ represents a case of pre- and post-selection, and, as argued by Aharonov et. al. [45], the concept of a quantum state has to be generalized in order to handle such cases.




FIG. 9: Learning both the outcome of a direct measurement and the outcome of a remote measurement.

Example III.12. Consider two acausally related quantum regions A and B . Here, B is the region of interest, but direct measurements are made on both A and B , resulting in the classical variables X_1 and X_2 respectively. This is depicted in fig. 9. Formally, this is very similar to pre- and post-selection and a joint state of $X_1 X_2 B$ is ruled out for similar reasons.

Suppose that A and B are qubits and that $\rho_{AB} = |\Psi^-\rangle \langle \Psi^-|_{AB}$ is a singlet state, where $|\Psi^-\rangle_{AB} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|01\rangle - |10\rangle)_{AB}$. If X_1 is the result of a measurement of A in the $\{|0\rangle_A, |1\rangle_A\}$ basis and X_2 is the result of measuring B in the $\{|+\rangle_B, |-\rangle_B\}$ basis then, as before, the

state $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}$ would have to be a definite state in the $\{|0\rangle_B, |1\rangle_B\}$ basis and $\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$ would have to be a definite state in the $\{|+\rangle_B, |-\rangle_B\}$ basis. The putative joint state would then have to have a conditional with components $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$ that are definite in both bases, which is not possible in the formalism as it currently stands.

IV. COMPATIBILITY OF QUANTUM STATES

This section describes our Bayesian approach to the compatibility of quantum states. We give alternative derivations of the BFM compatibility criterion from the point of view of objective and subjective Bayesianism. In each case, we begin by reviewing the corresponding argument in the classical case in order to build intuition, and draw out the parallels to the quantum case using the conditional states formalism.

A. Objective Bayesian compatibility

First consider compatibility for a classical random variable Y . For the objective Bayesian, the only way that two agents' probability assignments can differ is if they have had access to different data, so suppose Wanda learns the value of a random variable X_1 and Theo learns the value of a different random variable X_2 . According to the objective Bayesian, there is a unique prior probability distribution $P(Y, X_1, X_2)$ that both Wanda and Theo ought to initially assign to the three variables before they have observed the values of the X_j 's. Both Wanda and Theo's prior distribution for Y alone is simply the marginal $P(Y) = \sum_{X_1, X_2} P(Y, X_1, X_2)$. Upon observing a particular value x_j of X_j , Wanda and Theo update to their posterior distributions $P(Y|X_j = x_j)$.

Now suppose that we don't know the details of how Wanda and Theo arrived at their probability assignments and we are simply told that, at some specific point in time, Wanda assigns some distribution $Q_1(Y)$ to Y and Theo assigns a distribution $Q_2(Y)$ (different from $Q_1(Y)$ in general). For the objective Bayesian, this can only arise in the manner described above, so the notion of compatibility is defined as follows.

Definition IV.1 (Classical objective Bayesian compatibility). Two probability distributions $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ are *compatible* if it is possible to construct a pair of random variables, X_1 and X_2 , and a joint distribution $P(Y, X_1, X_2)$ such that $Q_1(Y)$ can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on $X_1 = x_1$ for some value x_1 , and $Q_2(Y)$ can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on $X_2 = x_2$ for some value x_2 , that is,

$$Q_j(Y) = P(Y|X_j = x_j) \quad (9)$$

for some values x_j of X_j . Further, we require that $P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2) \neq 0$ so that there is a possibility for both outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.

This definition of compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that the supports of $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ have nontrivial intersection, where the support of a probability distribution $P(Y)$ is defined as $\text{supp}[P(Y)] \equiv \{y \mid P(Y = y) > 0\}$.

Theorem IV.2. *Two distributions $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ satisfy definition IV.1, i.e. they are compatible in the objective Bayesian sense, iff they share some common support, i.e.*

$$\text{supp}[Q_1(Y)] \cap \text{supp}[Q_2(Y)] \neq \emptyset. \quad (10)$$

The proof makes use of the following lemma.

Lemma IV.3. If a probability distribution $P(X, Y)$ satisfies $P(X = x) \neq 0$ then $\text{supp}[P(Y|X = x)] \subseteq \text{supp}[P(Y)]$.

Proof. The condition $P(X = x) \neq 0$ implies that $P(Y = y|X = x)$ is well defined for all y . Let $\ker[P(Y)] = \{y \mid P(Y = y) = 0\}$, i.e. $\ker[P(Y)]$ is the complement of $\text{supp}[P(Y)]$. Let $y \in \ker[P(Y)]$. Since $P(Y = y) = 0$, we have $\sum_{x'} P(Y = y, X = x') = 0$, which implies that $P(Y = y, X = x') = 0$ for every value x' and consequently that $P(Y = y|X = x) = 0$. In other words, $y \in \ker[P(Y)]$ implies $y \in \ker[P(Y|X = x)]$, which means that $\ker[P(Y)] \subseteq \ker[P(Y|X = x)]$, or equivalently $\text{supp}[P(Y|X = x)] \subseteq \text{supp}[P(Y)]$. \square

Proof of theorem IV.2.

The ‘‘only if’’ half:

It is given that there is a joint distribution $P(Y, X_1, X_2)$ such that $Q_j(Y) = P(Y|X_j = x_j)$. Since $P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2) \neq 0$, $P(Y|X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2)$ exists and, by lemma IV.3, it must satisfy

$$\text{supp}[P(Y|X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2)] \subseteq \text{supp}[P(Y|X_1 = x_1)] \quad (11)$$

$$\text{supp}[P(Y|X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2)] \subseteq \text{supp}[P(Y|X_2 = x_2)]. \quad (12)$$

Since every probability distribution has nontrivial support, $\text{supp}[P(Y|X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2)] \neq \emptyset$, so

$$\text{supp}[P(Y|X_1 = x_1)] \cap \text{supp}[P(Y|X_2 = x_2)] \neq \emptyset. \quad (13)$$

The ‘‘if’’ half:

Given that $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ have intersecting support, one can find a normalized probability distribution $Q_0(Y)$ such that

$$Q_1(Y) = p_1 Q_0(Y) + (1 - p_1) Q'_1(Y), \quad (14)$$

$$Q_2(Y) = p_2 Q_0(Y) + (1 - p_2) Q'_2(Y), \quad (15)$$

where $Q'_1(Y)$ and $Q'_2(Y)$ are each normalized probability distributions and $0 < p_1, p_2 \leq 1$.

This decomposition can be used to construct two random variables, X_1 and X_2 , and a joint distribution $P(Y, X_1, X_2)$ such that $P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2) \neq 0$ and $Q_j(Y) = P(Y|X_j = x_j)$ for some values x_1 and x_2 . Let X_1 and X_2 be bit-valued variables that take values $\{0, 1\}$, and define

$$P(Y|X_1 = 0, X_2 = 0) = Q_0(Y) \quad (16)$$

$$P(Y|X_1 = 0, X_2 = 1) = Q'_1(Y) \quad (17)$$

$$P(Y|X_1 = 1, X_2 = 0) = Q'_2(Y). \quad (18)$$

The result of conditioning on $(X_1 = 1, X_2 = 1)$ can be taken to be an arbitrary distribution, denoted by $N(Y)$, i.e.

$$P(Y|X_1 = 1, X_2 = 1) = N(Y). \quad (19)$$

Next, define the following distribution over X_1 and X_2 :

$$P(X_1 = 0, X_2 = 0) = p_1 p_2 \quad (20)$$

$$P(X_1 = 0, X_2 = 1) = (1 - p_1) p_2 \quad (21)$$

$$P(X_1 = 1, X_2 = 0) = p_1 (1 - p_2) \quad (22)$$

$$P(X_1 = 1, X_2 = 1) = (1 - p_1) (1 - p_2). \quad (23)$$

Using these, we can define $P(Y, X_1, X_2) = P(Y|X_1, X_2)P(X_1, X_2)$. It is straightforward to verify that this satisfies $P(X_1 = 0, X_2 = 0) = p_1 p_2 > 0$ and that $P(Y|X_1 = 0)$ and $P(Y|X_2 = 0)$ are equal to the right-hand sides of eqs. (14) and (15). Consequently, they are equal to $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ respectively. \square

The ‘‘only if’’ part of the proof of theorem IV.2 establishes that intersecting supports is a necessary requirement for objective Bayesian state assignments. On the other hand, the ‘‘if’’ part only establishes sufficiency for causal scenarios that support generic joint states. For a given causal scenario, i.e. a given set of causal relations holding among Y , X_1 and X_2 , there may be restrictions on the joint probability distributions that can arise. As an extreme example, if the causal structure is such that the composite variable YX_1 and the elementary variable X_2 are neither connected by some direct or indirect causal influence, nor connected by a common cause, then they will be statistically independent and the joint distribution will factorize as $P(Y, X_1, X_2) = P(Y, X_1)P(X_2)$. Under such a restriction, there are certain pairs of states $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ that have intersecting support, but Wanda and Theo could never come to assign them by conditioning on X_1 and X_2 . For instance, in the example just mentioned, $Q_2(Y)$ must be equal to the prior over Y and consequently, by lemma IV.3, the only pairs $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ that can arise by such conditioning are pairs for which the support of $Q_1(Y)$ is contained in that of $Q_2(Y)$. Therefore, not every pair of compatible state assignments will arise in a given causal scenario. On the other hand, in ‘‘generic’’ scenarios wherein the causal structure does not force any conditional independences in the joint distribution over Y , X_1 and X_2 , the ‘‘if’’ part of the proof does establish that any pair of states with

intersecting support can arise as the state assignments of a pair of objective Bayesian agents.

Turning now to the quantum case, consider a quantum region B with Hilbert space \mathcal{H}_B . For the objective Bayesian the only way that two agents’ state assignments to B can differ is if they have access to different data. We represent this data by two random variables X_1 and X_2 , where Wanda has access to X_1 and Theo has access to X_2 . Assume that the causal scenario of the experiment can be described by a joint state on the hybrid region BX_1X_2 , as discussed in §III B.

Given that this is an objective Bayesian approach, before Wanda and Theo observe the values of the X_j ’s, there is a unique prior state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ which they should both assign, the prior state for B alone being $\rho_B = \text{Tr}_{X_1X_2}(\rho_{BX_1X_2})$. After Wanda and Theo observe the values x_j for X_j they update their states for B to the posteriors $\rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$.

Now suppose that we don’t know the details of how Wanda and Theo arrived at their state assignments and we are simply told that, at some specific point in time, Wanda assigns a state $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ to B and Theo assigns a state $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ (different from $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ in general). For the objective Bayesian, this can only arise in the manner described above, so the condition for compatibility is that it should be possible to construct a hybrid state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ over B and two classical random variables X_1 and X_2 such that $\sigma_B^{(j)} = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$ for some values x_j of X_j .

Definition IV.4 (Quantum objective Bayesian compatibility). Two quantum states $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ of a region B are compatible if it is possible to construct a pair of random variables X_1 and X_2 and a hybrid state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ such that $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on $X_1 = x_1$ for some value x_1 , and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on $X_2 = x_2$ for some value x_2 , i.e.

$$\sigma_B^{(j)} = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j} \quad (24)$$

for some values x_j of X_j . Further, we require that $\rho_{X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2} \neq 0$ so that there is a possibility for both outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.

This holds whenever the BFM compatibility condition is satisfied, as the following theorem demonstrates. Recall that the support of a state ρ_B is the span of the eigenvectors of ρ_B associated with nonzero eigenvalues. We denote it by $\text{supp}[\rho_B]$.

Theorem IV.5. *Two quantum states $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ of a region B satisfy definition IV.4, i.e. they are compatible in the objective Bayesian sense, iff they share some common support, i.e.*

$$\text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(1)}] \cap \text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(2)}] \neq \emptyset, \quad (25)$$

where \cap indicates the geometric intersection of the subspaces.

The proof of this theorem closely resembles the proof of its classical counterpart. First, note the quantum analogue of lemma IV.3.

Lemma IV.6. If a hybrid state ρ_{XB} satisfies $\rho_{X=x} \neq 0$ then $\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X=x}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\rho_B]$.

Proof. The condition $\rho_{X=x} \neq 0$ implies that $\rho_{B|X=x}$ is well defined. Let $\ker[\rho_B] = \{|\psi\rangle_B \mid \rho_B|\psi\rangle_B = 0\}$, i.e. $\ker[\rho_B]$ is the orthogonal complement of $\text{supp}[\rho_B]$. Let $|\psi\rangle_B \in \ker[\rho_B]$. Then $\langle\psi|_B \text{Tr}_X(\rho_{BX})|\psi\rangle_B = 0$. This implies that $\langle\psi|_B \rho_{B,X=x'}|\psi\rangle_B = 0$ for every x' because each operator $\rho_{B,X=x'}$ is positive. Consequently, $\langle\psi|_B \rho_{B|X=x}|\psi\rangle_B = 0$. In other words, if $|\psi\rangle_B \in \ker[\rho_B]$ then $|\psi\rangle_B \in \ker[\rho_{B|X=x}]$, which means that $\ker[\rho_B] \subseteq \ker[\rho_{B|X=x}]$, or equivalently $\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X=x}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\rho_B]$. \square

Proof of theorem IV.5.

The “only if” half:

It is given that there is a hybrid joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ such that $\sigma_B^{(j)} = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$ for some values x_j of X_j . Since $\rho_{X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2} \neq 0$, the conditional state $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$ is well defined. Lemma IV.6 then implies that

$$\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}] \quad (26)$$

$$\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}]. \quad (27)$$

Since $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$ has nontrivial support, it follows that

$$\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}] \cap \text{supp}[\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}] \neq \emptyset. \quad (28)$$

The “if” half:

Given that $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ have intersecting support, one can find a quantum state μ_B such that

$$\sigma_B^{(1)} = p_1\mu_B + (1-p_1)\eta_B^{(1)}, \quad (29)$$

$$\sigma_B^{(2)} = p_2\mu_B + (1-p_2)\eta_B^{(2)}, \quad (30)$$

where $\eta_B^{(1)}$ and $\eta_B^{(2)}$ are each quantum states and $0 < p_1, p_2 \leq 1$.

This decomposition can be used to construct two classical variables, X_1 and X_2 and a hybrid state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ such that $\rho_{X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2} \neq 0$ and $\sigma_B^{(j)} = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$ for some values x_1 and x_2 . Let X_1 and X_2 be bit-valued variables, and define

$$\rho_{B|X_1=0, X_2=0} = \mu_B \quad (31)$$

$$\rho_{B|X_1=0, X_2=1} = \eta_B^{(1)} \quad (32)$$

$$\rho_{B|X_1=1, X_2=0} = \eta_B^{(2)}. \quad (33)$$

The result of conditioning on $(X_1 = 1, X_2 = 1)$ can be taken to be an arbitrary state, denoted ν_B , i.e.

$$\rho_{B|X_1=1, X_2=1} = \nu_B. \quad (34)$$

Next, define the following (classical) state over X_1 and X_2 :

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_{X_1, X_2} = & p_1 p_2 |00\rangle\langle 00|_{X_1 X_2} \\ & + (1-p_1)p_2 |01\rangle\langle 01|_{X_1 X_2} \\ & + p_1(1-p_2) |10\rangle\langle 10|_{X_1 X_2} \\ & + (1-p_2)(1-p_2) |11\rangle\langle 11|_{X_1 X_2}. \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

This can be combined with the conditional states defined above to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_{BX_1X_2} = & \rho_{B|X_1X_2}\rho_{X_1X_2} \\ = & p_1 p_2 (\mu_B \otimes |00\rangle\langle 00|_{X_1 X_2}) \\ & + (1-p_1)p_2 (\eta_B^{(1)} \otimes |01\rangle\langle 01|_{X_1 X_2}) \\ & + p_1(1-p_2) (\eta_B^{(2)} \otimes |10\rangle\langle 10|_{X_1 X_2}) \\ & + (1-p_2)(1-p_2) (\nu_B \otimes |11\rangle\langle 11|_{X_1 X_2}). \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

It is then easy to verify that $\rho_{B|X_1=0}$ and $\rho_{B|X_2=0}$ are equal to the right-hand sides of eqs. (29) and (30), and consequently are equal to $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ respectively. \square

As noted in the classical case, the “if” part of the proof only establishes sufficiency of the BFM criterion for causal scenarios that support generic joint states. Certain causal scenarios may enforce a restriction on the pairs of states $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ that Wanda and Theo can come to assign by conditioning on X_1 and X_2 . For instance, consider the causal scenarios depicted in fig. 3, where X_2 is obtained by post-processing of X_1 , so that all correlations between X_2 and B are mediated by X_1 . In this case, the only pairs $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ that can arise by conditioning on X_1 and X_2 are those for which the support of $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ is contained in that of $\sigma_B^{(2)}$. We are led to the same conclusion as we found classically: although BFM compatibility is necessary in any causal scenario, not every pair of BFM compatible state assignments can arise in every causal scenario. Nonetheless, we can always find a causal scenario wherein there are no restrictions on the joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ and therefore no restriction on the states to which a pair of agents can be led by Bayesian conditioning. The causal scenario considered by BFM, where X_1 and X_2 are the outcomes of a pair of remote measurements on B (depicted in fig. 5) is one such example, as is the causal scenario considered by Jacobs, where X_1 and X_2 are the outcomes of a sequential pair of measurements and B is the output (depicted in fig. 5)⁵.

⁵ To realize an arbitrary joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ in this scenario, it suffices to use the following components. Let A_1 and A_2 be classical systems that each have a preferred basis that is labeled by the values of both X_1 and X_2 . Set the state of the input A_1 to $\rho_{A_1} = \sum_{x_1, x_2} P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2) |x_1 x_2\rangle\langle x_1 x_2|_{A_1}$, where

B. Subjective Bayesian compatibility

A subjective Bayesian cannot use the approach just discussed in general, since it depends on postulating a unique prior state over B , X_1 , and X_2 (or Y , X_1 , and X_2 in the classical case) that all agents agree upon before collecting their data. Given that the choice of prior is an unanalyzable matter of belief for the subjectivist, there is no reason why Wanda and Theo need to agree on a prior at the outset and, further, there is no reason why the difference in their probability assignments has to be explained by their having had access to different data in the first place. If it happens that Wanda and Theo did have a shared prior before collecting their data then the argument runs through, but for the subjective Bayesian this is the exception rather than the rule. In fact, since subjective Bayesians do not rule out as irrational the possibility of agents starting out with contradictory beliefs, it might seem that there is no role for compatibility criteria in this approach at all.

However, this is not the case since, although subjective Bayesians do not analyze how agents arrive at their beliefs, they are interested in whether it is possible for them to reach inter-subjective agreement in the future, i.e. whether it is possible for them to resolve their differences by experiment or whether their disagreement is so extreme that one of them has to make a wholesale revision of their beliefs in order to reach agreement. In the classical case, a subjective Bayesian will therefore say that two probability assignments $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ to a random variable Y are compatible if it is possible to construct an experiment, for which Wanda and Theo agree upon a statistical model, i.e. a likelihood function $P(X|Y)$, such that at least one outcome $X = x$ of the experiment would cause Wanda and Theo to assign identical probabilities when they update their probabilities by Bayesian conditioning. In other words, the subjective Bayesian account of compatibility is in terms of the possibility of *future* agreement, in contrast to the objective Bayesian account, which relies on a guarantee of agreement in the *past*⁶

Definition IV.7 (Classical subjective Bayesian compatibility). Two probability distributions, $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$, are compatible if it is possible to construct a random variable X and a conditional probability distribution $P(X|Y)$ (often called a likelihood function in this context) such that there exists a value x of X for which $\sum_Y P(X = x|Y)Q_j(Y) \neq 0$ and

$$P_1(Y|X = x) = P_2(Y|X = x) \quad (37)$$

where $P_j(Y|X) \equiv P(X|Y)Q_j(Y)/\sum_Y P(X|Y)Q_j(Y)$.

It turns out that the mathematical criteria that $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ must satisfy in order to be compatible in this subjective Bayesian sense are precisely the same as those required for objective Bayesian compatibility.

Theorem IV.8. *Two probability distributions $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ satisfy definition IV.7, i.e. they are compatible in the subjective Bayesian sense, iff they share some common support, i.e.*

$$\text{supp}[Q_1(Y)] \cap \text{supp}[Q_2(Y)] \neq \emptyset. \quad (38)$$

Proof.

The “only if” half:

Since $P_j(Y|X = x)$ is derived from $Q_j(Y)$ by Bayesian conditioning, it follows from lemma IV.3 that

$$\text{supp}[P_1(Y|X = x)] \subseteq \text{supp}[Q_1(Y)] \quad (39)$$

$$\text{supp}[P_2(Y|X = x)] \subseteq \text{supp}[Q_2(Y)]. \quad (40)$$

However, by assumption, $P_1(Y|X = x) = P_2(Y|X = x)$, so the left-hand sides of eqs. (39) and (40) are equal. It follows that $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$ have some common support, namely, $\text{supp}[P_1(S|X = x)]$.

The “if” half:

By assumption, there is at least one value y of Y belonging to the common support of $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$. Let X be a classical bit and define the likelihood function

$$P(X = 0|Y = y) = 1 \quad P(X = 1|Y = y) = 0 \quad (41)$$

$$P(X = 0|Y \neq y) = 0 \quad P(X = 1|Y \neq y) = 1. \quad (42)$$

If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood function, then, upon observing $X = 0$, they will update their distributions to

$$P_j(Y = y'|X = 0) = \frac{P(X = 0|Y = y')Q_j(Y = y')}{\sum_{y'} P(X = 0|Y = y')Q_j(Y = y')} = \delta_{y,y'}, \quad (43)$$

which is independent of j and hence brings them into agreement. \square

$P(X_1 = x_1, X_2 = x_2) = \rho_{X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$. Let the first quantum instrument, $\varrho_{X_1 A_2 | A_1}$, be a measurement of the projector-valued measure $\{|x_1\rangle\langle x_1| \otimes I\}$ with a projection postulate update rule, and let the second quantum instrument, $\varrho_{X_2 B | A_2}$, be a measurement of the projector-valued measure $\{I \otimes |x_2\rangle\langle x_2|\}$ with an update rule that takes $|x_1 x_2\rangle\langle x_1 x_2|_{A_2}$ to $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$.

⁶ Note that by “the possibility of future agreement” we mean agreement about what value the variable Y took at some particular moment in its dynamical history, but where that agreement might only be achieved in the future epistemological lives of the agents, after they have acquired more information. We do *not* mean the possibility of agreement about what value the variable Y takes at some future moment in its dynamical history. The distinction between these two sorts of temporal relation, i.e. between moments in the epistemological history of an agent on the one hand and between moments in the ontological history of the

system on the other, is critical when discussing Bayesian inference for systems that persist in time. It is discussed in [1] and in § IV C 3.

In the quantum case, if Wanda and Theo assign states $\sigma_S^{(j)}$ to a quantum region then they are compatible if there is some classical data X that they can collect about the system, for which Wanda and Theo agree upon a statistical model, such that observing at least one value x of X would cause their state assignments to become identical.

Definition IV.9 (Quantum subjective Bayesian compatibility). Two states $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ are compatible if it is possible to construct a random variable X and a conditional state $\rho_{X|B}$ (which we call a likelihood operator) such that there exists a value x of X for which $\text{Tr}_B(\rho_{X=x|B}\sigma_B^{(j)}) \neq 0$ and

$$\rho_{B|X=x}^{(1)} = \rho_{B|X=x}^{(2)} \quad (44)$$

where $\rho_{B|X=x}^{(j)}$ is given by the quantum Bayes' theorem: $\rho_{B|X=x}^{(j)} \equiv (\rho_{X=x|B} \star \sigma_B^{(j)}) / \text{Tr}_B(\rho_{X=x|B}\sigma_B^{(j)})$.

Once again, subjective Bayesian compatibility has the same mathematical consequences as its objective counterpart. Both are equivalent to requiring the BFM criterion.

Theorem IV.10. *Two states $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ satisfy definition IV.9, i.e. they are compatible in the subjective Bayesian sense, iff they share common support, i.e.*

$$\text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(1)}] \cap \text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(2)}] \neq \emptyset, \quad (45)$$

where \cap denotes the geometric intersection.

Proof.

The “only if” half:

Since $\rho_{B|X=x}^{(j)}$ is derived from $\sigma_B^{(j)}$ by Bayesian conditioning, it follows from lemma IV.6 that

$$\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X=x}^{(1)}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(1)}] \quad (46)$$

$$\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X=x}^{(2)}] \subseteq \text{supp}[\sigma_B^{(2)}]. \quad (47)$$

However, by assumption, $\rho_{B|X=x}^{(1)} = \rho_{B|X=x}^{(2)}$, so the left-hand sides of eqs. (46) and (47) are equal. It follows that $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ have some common support, namely, $\text{supp}[\rho_{B|X=x}^{(1)}]$.

The “if” half:

By assumption, the supports of $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$ have non-trivial intersection. It follows that there is a pure state $|\psi\rangle_B \in \mathcal{H}_B$ in the common support. Let X be a classical bit and define the likelihood operator

$$\rho_{X|B} = |0\rangle\langle 0|_X \otimes |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|_B + |1\rangle\langle 1|_X \otimes (I_B - |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|_B). \quad (48)$$

If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood operator, then, upon observing $X = 0$ they will update their states to

$$\rho_{B|X=0}^{(j)} = \frac{\rho_{X=0|B} \star \sigma_B^{(j)}}{\text{Tr}_B(\rho_{X=0|B}\sigma_B^{(j)})} = |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|_B, \quad (49)$$

which is independent of j and hence brings them into agreement. \square

C. Comparison to other approaches

1. Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin

The original BFM argument [24], which is objective Bayesian in flavor, is divided into arguments for the necessity and sufficiency of their criterion. To establish sufficiency, they show that for any pair of state assignments that satisfy their criterion, one can find a triple of distinct systems, and a quantum state thereon, such that if Wanda measures one system and Theo another, then for some pair of outcomes Wanda and Theo are led to update their description of the third system to the given pair of state assignments. This is equivalent to the “if” part of our theorem IV.5 when applied to the remote measurement scenario depicted in fig. 5. The argument provided by BFM for the necessity of their criterion is based on a set of reasonable-sounding requirements. For example, their first requirement is:

If anybody describes a system with a density matrix ρ , then nobody can find it to be in a pure state in the null space of ρ . For although anyone can get a measurement outcome that everyone has assigned nonzero probabilities, nobody can get an outcome that anybody knows to be impossible.

If one is adopting an approach wherein quantum states describe the information, knowledge, or beliefs of agents, then the notion of finding a system “to be in a pure state” is inappropriate, as emphasized by Caves, Fuchs and Schack [29]. However, even glossing over this, their argument does not satisfy an ideal to which a proper objective Bayesian account of compatibility should strive, namely, of being justified by a general methodology for Bayesian inference. This ideal is illustrated by the derivation of the objective Bayesian criterion of *classical* compatibility presented in §IVA: if a pair of agents obey the strictures of objective Bayesianism, i.e. assigning the same ignorance priors and updating their probabilities via Bayesian conditioning, then they will never encounter a situation in which the compatibility condition does not hold, and conversely if the compatibility condition holds, it is always possible for them to come to their state assignments by Bayesian updating.

Because we have proposed a methodology for *quantum* Bayesian inference, we can achieve this ideal in the quantum case as well. Indeed, the close parallel between the proofs of the classical and quantum compatibility theorems demonstrates that one can achieve the ideal in the quantum context to precisely the same extent that it can be achieved in the classical context. Whilst our argument for sufficiency of the BFM criterion (the second part of our proof of theorem IV.5) is mathematically similar to BFM’s argument for sufficiency, it is only against the background of our framework of quantum conditional states that it becomes possible to identify the update rule used by Wanda and Theo as an instance of Bayesian conditioning, and thus a special case of a general methodology for Bayesian inference.

A second point to note is that in our argument for the compatibility condition, we consider a triple of space-time regions that do not necessarily correspond to three distinct systems at a given time — the case considered by BFM. The causal relation between them might instead be any of those depicted in figs. 3–7, or indeed any scenario wherein all the available information about the quantum region can be captured by assigning a single quantum state. Thus, our results generalize the range of applicability of the BFM compatibility criterion to a broader set of causal scenarios.

2. Jacobs

Jacobs [28] has also considered the compatibility of state assignments using an approach that is objective Bayesian in flavor. In his analysis, the region of interest is the output of a sequence of measurements made one after the other on the same system, and Wanda and Theo have information about the outcomes of distinct subsets of those measurements. A simple version of this scenario is where there is a sequence of *two* measurements, where the outcome of the first measurement is known to Wanda and the outcome of the second is known to Theo. This is just the causal scenario depicted in fig. 7, and as emphasized there, such a scenario falls within the scope of our approach. In the objective Bayesian framework, Wanda and Theo agree on the input state to the pair of measurements and they agree on the quantum instruments that describe each measurement. Jacobs shows that if Wanda and Theo’s state assignments are obtained in this way, then they must satisfy the BFM compatibility criterion, that is, he provides an argument for the necessity of the BFM compatibility criterion in this causal context.

If Wanda and Theo come to their state assignments for B using Jacobs’ scheme, then, as explained in §III B, their prior knowledge of B and the two outcome variables, X_1 and X_2 , can be described by a joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$. After observing values x_1 and x_2 respectively, they come to assign states $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}$ and $\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$, which are derived from the conditional states of the joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$. Such a pair of states satisfies the definition IV.4 of quan-

tum objective Bayesian compatibility. Theorem IV.5 then implies that their state assignments satisfy the BFM compatibility criterion. Conversely, because the set of joint states $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ which can arise in this causal scenario is unrestricted (see footnote ⁵), it also follows from theorem IV.5 that for any pair of state assignments satisfying the BFM criterion, Wanda and Theo could come to assign those states in this causal scenario. These results can be generalized to the case of a longer sequence of measurements with the outcomes distributed arbitrarily among a number of parties, which covers the most general case considered by Jacobs.

To summarize, our results can be applied to Jacobs’ scenario and we recover Jacobs’ result that the BFM criterion is a necessary requirement. Furthermore, we have improved upon Jacobs’ analysis in two ways. Firstly, we have shown that the BFM compatibility criterion is not only a necessary condition for compatibility in this scenario, but is *sufficient* as well. Secondly, our analysis demonstrates that, just as with the scenario of remote measurements, the BFM criterion can be justified in the scenario of sequential measurements by insisting that states should be updated by Bayesian conditioning within a general framework for quantum Bayesian inference.

3. Caves, Fuchs and Schack

In contrast to BFM and Jacobs, CFS [29] discuss the problem of quantum state compatibility from an explicitly subjective Bayesian point of view. They argue that there cannot be a unilateral requirement to impose compatibility criteria of any sort on subjective Bayesian degrees of belief because there is no unique prior quantum state that an agent ought to assign in light of a given collection of data. The only necessary constraint is that states should satisfy the axioms of quantum theory, i.e. they should be normalized density operators. In particular, it should not be viewed as irrational for two agents to assign distinct, or even orthogonal, pure states to a quantum system.

Whilst we agree with this argument, we think that there is still a role for compatibility criteria within the subjective approach. They can be viewed as a check to see whether it is worthwhile for the agents to engage in a particular inference procedure, and this is conceptually distinct from viewing them as unilateral requirements that must be imposed upon all state assignments. In the case of BFM compatibility, the criterion of intersecting supports is simply a check that agents can apply to see if it is worth their while to try and resolve their differences empirically by collecting more data, or whether their disagreement is so extreme that resolving it requires one or more of the agents to make a wholesale revision of their beliefs. From this point of view, BFM plays the same role as the criterion of overlapping supports does in classical subjective Bayesian probability.

Despite their skepticism of compatibility criteria, CFS do attempt to recast the necessity part of the BFM argument in terms that would be more acceptable to the subjective Bayesian, i.e. they outline a series of requirements that a pair of subjective Bayesian agents may wish to adopt that would lead them to assign BFM compatible states. They do not provide an argument for sufficiency, so this is one way in which our argument is more complete. CFS’s argument is quite similar to the BFM necessity argument, except that it is phrased in terms that would be more acceptable to a subjective Bayesian. For example, they talk about the “firm beliefs” of agents rather than saying that systems are “found to be” in certain pure states. However, this line of argument is still open to an objection that we leveled against the BFM argument. In our view, compatibility criteria should be derived from the inference methodologies that are being used by the agents rather than from a list of reasonable sounding requirements. Another objection is that their argument relies on strong Dutch Book coherence, which is a strengthening of the usual Dutch Book coherence that subjective Bayesians use to derive the structure of classical probability theory. Strong coherence entails that if an agent assigns probability one to an event then she must be certain that it will occur. This is obviously problematic in the case of infinite sample spaces due to the presence of sets of measure zero and, since there is nothing in the Dutch Book argument that singles out finite sample spaces, it would not usually be accepted by subjective Bayesians in that case either.

Since CFS do not believe that the BFM criterion is a uniquely compelling requirement, they also introduce a number of weaker compatibility criteria based on the compatibility of the probability distributions obtained by making different types of measurement on the system. Three of these compatibility criteria are equivalent to the usual intersecting support criterion in the classical case, but they become inequivalent when applied to quantum theory. Presumably, this is supposed to cast doubt upon the uniqueness of BFM as a compelling compatibility criterion in the quantum case. However, in our view, the non-BFM criteria in the CFS hierarchy are not meaningful as compatibility criteria. To explain why, we take their weakest criterion — W' compatibility — as an example.

The W' criterion says that two quantum states are compatible if there exists a measurement for which the Born rule outcome probability distributions computed from the two states are compatible in the classical sense, i.e. they have intersecting support in the set of outcomes. It is fairly easy to see that this places no constraint at all on state assignments — such a measurement can always be found. For example, if Wanda and Theo assign two orthogonal pure states then a measurement in a complementary basis would always yield compatible probability distributions over the set of outcomes. CFS argue that Wanda and Theo could resolve their differences empirically by making such a measurement in this scenario.

After the measurement, if both Wanda and Theo learn the outcome and apply the projection postulate, then they would end up assigning the same state to the system, specifically, the state in the complementary basis corresponding to the outcome that was observed.

However, in our view, this does not resolve the original conflict between Wanda and Theo. Although Wanda and Theo’s state assignments to the region *after* the measurement (its quantum output) are now identical, their state assignments to the region *before* the measurement (its quantum input) remain unchanged. As stated in §III A, and explained in more detail in [1], the state of the region before the measurement updates via quantum Bayesian conditioning rather than by the projection postulate. Pure states are fixed points of quantum Bayesian conditioning, so Wanda and Theo will always continue to disagree about the state of this region, whatever information they later acquire about the region.

The mistake that CFS have made is to think of compatibility in terms of persistent systems rather than spatio-temporal regions, and to think of the projection postulate as a quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. It is easy to make this mistake because in a classical theory of Bayesian inference, a measurement can be non-disturbing. In this case, the value of the variable Y being measured is not changed by the measurement, and the update rule for the probability distribution of Y can be understood as conditioning Y on the outcome of the measurement. The variable describing the system before the measurement is the same as the one describing it after, so that updating your beliefs about one is the same as updating your beliefs about the other. But this is no longer true for classical measurements that *disturb* the system, and as argued in [1], all nontrivial quantum measurements are analogous to these. Therefore, to highlight the problem with the W' compatibility criterion, we consider what it would predict in the case of a disturbing classical measurement.

Suppose the system is a coin that has just been flipped, but is currently hidden from Wanda and Theo. If Wanda believes that the coin has definitely landed heads and Theo believes that it has definitely landed tails, then their beliefs are certainly incompatible. If the coin is then flipped again and Wanda and Theo are shown the outcome of the second toss, they will agree on the current state of the coin, and hence their state assignments to the system after the observation are now compatible. However, because the configuration of the coin was disturbed in the process of measurement, there is no sense in which their disagreement about the outcome of the first coin flip has been resolved. Similarly, we believe that because nontrivial quantum measurements always entail a disturbance (in the sense described in [1]), coming to agreement about the state of the region after the measurement does not resolve a disagreement about the state of the region before the measurement.

Despite our reservations about the CFS compatibility criteria, they are still of some independent interest. In

particular, one of them (the PP criterion) was recently used in a quite different context as part of a no-go theorem for certain types of hidden variable models for quantum theory [46].

V. INTERMEZZO: CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SUFFICIENCY

Having dealt with state compatibility, our next task is to develop a Bayesian approach to combining state assignments. In order to do this, two additional concepts are needed: conditional independence and sufficient statistics, which are reviewed in this section. Quantum conditional independence has been studied in [40], from which we quote results without proof.

A. Conditional independence

1. Classical conditional independence

A pair of random variables R and S are conditionally independent given another random variable T if they satisfy any of the following equivalent conditions:

$$\mathbf{CI1:} \quad P(S|R, T) = P(S|T)$$

$$\mathbf{CI2:} \quad P(R|S, T) = P(R|T)$$

$$\mathbf{CI3:} \quad I(R : S|T) = 0$$

$$\mathbf{CI4:} \quad P(R, S|T) = P(R|T)P(S|T),$$

where it is left implicit that these equations only have to hold for those values of the variables for which the conditionals are well-defined. Here, $I(R : S|T)$ is the conditional mutual information of R and S given T , defined by

$$I(R : S|T) = H(R, T) + H(S, T) - H(T) - H(R, S, T), \quad (50)$$

where $H(R) = -\sum_r P(R = r) \log_2 P(R = r)$ is the Shannon entropy of R , with the obvious generalization to multiple variables. Note that the conditional mutual information is always positive.

Conditional independence of R and S given T means that any correlations between R and S are mediated, or screened-off, by T . In other words, if one were to learn the value of T then R and S would become independent.

2. Quantum conditional independence for acausally related regions

In the quantum case, the three random variables R , S and T become quantum regions with Hilbert spaces \mathcal{H}_A , \mathcal{H}_B and \mathcal{H}_C . We specialize to the case of three acausally

related regions because the theory of conditional independence has not yet been developed for other causal scenarios. Prior to the introduction of conditional states, it was not obvious whether the conditional independence conditions **CI1**, **CI2** and **CI4** had quantum analogs, but **CI3** has a straightforward generalization where $I(A : B|C)$ is now the quantum conditional mutual information defined as

$$I(A : B|C) = S(A, C) + S(B, C) - S(C) - S(A, B, C), \quad (51)$$

where $S(A) = -\text{Tr}_A(\rho_A \log \rho_A)$ is the von Neumann entropy of the state on A . The quantum conditional mutual information satisfies $I(A : B|C) \geq 0$, which is equivalent to the strong sub-additivity inequality [47], and so the quantum conditional independence condition $I(A : B|C) = 0$ is the equality condition for strong sub-additivity.

In the conditional states formalism, there are direct analogs of the conditions **CI1** and **CI2** that provide an alternative characterization of quantum conditional independence.

Theorem V.1. *For three acausally related regions, A , B and C , the following conditions are equivalent:*

$$\mathbf{QCI1:} \quad \rho_{A|BC} = \rho_{A|C}$$

$$\mathbf{QCI2:} \quad \rho_{B|AC} = \rho_{B|C}$$

$$\mathbf{QCI3:} \quad I(A : B|C) = 0$$

Due to these equivalences, any of **QCI1–QCI3** can be viewed as the definition of quantum conditional independence.

It is also true that

Theorem V.2. *If A is conditionally independent of B given C , then*

$$\mathbf{QCI4:} \quad \rho_{AB|C} = \rho_{A|C} \rho_{B|C}.$$

Because $\rho_{AB|C}$ is self-adjoint, theorem V.2 implies that $\rho_{A|C}$ and $\rho_{B|C}$ must commute when A and B are conditionally independent given C . Unlike in the classical case, the converse of theorem V.2 does not hold, i.e. $\rho_{AB|C} = \rho_{A|C} \rho_{B|C}$ does not imply conditional independence. Extra constraints on the form of ρ_C can be imposed to yield equivalence, but these are not important for present purposes (see [40] for details).

3. Hybrid conditional independence

The case that is most relevant to the present work is when two classical random variables X_1 and X_2 are conditionally independent given a quantum region B . The proofs of theorems V.1 and V.2 only depend on the existence of a joint state (positive, normalized, density operator) for the three regions under consideration. Therefore,

if we specialize to causal scenarios in which a joint state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ can be assigned, as discussed in §III B, then the definitions **QCI1–QCI3** can now be applied in any of these causal scenarios by substituting X_1 for A , X_2 for B and B for C . The consequence **QCI4** also applies to this case.

B. Sufficient statistics

The idea of a sufficient statistic can be motivated by a typical example problem in statistics: estimating the bias of a coin from a sequence of coin flips that are judged to be independent and identically distributed. In this problem, only the relative frequency of occurrence of heads and tails in the sequence is relevant to the bias, whilst the exact ordering of heads and tails is irrelevant. The relative frequency is then an example of a sufficient statistic for the sequence with respect to the bias. In this section, this notion is generalized to the hybrid case wherein the classical parameter to be estimated is replaced by a quantum region, but the data is still classical, i.e. this section concerns sufficient statistics for classical data with respect to a quantum region. Note that quantum sufficient statistics have been considered before in the literature [41–43], but these works are somewhat orthogonal to the present treatment because they concern sufficiency of a quantum system with respect to classical measurement data [42, 43], or the sufficiency of measurement data with respect to preparation data [41].

1. Classical sufficient statistics

Suppose a parameter, represented by a random variable Y , is to be estimated from data, represented by a random variable X .

Definition V.3. A *sufficient statistic* for X with respect to Y is a function t of the values of X such that the random variable $t(X)$ satisfies

$$P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) = P(Y|X = x), \quad (52)$$

for all x such that $P(X = x) \neq 0$.

A sufficient statistic for X is a way of processing X such that the result is just as informative about Y as X is. In other words, learning the value of the processed variable $t(X)$ allows an agent to make all the same inferences about Y that they could have made by learning the value of X itself. Such processings are coarse-grainings of the values of X , which discard information about X , but only information that is not relevant for making inferences about Y .

Since $t(X)$ is just a function of X , it is immediate that Y is conditionally independent of $t(X)$ given X , i.e.

$$P(Y|X, t(X)) = P(Y|X), \quad (53)$$

This follows from the fact that we can write the joint distribution as $P(Y, X, t(X)) = P(t(X)|X)P(Y|X)$ (where $P(t(X) = a|X = x) = \delta_{a,t(x)}$). Moreover, the sufficiency condition, eq. (52), implies that it is also true that Y is conditionally independent of X given $t(X)$, i.e.

$$P(Y|X, t(X)) = P(Y|t(X)). \quad (54)$$

This is a consequence of the fact that the joint distribution can also be written as $P(Y, X, t(X)) = P(t(X)|X)P(Y|t(X))P(X)$, where we have used eq. (52).

Definition V.4. A *minimal* sufficient statistic for X with respect to Y is a sufficient statistic that can be written as a function of any other sufficient statistic for X with respect to Y .

A minimal sufficient statistic for X with respect to Y contains only that information about X that is relevant for making inferences about Y . Clearly, a sufficient statistic t is minimal iff

$$t(x) = t(x') \Leftrightarrow P(Y|X = x) = P(Y|X = x'). \quad (55)$$

The following lemma is used repeatedly in our discussion of combining quantum states.

Lemma V.5. Let $P(X, Y)$ be a probability distribution over two random variables and let $t(x) = P(Y|X = x)$, i.e. t is a statistic for X that takes functions of Y for its values. Then, t is a minimal sufficient statistic for X with respect to Y and

$$P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) = t(x). \quad (56)$$

Proof. Clearly t satisfies eq. (55) because $t(x)$ is equal to $P(Y|X = x)$ in this case. It is therefore minimally sufficient. By the conditional version of belief propagation

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) &= \\ \sum_{x'} P(Y|X = x', t(X) = t(x))P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x)). \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

Since t is a sufficient statistic, A is conditionally independent of $t(X)$ given X , so this reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) &= \\ \sum_{x'} P(Y|X = x')P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x)). \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

The term $P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x))$ is only nonzero for those values x' such that $t(x') = t(x)$ and all such values satisfy $P(Y|X = x') = P(Y|X = x)$. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) &= \\ P(Y|X = x) \sum_{\{x'|t(x')=t(x)\}} P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x)). \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

However, $\sum_{\{x'|t(x')=t(x)\}} P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x)) = \sum_{x'} P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x)) = 1$, since $P(X = x'|t(X) = t(x))$ is zero when $t(x') \neq t(x)$ and it is a conditional probability distribution. Hence,

$$P(Y|t(X) = t(x)) = P(Y|X = x) \quad (60)$$

$$= t(x). \quad (61)$$

□

Eq. (56) looks superficially similar to Lewis' Principal Principle [48], which states that when you know that the objective chance of an event takes a particular value then you should assign that value as your subjective probability for that event. However, eq. (56) is not a statement about objective chances. Its interpretation is entirely in terms of subjective probabilities. Suppose $P(X, Y)$ is your subjective probability distribution for X and Y and you announce this to me. I then go and observe X , finding that it has the value x . If I then tell you that the subjective probability distribution that you would assign to Y if you knew the value of X that I have observed is $Q(Y)$, and you believe that I am being honest, i.e. that I have computed $Q(Y) = P(Y|X = x)$ from your subjective probability distribution and this is what I am reporting back to you, then you have learned that $t(X) = Q$ and eq. (56) says that your posterior probability distribution for Y should now be $Q(Y)$.

2. Hybrid sufficient statistics

Recall that if XB is a hybrid region then conditional density operators $\rho_{B|X}$ are of the form

$$\rho_{B|X} = \sum_x |x\rangle \langle x|_X \otimes \rho_{B|X=x}, \quad (62)$$

where the operators $\rho_{B|X=x}$ are normalized density operators on \mathcal{H}_B . As in the classical case, the idea of sufficiency is to find a statistic for X with fewer values than X that still allows the conditional density operator to be reconstructed. In order to do this, it is only necessary to know which density operator $\rho_{B|X=x}$ a value of X corresponds to, and there may be fewer distinct density operators than values of X . This motivates the following definition.

Definition V.6. A *sufficient statistic* for X with respect to the quantum region B is a function t of the values of X such that the random variable $t(X)$ satisfies

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = \rho_{B|X=x}, \quad (63)$$

for all x such that $\rho_{X=x} \neq 0$.

This definition captures the notion that learning the value of the processed variable $t(X)$ allows an agent to make all the same inferences about the quantum region

B that they could have made by learning the value of X itself.

Since $t(X)$ is just a classical processing of X (specifically, $\rho_{t(X)=a|X=x} = \delta_{a,t(x)}$), we can introduce a joint state on the composite system $BXt(X)$ as discussed in §III B via

$$\rho_{BXt(X)} = \rho_{t(X)|X} \rho_{BX}, \quad (64)$$

As one can easily verify, this state satisfies the analogous conditional independence relations to those that hold in the classical case. Specifically, B and $t(X)$ are conditionally independent given X ,

$$\rho_{B|Xt(X)} = \rho_{B|X}, \quad (65)$$

and because $t(X)$ is a sufficient statistic for X with respect to B , it is also the case that B and X are conditionally independent given $t(X)$,

$$\rho_{B|Xt(X)} = \rho_{B|t(X)}, \quad (66)$$

as can be seen by noting that the joint state can also be written as $\rho_{BXt(X)} = \rho_{t(X)|X} \rho_{B|t(X)} \rho_X$ if one makes use of eq. (63).

Definition V.7. A *minimal sufficient statistic* for X with respect to a quantum region B is a sufficient statistic that can be written as a function of any other sufficient statistic for X with respect to a quantum region B .

It follows that minimal sufficiency is equivalent to

$$t(x) = t(x') \Leftrightarrow \rho_{B|X=x} = \rho_{B|X=x'}. \quad (67)$$

We will also need an analog of lemma V.5.

Lemma V.8. Let ρ_{XB} be the state of a hybrid region XB and let $t(x) = \rho_{B|X=x}$, i.e. t is a statistic for X that takes quantum states on B for its values. Then, t is a minimal sufficient statistic for X with respect to B and

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = t(x). \quad (68)$$

Proof. The statistic t satisfies eq. (67) because $t(x)$ is equal to $\rho_{B|X=x}$. It is therefore minimally sufficient. By the conditional version of belief propagation

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = \text{Tr}_X (\rho_{B|Xt(X)=x} \rho_{X|t(X)=t(x)}). \quad (69)$$

Since t is a sufficient statistic, B is conditionally independent of $t(X)$ given X , so this reduces to

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = \text{Tr}_X (\rho_{B|X} \rho_{X|t(X)=t(x)}). \quad (70)$$

However, $\rho_{X=x'|t(X)=t(x)}$ is only nonzero for those values x' such that $t(x') = t(x)$ and all such values satisfy $\rho_{B|X=x'} = \rho_{B|X=x}$. Therefore,

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = \rho_{B|X=x} \sum_{\{x'|t(x')=t(x)\}} \rho_{X=x'|t(X)=t(x)}. \quad (71)$$

However, $\sum_{\{x'|t(x')=t(x)\}} \rho_{X=x'|t(X)=t(x)} = \text{Tr}_X (\rho_{X|t(X)=t(x)}) = 1$, since $\rho_{X=x'|t(X)=t(x)}$ is zero when $t(x') \neq t(x)$ and $\rho_{X|t(X)}$ is a conditional state. Hence,

$$\rho_{B|t(X)=t(x)} = \rho_{B|X=x} \quad (72)$$

$$= t(x). \quad (73)$$

□

VI. QUANTUM STATE IMPROVEMENT

State improvement is the task of updating your state assignment in the light of learning another agent's state assignment. It is the simplest example of a procedure for combining different states. We adopt the approach of treating the other agent's state assignment as data and conditioning on it. In the classical case, this idea is usually attributed to Morris [49].

A. General methodology for state improvement

Classically, suppose a decision maker, Debbie, assigns a prior state $P_0(Y)$ to the variable of interest, Y . Debbie may have little or no specialist knowledge about Y , in which case her prior would be something like a uniform distribution. In order to improve the quality of her decision, she consults an expert, Wanda, who reports her opinion in the form of a state $Q_1(Y)$. Assuming that Debbie does not have the expertise to assess the data and arguments by which Wanda arrived at her state assignment, the summary $Q_1(Y)$ is all she has to go on.

In order to improve her state assignment by Bayesian conditioning, Debbie has to treat Wanda's state assignment as data. This means that she has to construct a likelihood function $P_0(R|Y)$, where R is a random variable that ranges over all the possible state assignments that Wanda might report. Since R ranges over a space of functions, there may be technical difficulties in defining a sample space for it, but in practice R can usually be confined to well parameterized families of states, e.g. Gaussian states or a finite set of choices. In assigning her likelihood function, Debbie has to take into account factors such as Wanda's trustworthiness, her accuracy in making previous predictions, and so forth. Assuming that Debbie can do this, she can then update her prior state via Bayes' theorem to obtain

$$P_0(Y|R = Q_1) = \frac{P_0(R = Q_1|Y)P_0(Y)}{P_0(R = Q_1)}. \quad (74)$$

where $P_0(R = Q_1) = \sum_Y P_0(R = Q_1|Y)P_0(Y)$.

Turning to the quantum case, the situation is precisely the same except that we are now dealing with hybrid regions and the quantum Bayes' theorem. Specifically, Debbie is now interested in a quantum region B , to which

she assigns a prior state $\rho_B^{(0)}$, and Wanda announces her expert state assignment $\sigma_B^{(1)}$. Debbie treats Wanda's announcement as data and constructs a classical random variable R that takes Wanda's possible state assignments as values. Constructing a sample space for all possible states is again technically subtle, but in practice attention can be restricted to well-parameterized families. Debbie's likelihood is now a hybrid conditional state $\rho_{R|B}^{(0)}$ and she updates her prior state assignment via the hybrid Bayes' theorem to give

$$\rho_{B|R=\sigma_B^{(1)}}^{(0)} = \rho_{R=\sigma_B^{(1)}|B}^{(0)} \star \left(\rho_B^{(0)} \left[\rho_{R=\sigma_B^{(1)}}^{(0)} \right]^{-1} \right). \quad (75)$$

where $\rho_{R=\sigma_B^{(1)}}^{(0)} = \text{Tr}_B \left(\rho_{R=\sigma_B^{(1)}|B}^{(0)} \rho_B^{(0)} \right)$.

Note that the same methodology can be applied when Debbie consults more than one expert: Wanda, Theo, etc. Debbie simply has to construct a likelihood function $P(R_1, R_2, \dots | Y)$ in the classical case or a likelihood operator $\rho_{R_1 R_2, \dots | B}$ in the quantum case, where R_1 represents Wanda's state assignment, R_2 represents Theo's state assignment, etc. She then applies the appropriate version of Bayes' theorem to condition on the state assignments that the experts announce. This procedure is used in our approach to the pooling problem, discussed in §VII.

B. The case of shared priors

Eqs. (74) and (75) are the general rules that Debbie should use to improve her state assignment, but in practice it can be difficult to determine the likelihoods for R needed to apply them. However, the rules can simplify drastically in some situations. In particular, if Debbie and Wanda started with a shared prior for Y or B , Wanda's state differs from Debbie's due to having collected more data, and Debbie is willing to trust Wanda's data analysis, then the rules imply that Debbie should just adopt Wanda's state assignment wholesale.

Note that, in both the objective and subjective approaches, starting out with shared priors is an idealization. In the objective approach this is because it is unlikely that Debbie and Wanda have exactly the same knowledge about the region of interest, and in the subjective approach this is because their prior beliefs might simply be different. Nevertheless, in the objective approach we can always imagine a (possibly hypothetical) time in the past at which Debbie and Wanda had exactly the same knowledge and, provided Debbie's knowledge is a subset of Wanda's current knowledge, the result still follows. This argument does not apply in the subjective case, but there are still circumstances in which the ideal of shared priors is a good approximation.

Consider first the classical case. Debbie and Wanda share a prior state assignment $P_0(Y) = P_1(Y) = P(Y)$

for the variable of interest. Wanda then obtains some extra data in the form of the value x of some random variable X that is correlated with Y . Before learning the value of X , Wanda adopts a likelihood model for it, given by conditional probabilities $P(X|Y)$, and we assume that Debbie agrees with this likelihood model. Upon acquiring the value x of X , Wanda updates her probabilities to $Q_1(Y) = P(Y|X = x)$, which can be computed from Bayes' theorem, and then she reports $Q_1(Y)$ to Debbie. In other words, Debbie learns that $R = Q_1$ and she must condition on this data to obtain her improved state assignment $P(Y|R = Q_1)$.

Proposition VI.1. *If Debbie and Wanda share a prior state assignment $P(Y)$ and likelihood model $P(X|Y)$ for the data collected by Wanda, then Debbie's improved state is $P(Y|R = Q_1) = Q_1(Y)$, where $Q_1(Y)$ is Wanda's updated state assignment.*

Proof. Because Debbie and Wanda have a shared prior and likelihood assignment, the variable R is simply $R(x) = P(Y|X = x)$, where $P(Y|X = x)$ is the probability distribution that Debbie would assign if she knew the value of X . Lemma V.5 then implies that $P(Y|R = Q_1) = Q_1$. \square

Note that Aumann [50] has argued that there is a unique posterior that objective Bayesians ought to assign when their state assignments are common knowledge. The above theorem is a special case of this in which the unique state can be easily computed.

In the quantum case, the argument proceeds in precise analogy. Debbie and Wanda start with a shared prior state ρ_B for region B . Wanda announces her state assignment $\sigma_B^{(1)}$, which can be represented as the result of conditioning B on the value x of a random variable X , i.e. $\sigma_B^{(1)} = \rho_{B|X=x}$. We assume that Debbie and Wanda agree upon the likelihood operator $\rho_{X|B}$ for X . Debbie then has to compute her improved state $\rho_{B|R=\sigma_B^{(1)}}$.

Proposition VI.2. *If Debbie and Wanda share a prior state assignment ρ_B and likelihood operator $\rho_{X|B}$ for the data collected by Wanda, then Debbie's improved state is $\rho_{B|R=\sigma_B^{(1)}} = \sigma_B^{(1)}$, where $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ is Wanda's updated state assignment.*

The proof is just the obvious generalization of the proof of theorem VI.1, making use of lemma V.8 instead of lemma V.5.

C. Discussion

Although our results show that state improvement is trivial in the case of shared priors, eqs. (74) and (75) are still applicable when Debbie and Wanda do not share prior states and, in that case, they give nontrivial results. The analysis of such cases is a lot more involved, so we do not consider any examples here.

In the classical case, the general methodology leading to eq. (74) can be criticized. It is an onerous requirement for Debbie to be able to articulate a likelihood for all possible state assignments that Wanda might make. This criticism is mitigated by the shared priors result, which shows that, at least in this case, the likelihood model need not be specified in detail. Such simplifications might also occur in other models that do not depend on shared priors. In any case, this criticism is not particularly unique to state improvement, since it can be leveled at Bayesian methodology in general. It is always a heavy requirement for an agent to specify a full probability distribution over all the variables of interest. For this reason, alternative Bayesian theories have been developed with less onerous requirements, such as the requirement to specify expectation values rather than full probability distributions [19, 20, 51].

A criticism that is more specific to state improvement is that the beliefs that Debbie uses to determine $P_0(Y)$ might be correlated with the beliefs that she uses to determine the likelihood $P_0(R|Y)$, e.g. Debbie might be biased towards believing that Wanda will report states that are concentrated on values of Y that Debbie herself believes are likely. A generalization that takes these correlations into account has been proposed [52].

Every criticism leveled against the classical methodology also applies to the quantum case and, no doubt, the proposed classical generalizations could be raised to the quantum level by applying the methods outlined in this paper. This is not done here because it is not our goal to say the final word on quantum state improvement, but only to point out that there is no need to reinvent the wheel when studying the quantum case because classical methods can be easily adapted using the formalism of conditional states.

Finally, note that quantum state improvement has previously been considered by Herbut [34], who adopted an ad hoc procedure based on closeness of Debbie and Wanda's states with respect to Hilbert-Schmidt distance. It would be interesting to see if Herbut's rule can be derived using Bayesian methodology under a set of reasonable assumptions that Debbie could make about how Wanda arrived at her state assignment.

VII. QUANTUM STATE POOLING

The problem of state pooling concerns what happens when agents who each have their own state assignments want to make decisions as a group. To do so, they need to come up with a state assignment that accurately reflects the views of the group as a whole.

In an ideal world, the agents would first reconcile their differences empirically so that everyone agrees on a common state assignment. The discussion of subjective Bayesian compatibility shows that it is possible for this to happen if their states satisfy the BFM compatibility criterion. Furthermore, as a consequence of the classical

and quantum de Finetti theorems [18, 20, 53, 54], if the agents can construct an exchangeable sequence of experiments then their states can be expected to converge in the long run by application of Bayesian conditioning. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to collect more data before a decision has to be made and, for the subjective Bayesian, there is also the question of how to combine sharply contradictory beliefs that do not satisfy compatibility criteria in the first place.

The goal of this section is to provide a general methodology for quantum pooling based on applying the principles of quantum Bayesian inference, similar to the approach to state improvement developed in §VI. In the case of shared priors, we also derive a specific pooling rule from this methodology that was previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman [10]. However, before embarking upon this discussion, it is useful to take a step back and look at the basic requirements for pooling and some of the specific pooling rules that have been proposed in the classical case.

A. Review of pooling rules

One reasonable requirement for a pooling rule is that the pooled state should be compatible with each agent's individual state assignment. If this is so then each agent is assured that it is possible for them to be vindicated by future observations. This is because subjective Bayesian compatibility guarantees that, for each agent, it is possible that data could be collected that would cause the pooled state and the agent's individual state to become identical upon Bayesian conditioning.

Consider the classical case where n agents assign states $Q_1(Y), Q_2(Y), \dots, Q_n(Y)$ to a random variable Y . A *linear opinion pool* is a rule where the pooled state Q_{lin} is of the form

$$Q_{\text{lin}}(Y) = \sum_{j=1}^n w_j Q_j(Y), \quad (76)$$

where $0 < w_j < 1$ and $\sum_{j=1}^n w_j = 1$. The weight w_j can be thought of as a measure of the amount of trust that the group assigns to the j th agent. The state $Q_{\text{lin}}(Y)$ is BFM compatible with every $Q_j(Y)$ because eq. (76) is an ensemble decomposition of $Q_{\text{lin}}(Y)$ in which each agent's state appears. A linear opinion pool is typically less sharply peaked than the individual agents' assignments. In particular its entropy cannot be lower than that of the lowest entropy individual state. It may be appropriate to use it as a diplomatic solution. Indeed, this sort of pooling rule may be applied even if the agents' state assignments are not pairwise compatible.

Linear opinion pools can be straightforwardly generalized to the quantum case. Specifically, if n agents assign states $\sigma_B^{(1)}, \sigma_B^{(2)}, \dots, \sigma_B^{(n)}$ to a quantum region B , then a quantum linear opinion pool is a rule where the pooled

state $\sigma_B^{(\text{lin})}$ is of the form

$$\sigma_B^{(\text{lin})} = \sum_{j=1}^n w_j \sigma_B^{(j)}, \quad (77)$$

where $0 < w_j < 1$ and $\sum_{j=1}^n w_j = 1$. Similar remarks apply to this as to the classical case.

Classically a *multiplicative opinion pool*⁷ is a rule whereby the pooled state is of the form

$$Q_{\text{mult}}(Y) = c \prod_{j=1}^n Q_j(Y)^{w_j}, \quad (78)$$

where c is a normalization constant,

$$c = \frac{1}{\sum_Y \prod_{j=1}^n Q_j(Y)^{w_j}}. \quad (79)$$

Multiplicative pools typically result in a pooled state that is more sharply peaked than any of the individual agent's states. Normalizability implies that multiplicative pools can only be applied to states that are jointly compatible, meaning that there is at least one value y of Y such that $Q_j(Y = y) > 0$ for all j . Any such value has nonzero weight in $Q_{\text{mult}}(Y)$, which guarantees that $Q_{\text{mult}}(Y)$ is compatible with every agent's individual assignment. As shown below, a multiplicative pool may be appropriate in an objective Bayesian framework where all the agents start with a shared uniform prior and the differences in their state assignments result from having collected different data.

In order to account for the case where the shared prior is not uniform, the multiplicative pool has to be generalized to

$$Q_{\text{gmult}}(Y) = c \prod_{j=0}^n Q_j(Y)^{w_j}, \quad (80)$$

where the extra state $Q_0(Y)$ represents the shared prior information.

Unlike with linear pools, it is not immediately obvious how to generalize multiplicative pools to the quantum case because the product of states in eq. (80) does not have a unique generalization due to non-commutativity.

B. General methodology for state pooling

As with the other problems tackled in this paper, pooling rules should be derived in a principled way from

⁷ The usual terminology for this is a *logarithmic* opinion pool, since it corresponds to a linear rule for combining the logarithms of states. However, we prefer the term multiplicative because log-linearity no longer holds in the quantum generalization.

the rules of Bayesian inference, rather than simply being posited. One way to do this is to adopt the *supra-Bayesian* approach. This works by requiring the group of agents to put themselves in the shoes of Debbie the decision maker who we met in the state improvement section. Specifically, in the classical case, acting together, they are asked to come up with a likelihood function $P_0(R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n|Y)$ that they think a neutral decision maker (Debbie the supra-Bayesian) would assign, where R_j is a random variable that ranges over all possible state assignments that the j th agent might make; and a prior $P_0(Y)$, which can often just be taken to be the uniform distribution or a shared prior that the agents may have agreed upon at some point in the past before their opinions diverged. They can then update $P_0(Y)$ to $P_0(Y|R_1 = Q_1, R_2 = Q_2, \dots, R_n = Q_n)$ via Bayesian conditioning and use this as the pooled state $Q_{\text{supra}}(Y)$. Pooling then becomes just an application of the state improvement method discussed in the previous section. In the quantum case, the equivalent ingredients are a hybrid likelihood $\rho_{R_1 R_2 \dots R_n|B}^{(0)}$ and a prior quantum state $\rho_B^{(0)}$, and then the pooled state is $\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = \rho_{B|R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}, R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}, \dots, R_n=\sigma_B^{(n)}}^{(0)}$, which can be computed from quantum Bayesian conditioning.

Admittedly, it might be a pretty tall order to expect the agents to be able to act together as a fictional supra-Bayesian Debbie, but this method does allow conditions under which the different pooling rules should be used to be derived rigorously, which in turn gives insight into when they might be useful as rules-of-thumb more generally. It also has the advantage that it allows quantum generalizations to be derived unambiguously, since the necessary tools of quantum Bayesian inference have been developed in [1] and the preceding sections. In particular, it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the correct quantum generalization of the multiplicative opinion pool.

To illustrate this, we show that, in the case of shared priors, the supra-Bayesian approach can be used to motivate the two-agent case of the quantum generalized multiplicative pool with $w_0 = -1, w_1 = 1, w_2 = 1$.

C. The case of shared priors

For simplicity, we specialize to the case of a group of two agents, Wanda and Theo. First consider the classical case where Wanda and Theo have individual state assignments $Q_1(Y)$ and $Q_2(Y)$. We assume that Wanda and Theo started from a shared prior $P(Y)$, which can be used as Debbie's prior $P_0(Y) = P(Y)$ in the supra-Bayesian approach, and that the current differences in Wanda and Theo's state assignments are due to having collected different data. The additional data available to Wanda and Theo are modeled as values x_1 and x_2 of random variables X_1 and X_2 respectively. Before learning the values of X_1 and X_2 , Wanda and Theo assigned likelihood functions $P(X_1|Y)$ and $P(X_2|Y)$,

which, when combined with the prior $P(Y)$, determine their current state assignments via Bayes' theorem, i.e. $Q_j(Y) = P(Y|X_j = x_j)$.

We assume that it is possible to assign a joint likelihood function $P(X_1, X_2|Y)$, such that $P(X_1|Y)$ and $P(X_2|Y)$ are obtained by marginalization. It is unrealistic to think that Wanda and Theo must specify this joint likelihood in detail. Fortunately, in order to obtain a generalized multiplicative pool, they need only agree on some of its broad features. In particular, if they agree that minimal sufficient statistics for X_1 and X_2 are conditionally independent given Y , then supra-Bayesian pooling gives rise to a generalized multiplicative pool.

Theorem VII.1. *If a minimal sufficient statistic for X_1 with respect to Y and a minimal sufficient statistic for X_2 with respect to Y are conditionally independent given Y , then the supra-Bayesian pooled state $Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = P_0(Y|R_1 = Q_1, R_2 = Q_2)$ is given by*

$$Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = c \frac{Q_1(Y)Q_2(Y)}{P(Y)}, \quad (81)$$

where c is a normalization factor, independent of Y .

Comparing this result with eq. (80) shows that this is a generalized multiplicative pool with $Q_0(Y) = P(Y)$, $w_0 = -1, w_1 = 1$ and $w_2 = 1$. In the special case of a uniform prior, this reduces to

$$Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = c' Q_1(Y)Q_2(Y), \quad (82)$$

where c' is a different normalization constant. This is a multiplicative pool with $w_1 = 1$ and $w_2 = 1$.

Proof of theorem VII.1. By definition, the supra-Bayesian pooled state is $Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = P(Y|R_1 = Q_1, R_2 = Q_2)$ and this can be computed from the prior $P(Y)$ and the likelihood $P(R_1, R_2|Y)$ via Bayes' theorem. Now, R_j can be thought of as a function-valued statistic for X_j via $R_j(x_j) = P(Y|X_j = x_j)$. It is a minimal sufficient statistic with respect to Y because $R_j(x_j) = R_j(x'_j)$ iff $P(Y|X_j = x_j) = P(Y|X_j = x'_j)$. By assumption, there exist minimal sufficient statistics for X_1 and for X_2 that are conditionally independent given Y . However, any minimal sufficient statistic is a bijective function of any other minimal sufficient statistic for the same variable, so if any pair of such statistics are conditionally independent then they all are. Therefore, R_1 and R_2 are conditionally independent given Y , and so by **CI4**:

$$P(R_1, R_2|Y) = P(R_1|Y)P(R_2|Y). \quad (83)$$

The terms $P(R_j|Y)$ can be inverted via Bayes' theorem to obtain $P(R_j|Y) = P(Y|R_j)P(R_j)/P(Y)$, which gives

$$P(R_1, R_2|Y) = P(R_1)P(R_2) \frac{P(Y|R_1)P(Y|R_2)}{P(Y)^2}. \quad (84)$$

Using Bayes' theorem again in the form $P(Y|R_1, R_2) = P(R_1, R_2|Y)P(Y)/P(R_1, R_2)$ gives

$$P(Y|R_1, R_2) = \frac{P(R_1)P(R_2)}{P(R_1, R_2)} \frac{P(Y|R_1)P(Y|R_2)}{P(Y)}, \quad (85)$$

which, upon substituting the announced values of R_1 and R_2 , gives

$$Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = \frac{P(R_1 = Q_1)P(R_2 = Q_2)}{P(R_1 = Q_1, R_2 = Q_2)} \times \frac{P(Y|R_1 = Q_1)P(Y|R_2 = Q_2)}{P(Y)}. \quad (86)$$

The term $c = [P(R_1 = Q_1)P(R_2 = Q_2)]/P(R_1 = Q_1, R_2 = Q_2)$ is independent of Y , so it can be determined from the normalization constraint $\sum_Y Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = 1$. Also, lemma V.5 implies $P(Y|R_j = Q_j) = Q_j(Y)$, so we have

$$Q_{\text{supra}}(Y) = c \frac{Q_1(Y)Q_2(Y)}{P(Y)}, \quad (87)$$

as required. \square

In the quantum case, Wanda and Theo have individual state assignments $\sigma_B^{(1)}$ and $\sigma_B^{(2)}$. Again, any differences in Wanda and Theo's state assignments are assumed to arise from having collected different data, before which they agreed upon a shared prior ρ_B , which can be used as Debbie's prior state $\rho_B^{(0)} = \rho_B$ in the supra-Bayesian approach.

Again, we assume that Wanda and Theo have observed values x_1 and x_2 of random variables X_1 and X_2 , with likelihood operators, $\rho_{X_1|B}$ and $\rho_{X_2|B}$. Wanda and Theo's states result from conditioning the shared prior on their data using these likelihoods. We assume that there is a joint likelihood $\rho_{X_1 X_2|B}$, of which Wanda and Theo's likelihoods are marginals. Wanda and Theo need not agree on the full details of this joint likelihood, only that minimal sufficient statistics for X_1 and X_2 satisfy **QCI4**, which is slightly weaker than conditional independence. We then have

Theorem VII.2. *If a minimal sufficient statistic t_1 for X_1 with respect to B and a minimal sufficient statistic t_2 for X_2 with respect to B satisfy*

$$\rho_{t_1(X_1)t_2(X_2)|B} = \rho_{t_1(X_1)|B}\rho_{t_2(X_2)|B}, \quad (88)$$

then the supra-Bayesian pooled state $\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = \sigma_{B|R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}, R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}^{(0)}$ is given by

$$\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = c\sigma_B^{(1)}\rho_B^{-1}\sigma_B^{(2)} \quad (89)$$

where c is a normalization factor, independent of B .

Eq. (89) is the quantum generalization of the generalised multiplicative pool with $w_0 = -1$, $w_1 = 1$, $w_2 = 1$. Despite appearances, this expression is symmetric under exchange of 1 and 2. This follows from the condition (88), which implies that $\rho_{t_1(X_1)|B}$ and $\rho_{t_2(X_2)|B}$ must commute. When ρ_B is a maximally mixed state, eq. (89) reduces to

$$\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = c'\sigma_B^{(1)}\sigma_B^{(2)}, \quad (90)$$

where c' is a different normalization constant. This is a quantum generalization of the multiplicative pool with $w_1 = 1$, $w_2 = 1$.

Although conditional independence of the minimal sufficient statistics was assumed in the classical case, eq. (88) is strictly weaker than conditional independence, as explained in §V A.

Proof of theorem VII.2. By definition, the supra-Bayesian pooled state is $\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = \rho_{B|R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}, R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}$ and this can be computed from the prior ρ_B and the likelihood $\rho_{R_1 R_2|B}$ via Bayes' theorem. Each R_j is an operator-valued statistic for X_j via $R_j(x_j) = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$. They are minimal sufficient statistics with respect to B because $R_j(x_j) = R_j(x'_j)$ iff $\rho_{B|X_j=x_j} = \rho_{B|X_j=x'_j}$. By assumption, there exist minimal sufficient statistics, t_1 and t_2 , for X_1 and X_2 that satisfy

$$\rho_{t_1(X_1)t_2(X_2)|B} = \rho_{t_1(X_1)|B}\rho_{t_2(X_2)|B}, \quad (91)$$

but since any minimal sufficient statistic is a bijective function of any other minimal sufficient statistic for the same variable, R_1 and R_2 must also satisfy

$$\rho_{R_1 R_2|B} = \rho_{R_1|B}\rho_{R_2|B}. \quad (92)$$

The terms $\rho_{R_j|B}$ can be inverted via Bayes' theorem to obtain $\rho_{R_j|B} = \rho_{B|R_j} \star (\rho_{R_j}\rho_B^{-1})$, which gives

$$\rho_{R_1 R_2|B} = [\rho_{B|R_1} \star (\rho_{R_1}\rho_B^{-1})] [\rho_{B|R_1} \star (\rho_{R_1}\rho_B^{-1})]. \quad (93)$$

Since R_1 and R_2 are classical, the operators ρ_{R_j} commute with everything else and so expanding the \star -products gives

$$\rho_{R_1 R_2|B} = \rho_{R_1}\rho_{R_2}\rho_B^{-\frac{1}{2}}\rho_{B|R_1}\rho_B^{-1}\rho_{B|R_2}\rho_B^{-\frac{1}{2}}. \quad (94)$$

Using Bayes' theorem again in the form $\rho_{B|R_1 R_2} = \rho_{R_1 R_2|B} \star (\rho_B\rho_{R_1 R_2}^{-1})$ and noting that $\rho_{R_1 R_2}$ commutes with everything else gives

$$\rho_{B|R_1 R_2} = \rho_{R_1}\rho_{R_2}\rho_{R_1 R_2}^{-1}(\rho_{B|R_1}\rho_B^{-1}\rho_{B|R_2}), \quad (95)$$

which, upon substituting the announced values of R_1 and R_2 , gives

$$\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = \frac{\rho_{R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}}\rho_{R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}}{\rho_{R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}, R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}} \times \rho_{B|R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}}\rho_B^{-1}\rho_{B|R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}, \quad (96)$$

The term $c = \left[\rho_{R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}} \rho_{R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}} \right] / \rho_{R_1=\sigma_B^{(1)}, R_2=\sigma_B^{(2)}}$ is independent of B , so it can be determined from the normalization constraint $\text{Tr}_B \left(\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} \right) = 1$. Also, lemma V.8 implies $\rho_{B|R_j=\sigma_B^{(j)}} = \sigma_B^{(j)}$, so we have

$$\sigma_B^{(\text{supra})} = c \sigma_B^{(1)} \rho_B^{-1} \sigma_B^{(2)}, \quad (97)$$

as we set out to prove. \square

D. Comparison to other approaches

Quantum state pooling has been discussed previously in [10, 25, 28, 38, 39]. Both [25] and [38] propose pooling methodologies that seem ad hoc from the Bayesian point of view, but, as with Herbut's approach to improvement, it would be interesting to see whether they could be justified in the supra-Bayesian approach.

Jacobs [28, 39] considers quantum state pooling in the case where Wanda and Theo arrive at their states by making direct measurements on the system of interest. In particular, he derives a generalization of the multiplicative rule that is distinct from the one we derive. From the perspective of the conditional states formalism, his rule is not a valid way of combining state assignments. The reason is that Jacobs takes collapse rules in quantum theory — such as the von Neumann-Lüders-von Neumann projection postulate or its generalization to POVMs — as quantum versions of Bayesian conditioning, but in the conditional states framework, such collapse rules are explicitly *not* instances of Bayesian conditioning, as argued in §III A and [1].

Spekkens and Wiseman [10] consider the case of pooling via remote measurements, wherein there is a shared prior state $\rho_{BA_1A_2}$ of a tripartite system and Wanda and Theo arrive at their differing state assignments for B by making POVM measurements on A_1 and A_2 respectively, as depicted in fig. 1b. They obtain the same generalized multiplicative pool that has been derived here, namely $c \sigma_B^{(1)} \rho_B^{-1} \sigma_B^{(2)}$, for two restricted classes of states $\rho_{BA_1A_2}$. Both of these classes are special cases of states for which A_1 and A_2 are conditionally independent given B . If $\rho_{BA_1A_2}$ satisfies this conditional independence then so does any hybrid state $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ obtained by measuring POVMs $\rho_{X_1|A_1}$ on system A_1 and $\rho_{X_2|A_2}$ on system A_2 . This is because the conditional mutual information cannot be increased by applying local CPT maps to A_1 and A_2 . The minimal sufficient statistics for X_1 and X_2 then also satisfy conditional independence because they are just local processings of X_1 and X_2 . Therefore, the assumptions of theorem VII.2 follow from this conditional independence. As such, the result of [10] is seen to be a special case of the one derived here.

What we have shown is that the Spekkens and Wiseman pooling rule holds under much weaker conditions than the conditional independence of A_1 and A_2 given B . For example, it also holds for states of the form

$\rho_{BA_1A_2} \otimes \rho_{A_1''A_2''}$, where $\mathcal{H}_{A_j} = \mathcal{H}_{A_j'} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{A_j''}$ and A_1' and A_2' are conditionally independent given B . For such states, A_1 and A_2 are not conditionally independent given B whenever $\rho_{A_1''A_2''}$ is a correlated state, but A_1'' and A_2'' contain no information about B , so they will not be correlated with the minimal sufficient statistics for X_1 and X_2 and consequently the minimal sufficient statistics *are* conditionally independent given B , which is sufficient to derive the result⁸. Of course, our results also significantly generalize those of [10] because theorem VII.2 applies to a broader set of causal scenarios than just the remote measurement scenario.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that both Jacobs [28, 39] and Spekkens and Wiseman [10] adopt a pooling methodology that is less widely applicable than the one used in the present work. In [10], for example, a fourth party called Oswald (the overseer) is introduced into the game, in addition to the two agents and the decision-maker (whom they call the pooler). Before any data is collected, everyone shares a prior ρ_B for the region of interest. In addition, Wanda, Theo and Oswald assign a shared prior $\rho_{BX_1X_2}$ including the data variables that Wanda and Theo are going to observe⁹. Oswald has access to both Wanda and Theo's data, i.e. he learns the values x_1 and x_2 that Wanda and Theo observe so he can update his state to the posterior $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2}$. It is then asserted that if Oswald's posterior can be determined from the data available to Debbie, then this is what she should assign as the pooled state. Since Debbie only knows Wanda and Theo's state assignments and the prior ρ_B , this is possible only if Oswald's posterior can be computed from these alone.

This methodology is less widely applicable than the one presented here because it does not specify what to do if Debbie cannot determine Oswald's posterior, whereas ours does. In fact, there are situations in which the multiplicative pooling rule is applicable even though Debbie cannot determine Oswald's posterior using the data that she has available. Therefore, even though the rule of adopting Oswald's posterior if it can be determined is indeed correct in the supra-Bayesian approach, requiring this is an unnecessary restriction and it is better to make do without Oswald.

It is useful to consider how such situations can arise. By learning $\rho_{B|X_1=x_1}$ and $\rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$, Debbie learns a minimal sufficient statistic for X_1 with respect to B and a minimal sufficient statistic for X_2 with respect to B and hence Debbie's posterior is $\rho_{B|R_1(X_1)=R_1(x_1), R_2(X_2)=R_2(x_2)}$, where the function $R_j(x_j) = \rho_{B|X_j=x_j}$ is the state-valued minimal suffi-

⁸ It would be interesting to fully classify the set of tripartite states $\rho_{BA_1A_2}$ for which the multiplicative pooling rule applies for all remote measurements.

⁹ Actually, only Oswald needs to know the full prior. Wanda and Theo can make do with knowing the reduced states ρ_{BX_1} and ρ_{BX_2} respectively.

cient statistic for X_j . This is identical to Oswald's posterior iff (R_1, R_2) happens to be a sufficient statistic for the pair (X_1, X_2) with respect to B , i.e. iff $\rho_{B|R_1(X_1)=R_1(x_1)R_2(X_2)=R_2(x_2)} = \rho_{B|X_1=x_1X_2=x_2}$. In general, this is not the case, since it is only guaranteed that R_1 and R_2 are locally sufficient for the individual data, i.e. $\rho_{B|R_1(X_1)=R_1(x_1)} = \rho_{B|X_1=x_1}$ and $\rho_{B|R_2(X_2)=R_2(x_2)} = \rho_{B|X_2=x_2}$, and not globally sufficient for the pair. However, Debbie only has enough data to reconstruct Oswald's posterior if they are in fact globally sufficient, that is, if $\rho_{B|R_1(X_1)=R_1(x_1),R_2(X_2)=R_2(x_2)} = \rho_{B|X_1=x_1,X_2=x_2}$.

Y	0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
X_1	0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
X_2	0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
$P(Y, X_1, X_2)$	$\frac{1}{4}$ 0 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ 0

TABLE III: A prior state for which Debbie cannot determine Oswald's prior, but for which the multiplicative pooling rule still holds

A classical example suffices to show that our pooling rule sometimes applies even in cases where Debbie cannot reconstruct Oswald's posterior. Suppose Y , X_1 and X_2 are classical bits and Oswald's prior is given by table III. With this assignment, the shared prior for Y is $P(Y = 0) = P(Y = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$. Learning the value of X_j on its own gives no further information about Y , i.e. $P(Y|X_j = x_j) = P(Y)$, independently of the value of X_j , so both Wanda and Theo simply report the uniform distribution back to Debbie. Any minimal sufficient statistic for X_j is trivial, consisting of just a single value, so the sufficient statistics for X_1 and X_2 are trivially conditionally independent and thus our derivation of the multiplicative pooling rule holds. Unsurprisingly, in this case it just says that Debbie should continue to assign the uniform distribution. On the other hand, knowing both the value of X_1 and the value of X_2 is enough to determine Y uniquely, so Oswald's posterior is a point measure and there is no way that Debbie could determine it from the data she has available. The reason why this happens is that all the information about Y is contained in the correlations between X_1 and X_2 , i.e. $P(Y = 0|X_1 = X_2) = 1$ and $P(Y = 0|X_1 \neq X_2) = 0$, and Oswald is the only agent who has access to this data.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have developed a Bayesian approach to quantum state compatibility, improvement and pooling, based on the principle that states should always be

updated by a quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning. This improves upon previous approaches, which were more ad hoc in nature. Due to our use of the conditional states formalism, our results apply to a much wider range of causal scenarios than previous approaches. Indeed, the ability of this formalism to unify the description of many distinct causal arrangements explains the otherwise puzzling fact that authors considering very different causal arrangements have found the same results. For instance, the compatibility criterion found by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin in the case of remote measurements [24] is identical to the one found by Jacobs in the case of sequential measurements [28].

This paper only represents the beginning of a Bayesian approach to these problems; there is a lot of scope for further work. For example, it would be interesting to determine when a quantum linear pooling rule can be derived from Bayesian principles, as it has been in the classical case [55], and whether the results of previous methodologies for quantum state improvement and pooling can be reconstructed from a Bayesian point of view. However, perhaps the most important lesson of this paper is that the conditional states formalism can vastly simplify the task of generalizing results from classical probability to the quantum domain. Definitions, theorems and proofs can often be ported almost mechanically from classical probability to quantum theory by making use of the appropriate analogies. Many aspects of quantum theory that might appear, by the lights of the conventional quantum formalism, to have no good classical analogue, are seen under the new formalism to be generalizations of very familiar features of Bayesian probability theory. As such, this new formalism helps us to focus our attention on those aspects of quantum theory that *truly* distinguish it from classical probability theory, such as violations of Bell inequalities, the impossibility of broadcasting, and monogamy constraints on correlations.

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